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This thesis investigates how economic ideas have shaped the evolution of sustainable 
finance between 1998 and 2018. Sustainable finance has become an ever more salient 
topic as financial institutions, governments and central banks have looked for ways to 
integrate sustainability concerns. The thesis develops a transmission mechanism that 
outlines how ideas from economic theories influence the frames that are adopted by 
policy actors. The transmission of ideas is investigated through network analysis, 
content analysis, interviews and participant observation.  
The thesis outlines four frames that actors utilise to conceptualise sustainable finance: 
(1) a socially responsible investment frame; (2) a risks and opportunities frame; (3) a 
climate finance frame; and (4) a critical frame. It finds that after an initial 
preoccupation with ethical questions, the most influential actors have framed 
sustainable finance in terms of risks and opportunities. The economic ideas that 
underpin most of these frames come from mainstream finance. Nonetheless, the recent 
emphasis on systemic risks has meant that actors like central banks have started to 
explore less orthodox ideas. With regards to transmission of frames to policy 
outcomes, the thesis finds that most of the debates have been about how to understand 
and implement a risks and opportunities approach. Importantly, the incorporation of 
economic ideas into the design of performative socio-technical instruments is a 
stronger transmission channel than the persuasion of policymakers.  
The findings in the thesis contribute to constructivist International Political Economy. 
First, the proposed transmission mechanism clarifies how economic ideas affect policy 
in a non-linear manner. Second, the study of a case of evolution contributes to the 
understanding of ideational dynamics in non-crisis times. The thesis also adds to the 
literature on environmental politics since understanding the thinking of actors and the 
functioning of instruments allows for assessments of how sustainable finance will 
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1. Introduction: A Paradigm Shift Without a Fight? 
 
Sustainable finance is not "second-best" finance (…) hopefully in five years' time we 
can drop the "sustainable" because it will have become already a normal way of 
looking at things. 
Jyrki Katainen, Vice-president of the Juncker Commission.1 
 
More than 10 years after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the financial sector could 
turn from villain to saviour. Instead of causing crises, finance is now presented as part 
of the solution to address environmental and social problems. This shift of focus is 
made evident by the above quote, which outlines that concerns about sustainability 
have become increasingly prominent in financial circles. Yet rather than taking the 
rhetoric of the shift at face value, the reorientation of finance towards sustainability 
warrants critical examination. Analysing the processes through which ‘normal 
finance’ is increasingly moving towards ‘sustainable finance’ can expand our 
understanding of how meaningful such a shift is both for sustainability outcomes and 
the governance of finance.  
 To understand how the transition towards sustainable finance occurred we 
might turn to earlier episodes of shifts in economic governance. Such shifts are 
routinely presented as responses to exogenous shocks. Keynesian macroeconomic 
policies, for example, are an outcome of the economic management of war economies. 
Similarly, the neoliberal policy toolkit was forged during the stagflation crisis of the 
1970s. And while seemingly exogenous shocks like wars, financial crises or 
 
1 Jyrki Katainen’s speech from March 22, 2018 at the High-level conference on financing sustainable 
growth. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_18_2405. 





pandemics provide the background against which the priorities and the targets of 
economic policy are changed, such big shifts often also involve a fight. On the one 
hand, the incumbents try to accommodate the changed circumstances within existing 
ideas, institutions and governance mechanisms. The challengers of the status quo, on 
the other hand, contest the potential for accommodation and advocate for new agendas 
and priorities. 
 In International Political Economy (IPE), the processes that link exogenous 
shocks, political and ideational contestation and paradigm shifts in economic policy 
have been a regular focus for research. Less well researched are situations where a 
change in economic policymaking occurs in the absence of an exogenous shock that 
is presented as a major crisis by opponents of the status quo.   
 Sustainable finance is such a case, where a change in orientation occurred in 
the absence of an easily identifiable exogenous shock. In 2014, sustainable finance and 
related terms like green finance, climate finance and Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) were only familiar to a narrow expert community and marginal to the concerns 
of most policymakers. By the end of 2019, by contrast, China, the EU, France and the 
UK either had plans to act on the issue or were already implementing measures. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, these policies include the formulation of standards and 
labels, risk disclosures for financial institutions, subsidies to financial instruments or 
the creation of credit lines to refinance green lending.  
 In 2019, the IMF dedicated a section in its Global Financial Stability Report to 
sustainable finance (IMF 2019: 90ff). This indicates that sustainable finance has 
become a topic that is deemed to have significance for assessing the state of the global 
financial system. In the same year, the Network for Greening the Financial System 





continents, published its first report and recommendations. Several members of the 
network (Denmark, France, Netherlands and the UK) have already started to 
implement these recommendations by designing climate stress tests for banks and 
insurance companies. Reflecting on how incorporating climate change considerations 
changes the nature of prudential supervision, a recent working paper from the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) went as far as referring to Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigm change to highlight the epistemological break that regulators’ assessments 
need to undergo in order to address questions of sustainability (Bolton et al. 2020: 21).  
 Importantly, sustainable finance is not only a topic for states and regulators. 
The Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), with US$ 1.5 trillion in 
assets the largest of its kind, has started to incorporate sustainability concerns into its 
investment strategies. It has, for example, stopped lending securities to short-sellers 
and started to align its passive investment with benchmarks that reflect Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) issues.2 The fact that this move is not confined to GPIF 
but reflects a broader sentiment in the financial sector is illustrated by a recent episode 
involving the world’s largest asset manager, BlackRock. In the beginning of 2020, 
BlackRock announced that it would exit fossil fuels from its active managed funds and 
gear up the pressure on companies that failed to deliver on sustainability. This reflected 
a shift in strategy and was seen as a response to accusations that pointed out the asset 
manager’s poor record on ESG topics.3 
 
2 Leo Lewis and , “World’s biggest pension fund strikes blow against short sellers” Financial Times, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8d61bd14-1593-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385, Hugh Wheelan, “Japan’s 
GPIF selects ESG indices for $8.8bn allocation”, Responsible Investor, July 3rd, 2017. Accessed 
February 11th, 2020. 
https://www.responsible-investor.com/articles/japanese-pension-giant-awards-88bn-esg-mandate. 
Accessed February 11th, 2020. 
3 Attracta Mooney and Owen Walker, “BlackRock seeks to regain lost ground in climate fight”, 
Financial Times, January 14th, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/36282d86-36e4-11ea-a6d3-





 Another indication of the increased salience of sustainable finance is that public 
and private actors have started to devote considerable resources to establish common 
standards and definitions. At the time of writing, the Task-Force For Climate-Related 
Financial Disclosures (TCFD), hosted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), is trying 
to establish a global standard for corporates and financial institutions.  Meanwhile, the 
EU’s upcoming green taxonomy and the more recent efforts by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and the four global accounting firms to establish a metric for the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) move in the same space.4   
 Yet despite all these developments, there is no evidence of a crisis of the 
governance of international finance between 2014 and 2019 that resulted in a boost for 
sustainable finance. The fact that climate change is likely to result in catastrophic 
consequences for humanity has been documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) for decades. However, as will be discussed in the main body 
of the thesis, for most of the time between the 1990s and 2018, the majority of financial 
institutions paid little attention to climate change and did not view it as a fundamental 
crisis.  
 How did this rapid change come about? While existing literature suggests we 
might expect to observe a paradigm shift occurring via a contestation of the 
incumbents,  there is little evidence that a coalition of parties or interest groups that 
are promoting sustainable finance took over International Organisations, national 
ministries, central banks and private firms during this period. In the absence of a clear 
case of the well-studied dynamics of shock-induced paradigm shifts, one must look for 
 
4 Billy Nauman and Patrick Temple-West, “BofA chief leads new effort to tame unruly ESG metrics”, 
Financial Times, January 14th, 2020.https://www.ft.com/content/876f143a-36de-11ea-a6d3-





an alternative understanding that can accommodate a more gradual process that 
nevertheless resulted in the emergence of a new system of financial policymaking.   
 
1.1 Main Research Question and Focus of the Thesis 
This thesis addresses the following research question: 
How have economic ideas shaped the production of knowledge in the evolution of 
sustainable finance? 
 The focus on ideas is justified, because ideational approaches are well-
equipped to account for seemingly novel policy areas. One reason for this is that ideas 
provide actors with clues that reduce uncertainty in situations of crisis or novelty (cf. 
Blyth 2002; Widmaier et al. 2007). And while ideational accounts have often been 
applied to understand crises and abrupt changes, they also hold some explanatory 
power for evolutionary processes. Perhaps even more significantly, an analytical focus 
on ideas helps to reveal the politics of seemingly uncontested evolutionary processes. 
Yet when applied to sustainable finance the emphasis on ideas opens up two further 
questions. First, where have the ideas that are relevant for sustainable finance come 
from? And, second, how have they influenced it? 
 To address these questions, I draw on the literature on policy paradigms (Hall 
1993), which broadly speaking studies how economic theories from academia 
influence policy making. Rather than merely applying the existing conceptual 
framework, I separate ideas as economic theories from ideas as policy influencing 
devices before reconnecting them in a transmission mechanism. This reformulation of 
the policy paradigms concept enables me to define and measure its component parts. 





often been studied in an undefined (Kuzemko 2013: 33) or even contradictory (Blyth 
2013a) way.  
 This brief elaboration on the ideational component of the main research 
question leaves, however, still one question open, which is: What is sustainable 
finance? This question is much easier to ask than to answer and part of the thesis is 
dedicated to finding a response to it. For now, it suffices to state that I understand 
sustainable finance as the reconfiguration of financial systems to incorporate 
environmental, social and ethical considerations.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature 
In asking how the evolution of sustainable finance is related to economic ideas and 
policy paradigms, I engage with several strands of research. First, on the conceptual 
level, I draw on the literature on policy paradigms that was pioneered by Hall (1993) 
to study how economic ideas influence the processes that lead to incremental or all-
encompassing changes in macroeconomic policy. Empirical investigations of cases 
such as macroeconomic policy in different geographies (e.g. Lindvall 2009; 
Mandelkern 2015), energy governance (e.g. Kern et al. 2014; Kuzemko 2013) and 
financial regulation (Baker 2013; 2015) have applied and enriched Hall’s original 
contribution. In addition, there is a rich theoretical debate that seeks to clarify the 
concept as well as the process of paradigm change (Allan 2019; Blyth 2013; 
Carstensen 2011a; Carstensen and Matthijs 2018; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; 
Schmidt 2002; 2011).  
 Beyond policy paradigms, this thesis also addresses some broader questions of 
ideational explanations in IPE. First, I engage with the literature on transmission 





finance. I single out processes of institutionalisation and persuasion as well as 
performative dynamics throughout the stages of ideational transmission that I analyse. 
Second, by representing a case of evolution rather than of crisis, studying sustainable 
finance can deliver insights on the role of ideational factors in such circumstances. As 
such, the thesis contributes to longstanding theoretical debates about the seemingly 
different dynamics of ideas in crisis and non-crisis situations, where ideas are thought 
to be constraining in the former case while being disruptive in the latter (cf. Bell 2011; 
Bell and Feng 2019; Widmaier 2016). In exploring the characteristics of crises and 
evolution, the thesis also contributes to the emerging literature on slow- and fast-
burning crises (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2019) and the variety of crises (Baker 2015).  
 The focus on evolutionary situations also connects well with the discussions 
on how policy issues emerge (Carpenter 2007) and how objects that are deemed 
worthy of political interventions are constituted in the first place (Allan 2017). This 
offers a point of connection between constructivist IPE and the discipline of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS). As I argue in the second chapter of this thesis, those 
two literatures are complementary as bringing them together provides us with an 
account that offers both an intricate discussion of the technical workings of policies 
and the political contestations that accompany such seemingly technical issues.   
 More specifically, the preoccupation in STS with the design of technical 
objects (cf. McCarthy 2018: 2) offers a way to account for the interplay of ideational 
and material factors that underpin the functioning of economic and financial systems 
(cf. Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019: 775, 778). The emphasis on technical 
objects makes STS treatments relevant for studying the transmission of ideas in non-
crisis times. This is because ideas that are stabilised in technical instruments can still 





ruling policy paradigm. At the same time, STS scholarship cautions against a linear 
and deterministic understanding of both the ideational and the material. Instead, the 
focus on the micro-politics of the design and use of technical objects reminds us to 
incorporate context and agency (McCarthy 2012; 2018: 6ff; see also Bijker et al. 
1987).  
 In light of the complementarities between STS and constructivist IPE, scholars 
have called for a closer dialogue between the two strands of research in recent years 
(e.g. Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019; Braun 2016). Meanwhile, empirical 
contributions on topics such as banks’ risk management practices (Lockwood 2015), 
central bank repo markets (Braun 2017), big data and algorithmic governance 
(Campbell-Verduyn et al. 2017) and macroprudential supervision (Kranke and Yarrow 
2018) suggest that rich insights on the workings and the politics of finance – and by 
extension in all likelihood also on sustainable finance – can be obtained by combining 
STS and constructivist IPE.  
 Sustainable finance is more than a useful case for theory building – 
understanding its evolution is significant in its own right. The IPCC’s fourth 
assessment report as well as the special report on the differences between a 1.5° C and 
a 2° C warming scenario point towards the importance of redirecting both public and 
private financial flows for achieving mitigation and adaptation objectives (e.g. IPCC 
2014: 30; IPCC 2018: 25, 29).  
 At the same time, students of environmental IPE and environmental politics 
more broadly have repeatedly pointed out that the financial sector has the potential to 
play a prominent role in whether and how capitalism responds to environmental crises 
like climate change. Paterson and Newell (2010) suggest that finance – which does not 





Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and standard setters – is at the centre of a nascent 
coalition that can actually challenge fossil fuel based capitalism and deliver 
decarbonisation (see also Paterson 2010: 363). More recently, Newell (2019) made a 
similar argument using a Neo-Gramscian framework by asking the question whether 
finance might be a force that defects from the fossil fuel based historic bloc and throws 
its power behind a new accumulation regime. Notably, he also emphasises that finance 
cannot be understood as a homogenous system. For instance, investors with long-term 
liabilities represent patient capital, which means that their interests differ from those 
of hedge funds and private equity investors, which are known for their short-termism. 
 The significance of finance for societies’ (or better capitalism’s) response to 
climate change and other environmental crises has led scholars from IPE, 
environmental politics and human geography to study how different actors of the 
financial system address environmental issues. Among other things, this emerging 
literature has analysed investor networks (MacLeod and Park 2011), the governance 
and management of environmental risks (Christophers 2017; Paterson 2001; Pattberg 
2012; Thistlethwaite 2015; Thistlethwaite and Wood 2018) accounting and reporting 
standards (Knox-Hayes and Levy 2011; Thistlethwaite 2011; Thistlethwaite and 
Paterson 2016; Thislethwaite 2017), carbon markets and their governance (Böhm et 
al. 2014; Helleiner and Thistlethwaite 2014; Lohmann 2009; Paterson and Stripple 
2012; Paterson et al. 2017), shareholder activism (Neville et al. 2019) and the fossil 
fuel divestment movement (Mangat et al. 2018).    
 Many of the studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph offer an analysis of 
sustainable finance that goes beyond the issues and actors that are their immediate 
concern. The contributions also develop theoretical and conceptual claims that are 





empirical study that starts by treating the broader system of sustainable finance as its 
principal unit of analysis can help to complement the in-depth investigations of 
individual actors or actor types that many of the existing contributions offer. And while 
Newell and Paterson’s (2010) Climate Capitalism provides an early systemic account, 
the time of its publication means that it does not cover some of the more recent 
developments described at the beginning of this chapter.  
 In this thesis, I seek to contribute to this literature by looking at the relations 
among the actors that existing research has identified. I use the concept of policy 
subsystem (Sabatier 1998) and network analysis methods to situate these actors in a 
social space and to track their relations over the time period from 1998 to 2018. Based 
on this comprehensive mapping exercise, the thesis argues that the cleavages inside an 
evolving system like sustainable finance are at least partially structured according to 
economic ideas. This fits well with some of the existing literature in this fast-moving 
field, which has emphasised the significance of ideational categories like discourses 
and frames (e.g. MacLeod and Park 2011; Mangat et al. 2018, Newell 2019).  
 
1.3 The Argument in Brief 
Transmission of Ideas 
As a first step to understand the transmission from ideas to the governance of 
sustainable finance, the thesis delineates the social space in which actors develop and 
advance their preferred policies. I conceptualise this social space as a policy 
subsystem. This concept enables me to group actors from diverse backgrounds 
according to their shared ideas. More concretely, I treat these shared ideas as common 
frames. As further elaborated in chapter 2, frames allow the actors to understand their 





 Importantly, frames are not ad hoc constructions of the actors in the policy 
subsystem. Instead, they are related to existing ideas, which they reproduce and 
reassemble. Frames can hence be differentiated by linking them with established 
economic theories like neoclassical-inspired modern financial theory or ecological 
economics. Highlighting the differences of frames according to their connections with 
these economic theories can help to account for the dimensions that underscore the 
cleavages among actors. Through specifying the relations between frames and 
economic theories this thesis contributes to the literature about policy paradigms and 
the transmission of ideas from academic economics to policy actors. 
 Linking the ideas embodied in frames to economic theories is only the first part 
of the transmission mechanism that is examined in the thesis. Ideas that have been 
incorporated by actors within the policy subsystem through framing still have to be 
translated from the purely discursive realm to policy outcomes. Building on 
constructivist IPE and STS scholarship, I single out two transmission channels that 
connect frames to policy outcomes. First, there is the route of persuasion. When 
following this route, actors from the policy subsystem develop debate positions that 
are based on their initial framing. Yet while frames provide actors with a sense of 
direction and help them to define their interests, debate positions are intended to 
convince audiences that are not part of the policy subsystem. Furthermore, actors craft 
debate positions to underscore the differences of their positioning vis à vis others. 
 The way in which these debate positions are transmitted to policy outcomes is 
not fundamentally distinct from other areas of policymaking. Actors advance their 
position, try to garner support among policymakers, interest groups, the (specialised) 
media and the interested public. If they are successful, their positioning will be 





the question of whether financial institutions should divest from unsustainable 
companies or whether they should use their stakes to help the companies transition 
towards better practices. A resolution of this debate into a policy outcome would 
consist of policymakers being persuaded by either argument and subsequently 
adopting regulations that reflect the respective debate position and its ideational 
underpinnings.  
 The second transmission channel is less about controversies and, instead, 
relates to the performative character of socio-technical instruments. These instruments 
enable the governance of sustainable finance by establishing accepted categories, 
measurements and calculation techniques. As such, socio-technical instruments 
integrate the ideas that are present in the frames with the material components that are 
necessary to transform discursive factors into a more durable form. Examples of socio-
technical instruments are accounting standards, definitions, indicators and economic 
models. A concrete case that has received much attention in the recent past is the green 
taxonomy that has been tabled by the European Commission to define sustainable 
finance.  
 In addition to sketching the differences between debate positions or socio-
technical instruments, the thesis also develops a hypothesis concerning variations in 
the relative strength of either transmission channel. I suggest that the size and maturity 
of a policy subsystem influences the relevance of one or the other transmission channel 
and with that the degree of contestation. Whereas in mature and large policy 
subsystems the persuasive channel is more powerful, in small and emerging ones the 
performative channel is more relevant. As sustainable finance represents a case of an 





 The thesis operationalises the transmission from economic ideas to frames and 
subsequently to policy outcomes by looking at the knowledge production of actors 
inside the policy subsystem of sustainable finance. Actors that display a shared 
framing are detected through network analysis techniques. The content of the frames, 
meanwhile, is inspected through a combination of qualitative and quantitative text 
analysis, interview transcripts and participant observation data. Subsequently, I use 
text analysis methods, interviews and participant observation data to link the frames 
with economic theories to establish the first stage of ideational transmission. The 
transmission from frames to policy outcomes is, on the other hand, achieved via the 
persuasive and performative channels that were outlined above. While drawing on the 
same data sources, this second part of the transmission emphasises different aspects 
like contestations between actors and the development of socio-technical instruments.  
 
Findings 
The thesis analyses the structure of the policy subsystem of sustainable finance 
between 1998 and 2018. The starting point of this observation period corresponds with 
the time when the first regulatory efforts on sustainable finance were proposed in 
Europe, whereas the end point captures the inception of both European and global 
initiatives such as the EU’s sustainable finance action plan, the FSB TCFD and the 
NGFS. Based on both historical events like the GFC and the Paris Agreement and the 
distribution of the data I further partition the time between 1998 and 2018 into three 
subperiods, namely 1998-2008, 2009-2014 and 2015-2018 (cf. chapter 4). 
 Throughout these three periods I identify four frames. These frames are 1) 
Socially Responsible Investment or SRI, 2) Climate Finance, 3) Risks and 





emphasises the ethical dimension of investment. While dominant in the 1980s and 
1990s, the proponents of this frame never engaged systematically in knowledge 
production. This means that this frame has been increasingly marginalised. Already in 
the first period under study (1998-2008), SRI actors were challenged by the risks and 
opportunities frame. 
 The risks and opportunities frame, meanwhile, highlights that environmental, 
social and governance issues (ESG) are affecting financial returns. During the period 
under analysis there have been variations relating to the emphasis on either risks or 
opportunities. Perhaps more importantly, the specification of what counts as a risk has 
changed from an initial preoccupation with a large set of ESG issues to a narrower and 
more sophisticated analysis of the risks of climate change and the transition of energy 
systems. In terms of its location in the policy subsystem, the risks and opportunities 
frame has been dominant throughout the period under examination. 
 The third frame, which I term climate finance frame, is less preoccupied with 
assessing the risks and opportunities of existing financial assets and more with the 
creation of new financial instruments that mobilise the capital markets to finance 
projects for climate mitigation and adaptation. This frame is associated with the 
development community and emerged in the late 2000s. While the risks and 
opportunities frame has maintained its dominance, the climate finance frame offers a 
complementary approach to sustainable finance.  
 Finally, the critical frame is put forward by civil society actors that remain 
sceptical of the ability of financial institutions and capitalism more broadly to address 
systemic crises like climate change. While this frame has been on the margins of 
sustainable finance, it has nonetheless influenced the policy subsystem insofar as its 





financial institutions. In addition, the emphasis on systemic questions that was an early 
preoccupation of the critical frame has been incorporated into more recent variations 
of the risks and opportunities frame.  
 After describing the frames and situating them in the policy subsystem, the 
thesis goes on to link them with economic theories. I find that when looking at the 
whole policy subsystem through the entire time period, (mainstream) modern financial 
theory is most frequently referenced. Environmental and climate economics, 
ecological economics and evolutionary/complexity perspectives are acknowledged but 
appear to be less relevant. Importantly, not all the references to modern financial 
theory are supportive as some actors try to delegitimise those ideas. Furthermore, there 
is some co-variation between frames and theories. The risks and opportunities frame 
is, for instance, citing modern financial theory to a greater extent. Meanwhile, the 
critical frame as well as some parts of the (systemic risk-focused) regulatory 
community display greater affinity towards more heterodox evolutionary systems 
thinking. Another finding is that only a fraction of the actors in sustainable finance 
engages directly with the academic literature. This might point to the instrumental role 
of these actors as translators between the ideas of academic economics and the policy 
ideas of sustainable finance. On the other hand, this finding should also caution against 
attributing too much causal weight to the ideas of academic economists in processes 
of policy change.  
 In addition to analysing the links between economic theories and frames, the 
thesis also examines how frames and the ideas that are underlying them influence 
policy outcomes. As outlined above, I look at debate positions and socio-technical 
instruments to study this transmission process. Concerning debate positions, I find that 





frames but take place within the risks and opportunities frame. Furthermore, debates 
that occur in more scientific settings, such as the community of central bankers and 
regulators, have dividing lines that resemble economic theories more than frames. 
Variations between socio-technical instruments, on the other hand, are more closely 
aligned with frames. The risks and opportunities frame also dominates here as the 
definition of risk factors and the development of risk models are prioritised. 
Nevertheless, vestiges from the period in which SR investors were at the centre of the 
system remain present in areas like the measurement of ESG issues. The different 
priorities of the climate finance and the critical frame have likewise influenced the 
design of socio-technical instruments such as green taxonomies or metrics that 
benchmark the performance of the financial system as a whole against social and 
environmental objectives.  
 
1.4 Plan of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical 
framework by discussing the questions of how ideas matter, which ideas matter and 
where ideas matter. Drawing on literature from constructivist IPE, the sociology of 
professions and expertise and STS, I elaborate on a transmission mechanism that 
builds on Hall’s concept of policy paradigms. In light of the confusion and often 
unspecified use of this concept, the chapter takes a step back and starts with a 
discussion of the philosophy of science literature. Engaging with this literature enables 
me to separate Hall’s paradigm concept into academic paradigms, which denote sets 
of ideas elaborated in scientific settings, and policy paradigms, which are about the 
role of these ideas in policy making. The second chapter also introduces and 





(frames, debates, socio-technical instruments) and the social space in which it is 
situated (policy subsystems). Finally, I elaborate on the hypothesis that links variations 
in the size and maturity of policy subsystems to the relative strength of ideational 
transmission channels.  
 Chapter 3 discusses the methods and data sources that I use to conceptualise 
sustainable finance as an evolving policy subsystem. Before going into a detailed 
description of the methods, the chapter starts by discussing why the research strategy 
that is adopted in this thesis is well-suited to study the evolution of sustainable finance. 
In addition, I further explore the empirical literature of constructivist IPE to situate my 
thesis in the distribution of cases and to revisit existing research strategies. An in-depth 
discussion of the methods follows, starting with a description of techniques from the 
analysis of information networks that are used to delineate the boundaries of 
sustainable finance. Subsequently, I introduce network measures of centrality and 
methods for community detection. The latter are used to identify the communities that 
coalesce around the different frames. To establish the meaning of the frames, I draw 
on content analysis, interviews and participant observation.  
 The fourth chapter launches the empirical analysis of the thesis. The chapter 
begins with some background information on sustainable finance and a brief review 
of empirical studies on the topic. Subsequently, I introduce the data that underlies the 
network analysis and partition the time interval between 1998 and 2018 into three 
periods, i.e. 1998-2008, 2009-2014 and 2015-2018. The chapter proceeds with a 
description of each period, which introduces the actors that were present in the policy 
subsystem. Moreover, the frames that can be observed in each period are discussed. 
At the end of each section, the frames are summarised according to their diagnostic, 





visualise the relations between the actors in the policy subsystem and to cluster actors 
that display a shared framing.  
 The findings from chapter 4 suggest that the risks and opportunities frame was 
dominant during the entire time period, whereas the ethical SRI frame became 
increasingly marginalised. Towards the end of the 2000s, the climate finance frame 
started to emerge as an alternative but complementary understanding of sustainable 
finance. In the last period under study (2015-2018), the risks and opportunities frame 
became connected with the climate finance frame by hub-creating actors, which try to 
promote sustainable finance ‘as such’, thus creating a master frame. Lastly, proponents 
of the critical frame have been at the margins of sustainable finance. Nonetheless, they 
maintained some connections to the centre of the policy subsystem. 
 In the fifth chapter, the four frames are linked to four academic paradigms: 1) 
modern financial theory, 2) ecological economics, 3) environmental and climate 
economics and 4) a hybrid evolutionary systems paradigm. This linkage allows for 
identifying the differences of frames according to common categories that are derived 
from the philosophy of science. Furthermore, this sorting establishes the first part of 
the ideational transmission where ideas travel from academia to the actors inside the 
policy subsystem. By matching citation lists that reflect academic paradigms to the 
corpus that represents the knowledge production within sustainable finance, I find that 
only about one quarter of the actors engages with the academic literature. The most 
frequently referenced academic paradigm is modern financial theory. This goes both 
for citation numbers and the use of concepts. However, not all references are 
supportive since modern financial theory is also referenced by challengers who try to 
unpack and delegitimise it. Lastly, while there is a co-variation between academic 





economic ideas. For instance, despite significant theoretical differences, some actors 
use both environmental and ecological economics to link finance and the economy 
with the environment.  
 Chapter 6 concludes the empirical part of the thesis by describing the debates 
and socio-technical instruments that translate frames and economic ideas into policy. 
The chapter identifies four debates and five types of socio-technical instruments. 
Subsequently, both debate positions and socio-technical instruments are linked to 
frames and academic paradigms. While most of the debates are internal to the 
dominant risks and opportunities frame, the socio-technical instruments vary more in 
line with the frames. Also, in ‘scientised’ locations like central banks, academic 
paradigms seem to be of greater relevance as dividing lines than frames. The chapter 
closes by pointing out that socio-technical instruments are more politicised than 
debates. It links this observation with the hypothesis that stipulates that depending on 
the maturity and size of the policy subsystem, the persuasive or performative 
transmission channel is more influential.  
 The seventh chapter concludes the thesis by suggesting avenues for future 
research that could build on the findings of this thesis. First, future research could 
explore how evolutionary and crisis cases are related to ideational dynamics. A 
possible way to do this would be to look further into the hypothesis on how the 
maturity and size of a policy subsystem relates to the transmission of ideas. 
Furthermore, research that draws on the literature from environmental politics, IPE 
and STS could further explore how the changes to the financial system that are 
associated with sustainable finance influence capitalism’s response to environmental 
crises. The final chapter also discusses the limitations of the approach of this thesis. It 





1.5 Original Contributions 
This thesis makes theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions to 
constructivist IPE and environmental politics. On the theoretical side, it takes stock of 
the literature on policy paradigms and aims to clarify the discussions about the concept 
by outlining a process that specifies the connections between operationalisable 
concepts. These concepts are empirically applied through the combination of network 
analysis techniques, text analysis, interviews and participant observation. This builds 
on existing methodological toolkits but also expands them.  
 A second theoretical contribution is that the thesis studies a case of evolution 
rather than of crisis from an ideational perspective. Therefore, it helps to remedy the 
bias of focusing on crisis that is present in the literature. The focus on an evolutionary 
situation also helps to develop a more comprehensive framework for studying the role 
of ideas in policymaking processes.  
 The thesis also makes an important empirical contribution to the study of 
environmental politics. By conceptualising sustainable finance as a system and by 
sorting actors, debates and socio-technical instruments according to ideational 
categories, it helps to better understand the linkages between finance and 
environmental issues. While it is beyond the scope of this research project to make 
predictions about how the structure of sustainable finance will impact the environment 
in the future, understanding the functioning of the system nevertheless enables us to 
come up with informed conjectures about these relationships through showing how 








2. Charting the Transmission of Paradigms 
 
 A lot of interesting insights on ESG [Environment, Social and Governance issues] 
can be gained from economics and finance theories such as Modern Portfolio Theory 
We should move away from the unbelievable Cost Benefit Analysis and damaging 
discount rates that can be dangerous [for the environment and climate]5 
 
Despite being voiced at the same conference, the two quotes opening this chapter 
represent very different ideas on sustainable finance. The first quote emphasises the 
relevance of ideas that in the IPE literature have been categorised as ‘neoclassical’ or 
‘neoliberal’. The second intervention criticises these ideas. The proposition that such 
competing ideas ‘matter’ has influenced a great deal of political economy research. 
But what does it exactly mean? Who has, carries and promotes ideas? Which ideas 
matter and where do they come from? And how do ideas matter? These and similar 
questions have been the subject of many theoretical and empirical contributions in IPE 
and other social sciences. In IPE, there is no single theory about the role of ideas. 
Instead, scholars have come up with a host of theories, concepts and methods. This 
plurality of perspectives is valuable as it allows researchers to select the appropriate 
tools for investigating different research puzzles and avoids the application of a 
boilerplate approach. On the other hand, the variety of concepts and methods has also 
led to confusion and inconsistencies.  
 
 
5 Quotes from participants at the Global Research Alliance for Sustainable Finance and Investment’s 





 In this chapter, I draw from constructivist IPE, the sociology of professions and 
STS to outline what ideational explanations are and what insights they can deliver for 
the study of sustainable finance. Drawing from these literatures I develop a 
transmission mechanism that covers, first, the links between the ideas of academic 
economists and policy actors and, second, the links between the ideas of policy actors 
and the implementation of policy. This combination allows for a richer and more 
contextual understanding of the role that ideas played in the evolution of sustainable 
finance. Integrating insights from the three literatures also helps to avoid the pitfalls 
of a linear understanding of the influence of ideas.  
 This chapter elaborates the transmission mechanism from ideas to policies in 
six sections. In the first section, I introduce the three above mentioned literatures in a 
more general way and assess their complementarities. I give particular attention to 
their capabilities for understanding the evolutionary processes that are present in 
sustainable finance. The second section addresses the question of how ideas matter by 
revisiting the research on the transmission of ideas in each literature. In the third 
section, I query which ideas matter by introducing and operationalising the concept of 
academic paradigm, which I delineate from the concept of policy paradigm. The 
fourth section discusses where ideas matter. To do so I introduce the concept of policy 
subsystem. In addition, this section operationalises the concept of framing, which I use 
to sort actors inside the policy subsystem of sustainable finance. The fifth section 
brings the concepts together and develops the transmission mechanism. In this section, 
I also outline the differences between ideational transmission channels and suggest 







2.1 Crises, Evolution and Ideas: Insights from Constructivist IPE, the Sociology 
of Professions and STS  
Evolution and Crisis 
In IPE, situations of uncertainty and crisis have traditionally been seen as being most 
receptive to ideational factors. When confronted with a crisis, actors need ideas to 
know what their interests are before they can calculate their preferred outcome (cf. 
Blyth 2002). As such uncertain situations need to be interpreted by actors (cf. 
Widmaier et al. 2007), they also open up the space for understanding the crisis in 
different ways (cf. Boin et al. 2011). One prominent function of ideas is that they can 
help to identify the culprits for the crisis as well as solutions to it (Neep 2018; 
Widmaier 2016). Solutions can then become embedded in institutions where ideas 
continue to live on until the next crisis occurs (cf. Babb 2013; Oliver and Pemberton 
2004: 423).  
 This stability-crisis-stability sequencing has also been called the punctuated 
equilibrium model. A good illustration of punctuated equilibrium is Hall’s work on 
policy paradigms. In Hall’s original contribution one set of economic ideas reigns 
supreme until it is toppled by contending ideas during a crisis (cf. Hall 1993, see 
section 3). In constructivist and institutionalist scholarship, the notion of punctuated 
equilibrium has been widely criticised. Constructivist authors have singled out 
ideational factors as a means to overcome the difficulties of institutionalist 
explanations to deal with abrupt change (e.g. Blyth 2001; 2002; Schmidt 2002; 2008). 
Yet ideational accounts themselves have come under criticism for failing to address 
how and why ideas act differently in periods of crisis than in periods of stability (Bell 





between crisis and non-crisis has become the subject of critique. This is because it 
appears to be unable to integrate evolutionary changes (e.g. Carstensen 2011b).   
 In light of these criticisms, accounts that take an ideational approach but are 
focused on evolutionary cases rather than on the re-examination of stability-crisis-
stability dynamics can help to fill a gap in our understanding. A research design that 
explores how ideas matter in non-crisis situations can also address the calls for the 
development of a more unified theory of ideational influences (Bell 2011; Widmaier 
2016). Two strands of research that can complement the often crisis-based ideational 
accounts of IPE are the work on expert governance that is related to the sociology of 
professions and the research on performativity that has been carried out by STS 
scholars. These research streams have focused less on crisis-induced ruptures but on 
gradual change and evolution.  
 Reviewing the broader sociological literature, Zietsma et al. (2017: 52) suggest 
that research on institutions and fields has moved from explanations that are based on 
exogenous shocks and punctuated equilibria to a focus on endogenous dynamics. More 
narrowly, the sociology of professions is interested in how groups that are bound 
together by professional status establish and maintain the jurisdiction about a particular 
feature of social life. A classical case is the fight among communities of health 
practitioners over medical licensing (Abbott 2005). More recent investigations have 
also highlighted that transnational professionals can reinvent themselves by occupying 
a particular issue like certifications for sustainable forestry (Henriksen and Seabrooke 
2016) or carbon trading (Paterson et al. 2017). Here, expertise does not necessarily 
depend on formal gatekeepers like professional bodies but can be exerted in a loser 






 An important contribution from this research strand is that the power positions 
of expert communities are explicitly situated in social space through concepts like 
ecologies or fields. Power is relational as it depends on the location of an actor inside 
the system of expertise. A system focus can accommodate situations where expertise 
does not have an “organisational home” and is, instead, distributed throughout a 
network of people employed by different organisations (e.g. Paterson et al. 2017: 183; 
see also Thistlethwaite and Paterson 2016). As such, it is distinct from treatments in 
IPE, where ideas are often situated within established organisations like treasuries (e.g. 
Hall 1993) or the IMF (Chwieroth 2010; Nelson 2014). 
 Furthermore, the research on institutional fields offers a typology to classify 
actors’ positioning. Sociological research has studied parts of sustainable finance, such 
as impact investing and ESG issues, by using the concepts of interstitial and issue 
fields (Beunza and Ferrero 2019: 516; Zietsma et al. 2017: 25). These concepts denote 
situations in which actors that draw on resources and connections from their home 
fields seek to occupy an issue of their interest (cf. Zietsma et al. 2017: 21ff). The ability 
to account for actors from different backgrounds (e.g. private, public, civil society) 
means that insights regarding fields are well-equipped to account for still evolving and 
thus poorly defined issues. In addition, a system focus can provide a sorting of actors 
that is not dependent on essentialist notions of topics like ‘finance’ or ‘environment’ 
but, instead, classifies the actors according to their relations within the system. Finally, 
by comparing the structure of the system to other cases one can come up with 
hypotheses concerning the relations between the shape of the system and the relative 






 In summary, insights from the sociology of professions can be mobilised to 
explicitly map evolving systems of expertise. The research on institutional fields, on 
the other hand, can help to arrive at a classification of what kind of case sustainable 
finance presents (see section 5 and chapter 3).  
 STS is similar to the sociological research examined above in the sense that it 
takes a systemic approach. It also displays an evolutionary perspective that is 
evidenced by its focus on (competing) networks, into which actors have to be enrolled. 
An important difference of STS and its concept of ‘performativity’ vis à vis other 
ideational and expertise-based explanations is its rejection of the notion that ideas or 
actors influence the existing governance of an issue and shape it according to their 
preferences or convictions (cf. Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019: 6; Braun 2016). 
Instead, performativity describes a situation where the collaboration of ideas and actors 
is a precondition for governance (Allan 2017; MacKenzie 2007: 5). Depending on the 
ideas and actors that are involved in building the network, governance will offer certain 
options and interventions while closing off others (cf. Bowker and Star 1996; Latour 
2003).  
 This emphasis on the network being the material outcome instead of acting on 
the material world means that STS chooses socio-technical instruments, which 
combine ideational and material components, as its main unit of analysis. McCarthy 
points out that one of the main preoccupations of STS scholarship is to study how such 
technical objects come into being (McCarthy 2017: 10). Understanding the material 
and ideational factors that influence the design of socio-technical instruments is 
important, because these design choices mediate the possibilities of future users, many 





notwithstanding, socio-technical instruments are never completely deterministic as 
users still might find creative ways to repurpose them (McCarthy 2012: 477).  
 The focus on socio-technical instruments as the main unit of analysis means 
that the research strategies and methods of STS scholars differ from the treatments in 
IPE or sociology. Instead of identifying a population of actors to delineate a system, 
one starts from looking at an instrument like an auctioning mechanism (Muniesa and 
Callon 2007) or an economic model (MacKenzie and Millo 2003) and then maps the 
involved actors and ideas. The relations between human and non-human actors as well 
as between the ideational and the material are often studied by ‘following the actors’ 
using historical and interpretivist methods (McCarthy 2017: 12).   
 In the context of sustainable finance, research that draws from STS has covered 
the development of new definitions, metrics and classification systems. Studies have 
examined the networks and interactions of data providers (Beunza and Ferrero 2019), 
sustainability rating agencies (Crifo et al. 2018; Dejean et al. 2004; Giamporcaro and 
Gond 2016) and responsible indices (Slager et al. 2012). By integrating these insights 
with the empirical data that is presented in the thesis, chapter 6 develops a typology of 
the socio-technical instruments that are being developed for the governance of 
sustainable finance.  
 
Ideas and Contestation 
When it comes to identifying conflicting ideas and sorting them into different blocs, 
the constructivist, crisis-based explanations of IPE often highlight the contestation 
between analytically distinguishable ideas. This is demonstrated by the research on 





section. A typical paper identifies an incumbent and a challenger paradigm (e.g. 
Keynesianism vs. Neoliberalism) that fight over the governance of a policy field such 
as fiscal policy or business-labor bargaining. The outcome of this struggle is then the 
one preferred by the proponents of either paradigm or a hybrid case.  
 To map the differences between economic ideas, IPE scholars have often relied 
on classifications of schools of thought that are taken from the history of economic 
thought. In his book about the spread of Neoliberalism, Ban falls back on schools of 
thought to avoid a too broad (e.g. all of modern economics) or too narrow definition 
(e.g. only monetarism) of neoliberalism (Ban 2016: 20). Other ideational IPE scholars 
like Blyth (2002; 2013b) and Braun (2014) have also used history of economic thought 
literature to understand changes in economic policy.  
 This treatment of economic ideas as analytically distinguishable theories is less 
present in the sociological approaches and in STS. In part, these approaches have 
treated ideas as either enabling or constraining actors. Example of ideas being enabling 
can be found in some of the literature from the sociology of professions. Here, ideas 
are treated as a stock of relevant knowledge that can be mobilised by professionals to 
navigate the system (e.g. Abbott 2005; Seabrooke 2014). Ideas as constraints are 
featured in research that contends that professions (or fields like finance more 
generally) are characterised by a single and stable ideational logic (Zietsma et al. 2017: 
21; see Yan et al. 2018 for an empirical study related to sustainable finance).  
 Notably, the above-mentioned studies do not prioritise ideational contestations 
within one system. In the former case of professional contests, agency is mostly 
accorded to individuals (cf. Eyal 2013 for a criticism). When it comes to logics, on the 
other hand, contestation is assumed to happen between rather than within systems. 





conflicts. Notably, this holds also true for research from this strand of literature that 
explicitly includes the characteristics of ideas into its explanation. Fourcade (2006: 
158ff), for instance, engages with the history of economic thought to flesh out the 
characteristics of neoclassical economic ideas. However, her main concern is not with 
the conflicts of neoclassical economics with other economic theories, but with showing 
how the features of neoclassical ideas contributed to the global expansion of the 
economics profession.  
 While sociological research has largely sidelined classifications of economic 
ideas because the contest between them has not been its main research interest, STS 
scholars reject the usefulness of such classification exercises more categorically. 
Bockman and Eyal (2002: 312-314) argue, for example, that Neoliberalism should not 
be treated as a logically consistent theory but as an institution that is reproduced by an 
actor-network. Similarly, MacKenzie (2007: 5) states that “to view economics as a 
body of ideas is far too narrow, for economics also consists of people, skills, datasets, 
techniques, procedures, tools, and so on.” 
 According to this perspective, the study of the analytical differences between 
economic theories is meaningless, because in the real world these differences simply 
do not exist. What exists, instead, are complex arrangements that bring ideas together 
with human and material factors. Therefore, performativity research does not start 
from the ideas but chooses the instruments that make ideas matter as its main unit of 
analysis. The attention to the technical detail and the seemingly mundane choices is 
important as it prevents the researcher from just assuming that ideational convictions 






 By opening up technical details, performativity research can do much to answer 
the questions of how ideas are integrated into policy and what these policies do actually 
look like. Yet while performativity is strong on the details, it has deficiencies on the 
politics. The focus on instruments that eventually ‘worked’ gives it a status quo bias, 
where alternative ideas are easily dismissed or not even scrutinised. Furthermore, its 
perspective that different actors from the ideational and material world come together 
in networks makes it prone to the assumption that each of these actors is representative 
of its domain. Mirowski and Nik-Khan (2007) have thus criticised the complacency of 
performativity researchers with dominant (and in their view false) economic theory as 
they take the ruling orthodoxy as a proxy for economics. Likewise, Fine (2003) has 
accused performativity research of failing to move from description to explanation and 
for leaving the study of the economy to orthodox economists.  
 Through its fascination with socio-technical instruments, performativity seems 
to suggest that existing instruments are the strongest, since they work. This 
understanding eclipses – and thus reproduces – existing power asymmetries (Bernards 
and Campbell-Verduyn 2019: 3). Where ideational (IPE) theories see a fight between 
opposing coalitions, performativity research tends to see a problem. The outcome of 
this process of problem solving is then not conceptualised as the more powerful actor 
prevailing but as being the only one that is sufficiently inclusive to build a socio-
technical instrument.  If the proposals of one ideational coalition are not reflected, this 
is because they ‘did not work’, i.e. they could not enroll enough socio-technical actors 
into their network. From there it is only a matter of interpretation to say that the 






 Performativity research on sustainable finance has notably tried to address 
these criticisms by integrating a more explicit account of the power of individuals and 
organisations (Beunza and Ferrero 2019: 519; Slager et al. 2012: 767) as well as of 
macro actors like the state (Giamporcaro and Gond 2016). These studies are indicative 
that rather than transcending classical theories of power, STS approaches are better 
thought of as complements to other research strategies such as the ones employed by 
constructivist IPE. This is not least because if the complete collapsing of power into 
socio-technical instruments does not hold true, the same can arguably be said of 
ideational differences. 
 In this subsection, I have revisited the treatment of ideas in three different 
strands of literature. The section found that constructivist IPE is the literature that 
devotes most attention to studying how differences between ideas lead to political 
contestations. Sociological and STS research put less emphasis on these questions 
since they are less relevant for their research questions and units of analysis. When it 
comes to the study of how ideas matter in a system like sustainable finance, accounting 
for differences in the content of ideas remains a necessary exercise. Hence, rather than 
constituting an alternative, I argue that the sociology of professions and STS can 
complement IPE’s treatment of ideas.  
 
Complementarities of IPE, the Sociology of Professions and STS and Potential for 
Integration  
From the above discussion it becomes clear that an ideas-centred, evolutionary account 
of sustainable finance can gain much from integrating insights from each of the three 
approaches. The sorting of ideas that constructivist research excels in can be leveraged 





are embedded in already existing thought systems can provide insights on why 
different ideas are incompatible with one another and what their implementation would 
likely mean. The attention to technical detail that is the strength of performativity 
research, on the other hand, offers an intriguing account of how ideas influence the 
economy. Sociological research on expertise, finally, allows for an explicit mapping 
of the actor population. Conceptualising the expert community as a system also 
provides a handy way to detect power differentials between actors advancing different 
ideas.  
 Some IPE research has already begun to exploit the complementarities between 
the three approaches. Seabrooke and Tsingou (2014) connect the ideational dynamics 
of crises with the politics of expertise by exploring how prominent experts mediated 
between different interpretations of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Similarly, 
Hasselbalch (2016) has examined how professional actors draw on existing knowledge 
to frame emerging regulatory environments. Finally, performativity research has 
emphasised the links between ideas and economic models (Braun 2014; Henriksen 
2013; Huber et al. 2017). 
 A second advantage of combining the constructivist, crisis-based approach 
with the more evolutionary focus of performativity and expert governance research is 
that it can overcome the artificial dichotomy between the role of ideas in 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘normal’ times (cf. Bell and Feng 2019 for a discussion). Instead 
of having two theories of how ideas matter in special and normal situations, the 
differences can potentially be reduced to a matter of scale rather than one of essence. 
This can point towards new research questions about the factors that mediate the extent 
of ideational influence. An example of such research is Baker’s conceptualisation of 





influence where and how ideas matter (Baker 2015). Section 5 will discuss policy 
subsystems in connection with the literature on institutional fields that was briefly 
introduced above. For now, it suffices to state that variations in the degree of 
institutionalisation and the actor population can be used as scoping conditions for 
explanations of ideational influence.  
 Finally, an incorporation of performative elements into constructivist accounts 
can add to the understanding of how ideas relate do material factors. This would 
complement constructivist explanations, which have been criticised for being overly 
reliant on discursive shifts (cf. Allan 2019: 186).  
In summary, a focus on socio-technical instruments combined with a politicised 
understanding of competing ideas, which are explicitly mapped in a system of 
expertise can help to identify the role that ideas play in the evolution of sustainable 
finance. This is illustrated in table 2.1, which lists the contributions that constructivist 
IPE, the sociology of professions and STS can make to the ideational, evolutionary 

















Relevant Less Relevant 
Constructivist 
IPE 
Explicit sorting of ideas into 
established categories  
 
Politicisation and contested nature of 
ideational processes 
 
Transmission through (see next 
section) 
- Persuasion 
- Individuals as carriers of ideas 
- Institutionalisation  
Crisis focus 
 
Single organisations as 






Conceptualisation of ideas and 
expertise inside of a system 
 
Power is a represented by the position 




Sorting of systems (fields) according 
to variations in the structure of 
systems and the presence of actors 







Treatment of ideas as 
relational knowledge  
 
Unitary logics (e.g. 
financial logic) covering 




Focus on socio-technical instruments 
and their impact on future debates, 





Lack of contestation  
 
Exclusive focus on 
models (see section 5) 
Table 2.1: Relevance of Insights From Constructivist IPE, the Sociology of 













2.2 How Ideas Matter: Transmission Routes 
The transmission between ideas and policy outcomes has only more recently become 
a preoccupation of constructivist accounts. That constructivist IPE has been 
historically more concerned with the identification and sorting of ideas and less with 
the transmission of ideas into policy is evidenced by some early ideational research, 
which adopted a counterfactual approach. Here, ideas are first sorted into different 
categories like paradigms or schools of thought. Subsequently, it is demonstrated that 
variations in any other factor apart from ideas does not lead to policy change. 
Henceforth, it is concluded that “ideas matter” (e.g. Blyth 2001; Chwieroth 2010).   
 Since then, IPE research on the transmission of ideas has proliferated. 
Persuasion (e.g. Widmaier et al. 2007) and socialisation (e.g. Broome and Seabrooke 
2015) are only two of the transmission channels that have been suggested. To 
summarise existing research that does not only cover IPE but also the different 
research traditions that I introduced in the last section it is useful to look at a review 
article by Berman and Hirschman (2014) which identifies three distinct avenues for 
ideational transmission.  
 First, there is a prestige route, where the influence of ideas occurs in a way that 
is similar to the dynamics that are explored in the work on epistemic communities (cf. 
Haas 1992). Accordingly, actors in the policy process defer to the authority of 
(academic) economists rather than to other experts. This perspective can reveal 
dynamics occurring within professional jurisdictions (cf. Abbott 2005) as well as the 
emergence of new professional jurisdictions (e.g. Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016). Yet 
it is less attuned to make any pronouncements about the content of the expertise. This 
is because any route through which professional prestige translates ideas into policy 





This perspective is thus less well-equipped to detect conflicts within the expert 
community.  
 This assumption might not constitute a problem since, at first sight, economists 
appear to display a high degree of professional uniformity. Surveys of academic 
economists and graduate students have found that economists tend to be in broad 
agreement about matters of theory like the rationality assumption and some policy 
prescriptions like the dangers of protectionism (Colander 2005; Fourcade et al. 2014). 
As the discipline of economics becomes more aligned to the US graduate model, 
regional differences are also disappearing (Colander 2008; Frey et al. 2010).  
 Nevertheless, for emerging systems like sustainable finance, where financial 
expertise must engage with knowledge from other systems like environmental science 
and civil society, the assumption that actors holding the mainstream view are best 
positioned becomes problematic. This is because instead of being representative of the 
overall distribution, expertise systems that emerge at the periphery of finance might as 
well be biased. Thus one could hypothesise that the 15% of US economists that deem 
the rational expectations hypothesis to be unimportant (Colander 2005: 188) or the 
17% of German economists who disagree with the proposition that neoclassical theory 
is relevant for current political problems (Frey et al. 2010: 319) could plausibly be 
over-represented in sustainable finance.  
 Indeed, IPE accounts of ideational change have tended to focus on how actors 
holding a minority view became influential.  Both the UK’s shift to monetarism and 
new classical economics and the post-GFC switch from micro to macroprudential 
supervision came from minority groups within the community of economists (Baker 





 While keeping in mind the overall distribution of economists’ ideas, the 
presence of such ideas in an expertise system like sustainable finance remains an 
empirical question. This is not to ignore that the majority view maintains important 
advantages over challengers. Proponents of the majority view can, for instance, 
marshal superior resources. Apart from greater financial firepower, these resources can 
include better developed concepts, larger datasets and greater legitimacy. These 
advantages can translate into greater influence within an adjacent system such as 
sustainable finance. However, such mechanisms of translation must be explicitly 
accounted for rather than assumed a priori.  
 In light of the above, we can expect that the prestige mechanism is less relevant 
in systems where the appraisal criteria for what constitutes legitimate expertise are still 
emerging. This notwithstanding, it is useful to keep in mind that professional prestige 
as such is also subject to variations, which can have knock-on effects on the influence 
of experts, whatever the content or maturity of their ideas. Farrell and Quiggin (2017) 
emphasise in this context that the political authority of economics as a profession co-
varies with the degree of consensus that economists present.  
 A second transmission route identifies individuals as carriers of ideas. The 
individuals in question hold certain economic ideas (e.g. through socialisation). The 
transmission of their ideas to policy occurs as the individuals become policymakers, 
advisors or policy-implementing civil servants. This approach is adopted by Ban, who 
follows networks of individuals with either embedded or disembedded neoliberal 
views and traces their ways to positions of policy decision making (Ban 2016: 31).  
 While also relying on individuals as carriers of ideas, Chwierorth (2007; 2010) 
and Nelson (2014) have operationalised the attribution of ideas to individuals 





and professional experiences as a proxy variable. Chwieroth uses a list of neoliberal 
universities to detect variations in the educational background of IMF staff, which he 
subsequently links to a variation in the Fund’s position towards capital controls. 
Nelson, on the other hand, finds a variation in the stringency of the Fund’s lending 
modalities, which is dependent on the degree of neoliberal convictions of the 
interlocutors from the countries requesting IMF loans. To measure these convictions, 
Nelson uses the educational background of policymakers and their past experiences 
with the IMF and the World Bank as proxies (Nelson 2014: 312).  
 The use of such proxy variables has led to criticism. In a review of Nelson’s 
research, Ban (2018: 788) casts doubt on whether such broad educational and 
professional variables can measure Neoliberalism without distorting the concept. Such 
criticisms are important and the next section of this chapter that concerns the 
classification of ideas as well as chapter 3, which outlines how ideas can be detected, 
will address these issues. For the discussion on transmission channels it suffices to 
note that both the network-based and more contextualised approach of Ban as well as 
the variable-based studies of Chwieroth and Nelson belong to the same category as 
they focus on individuals.  
 In summary, this strand of research assumes that individuals are vectors that 
carry ideas. Individuals will enact policies in period t2 that are based on the ideas that 
they have been exposed to in period t1. If we are able to find evidence on the ideational 
credentials of an individual (e.g. education, membership in academic associations, 
think tanks, personal links, public statements), who is connected to economic 
policymaking, we can assume that policies, in which the individual in question played 
an instrumental role, reflect the previously identified ideas. An important corollary to 





policy but also in how ideas “become embedded in organisations, patterns of discourse, 
and collective identities” (Berman 2001: 233; cf. Lindvall 2009 for an empirical study 
with focus on the change of organisational routines).  
 A stronger version of individuals as carriers of ideas is the concept of 
internalisation. Here, the successful mobilisation of ideas in a first period leads to a 
narrowing down of the realm of the thinkable. In other words, ideas acquire taken for 
granted qualities (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895) and act as cognitive locks (Blyth 
2001: 3). When applied to economic ideas, this approach has, however, come under 
criticism for advancing an unrealistic conception of individuals, who are assumed to 
have internalised highly abstract systems of ideas (Carstensen 2011a).  
 The problems with internalisation notwithstanding, the transmission channel 
that focuses on individuals is a credible, tested and easy to operationalise way to map 
the trajectories of ideas. There is, however, an important nuance in conceptualising 
individuals as carriers of ideas that relates to the concepts of socialisation and 
persuasion. Whereas socialisation follows the explanation outlined above, where 
individuals integrate ideas as part of their worldview, persuasion is a less permanent 
and less intensive process. Widmaier et al (2007: 754) point out that persuasion is 
much more about ongoing struggles and continued contestation than about the 
permanent internalisation of ideas. 
 This separation is important, because I contend that individuals that are heavily 
invested in sustainable finance tend to be subjected to socialisation. This means that 
they introduce ideas from the outside to sustainable finance in the first place. 
Subsequently, they engage in knowledge production and, thereby, stabilise the 
presence of the ideas in question.  On the other hand, persuasion occurs when these 





remotely connected to sustainable finance that the governance of this system should 
be entrusted to them (see section 5 for a more detailed discussion).  
 Concerning the operationalisation of individuals as transmitters of ideas, the 
expanded size of the population of individuals inside sustainable finance makes an 
approach that builds on lengthy narrations of individuals’ biographies impractical. On 
the other hand, quantitative methods that assign ideational allegiance based on 
educational or professional trajectories (Chwieroth 2007; see also Seabrooke and 
Nilsson 2014) rely on the assumption that a group that is characterised by a common 
educational or professional background holds shared ideas. Yet this is precisely the 
assumption that was rejected above, because of the possibility that non-mainstream 
representatives might have a disproportionate presence in emerging expert systems.   
 To establish the ideational credentials of individuals without either relying on 
extensive narratives or potentially inaccurate assumptions, I shift the level of analysis 
to the organisation. This reduces the number of actors to a manageable level. To 
understand what ideas do in organisations it is useful to consider two of the main 
dynamics that are highlighted in institutionalist scholarship (cf. Bell 2011: 898ff). 
 Ideas (and their carriers) must adapt to the institutional legacies that they are 
confronted with. Research on how ideas are grafted and layered on existing institutions 
as well as studies about regional differences and the hybridisation of ideas has explored 
these dynamics (e.g. Ban 2016; Ban and Blyth 2013; Babb 2013; Moschella and 
Tsingou 2013). On the other hand, ideas get institutionalised themselves in 
organisations that reproduce them. Universities, think tanks and professional 
organisations have been singled out as the sites of such ideational institutionalisation 
(Campbell 2001: 171). Within these organisations ideas can get normalised and thus 





might live on and inspire procedures and policy long after their discursive hegemony 
has passed (cf. Babb 2013).  
 The third and final route of ideational influence that Berman and Hirschman 
identify is what they call cognitive infrastructures (Berman and Hirschman 2014: 4). 
As the term infrastructure suggests, this route deals with the stabilisation of ideas into 
more durable forms. Once established, infrastructures can be expected to mediate the 
possibilities for action that are open to their future users. The concept of infrastructure 
covers a cognitive and rules-based dynamic at the individual and organisational level 
as well as a performative dynamic at the level of socio-technical instruments. 
Concerning the question of what is stabilised, Berman and Hirschman point to the 
economic style of reasoning (individuals and organisations) and to policy devices 
(socio-technical instruments).  
 As to the economic style of reasoning, it is assumed that concepts from 
economics like incentives or the quantification drive tend to dominate the policy 
discourse beyond the level of a single individual or organisation. Berman and 
Hirschman draw from Hacking’s (1992) work on the statistical style of reasoning and 
explain that a style of reasoning transcends the differences among competing 
economic paradigms. As will be elaborated further in section 4, I disagree with this 
assessment as it paints a too unified and unproblematic picture of ‘economics’. 
Furthermore, the identifiers that Hirschman and Berman propose for the economic 
style – common concepts and methodological advice – are equivalent to the ones that 
philosophy of science scholars have for paradigms (cf. Hirschman and Berman 2014: 
25-26). In light of these criticisms and the fact that the economic style of reasoning 





socialisation, persuasion and institutionalisation, I will sort it with their second 
transmission channel.  
 Performativity, on the other hand, is about ideas becoming part of a socio-
technical instrument that is subsequently used to govern a part of reality. Instead of 
institutionalisation or internalisation, ideas influence the construction of socio-
technical instruments like evaluation standards (e.g. Cost Benefit Analysis), 
classification systems (e.g. NACE sector codes) or measurement conventions (e.g. 
GDP) (cf. Berman and Hirschman 2014: 29ff). Once such a technical device is 
constructed and used, the ideas that informed it become embedded as they constitute 
the background information against which governance is carried out. It is important to 
note though that the transmission from idea to socio-technical instrument is not 
unproblematic. As material factors like data availability, computing capacity or cost 
play a role, there is no linear translation from ideas to instruments. Just as ideas have 
to adapt to institutional legacies, socio-technical instruments have to bring together 
multiple actors to ‘perform’.  
 This section has reviewed the literature on transmission routes that map the 
trajectories from economic ideas to policy outcomes. The institutionalisation of ideas 
as well as socialisation (individuals and organisations within sustainable finance as 
unit of analysis), persuasion (individuals and organisations at the margins of 
sustainable finance as unit of analysis) and performative processes (socio-technical 
instruments as unit of analysis) have been singled out as the most promising avenues 






2.3 Which Ideas Matter: Sorting Ideas by Disentangling the Concept of 
Paradigms  
Differences and Dynamics Between Academic and Policy Paradigms 
The previous section gave some insights about how ideas influence policy. It has, 
however, not addressed the question of which ideas matter. As noted above, one of the 
strengths of constructivist IPE lies in the sorting of ideas. The toolkit provided by 
constructivist IPE enables us to go beyond the classification of ideas that are voiced in 
policy debates in an ad hoc manner. Moreover, it puts emphasis on the contested nature 
of ideas and avoids marking dominant ideas as just being the ‘correct’ ones. The 
strategy that is most commonly employed to sort ideas is relating them to existing 
knowledge structures.  
 To denote such broader knowledge structures, IPE scholars have developed 
and debated the concept of policy paradigm. The concept of paradigm comes from 
Kuhn’s work in the philosophy of science and was introduced to the study of ideas in 
political economy by Hall (1989; 1993). Since then it has been applied and modified 
(Babb 2013; Kuzemko 2013; Lindvall 2009; Mandelkern 2015; Neep 2018; Röper 
2018), criticised (Blyth 2013a; Carstensen 2011a, Carstensen and Matthijs 2018; 
Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Schmidt 2002; 2011) and declared as obsolete and 
incomplete (Allan 2019: 186ff).  
 Much of the criticism of Hall’s original framework has been directed at the 
conflation of the ‘scientific’ processes of paradigm change that are explored by Kuhn 
with the ‘political’ contests that are the subject of ideational explanations in IPE 
(Carstensen and Matthijs 2018: 431; see also Blyth 2013a). Scholars, who study the 
transmission from ideas to policy (cf. previous section), have argued that the Kuhnian 





Kuhn’s model posits a strong internal cohesiveness for paradigms. Yet political actors, 
who are faced with institutional legacies and political realities, care less about 
ideational purity and tend to act pragmatically (Carstensen 2011a). In addition, 
Carstensen has argued that, unlike their Kuhnian name givers, policy paradigms cannot 
be understood as static ideational configurations that are only periodically disrupted 
during crises. Instead, they are subject to endogenous and evolutionary dynamics that 
also occur during periods of relative stability (Carstensen 2011a; 2011b; Carstensen 
and Matthijs 2018).  
 The Kuhnian explanation is unable to accommodate these dynamics. This 
means that when policy paradigms are interpreted as resembling scientific paradigms, 
the result is a punctuated equilibrium model (Carstensen 2011a; Carstensen and 
Matthijs 2018; Schmidt 2002; 2011). One reason for this is the incommensurability 
thesis that Hall carries over from Kuhn. Incommensurability means that paradigms are 
mutually exclusive thought structures. Combining different paradigms is impossible, 
because concepts and data that are mobilised within one paradigm are meaningless for 
the other one. Kuhn argues that if Einsteinian mechanics are right, then Newtonian 
mechanics and all its experiments and research questions must not only be wrong, but 
meaningless and irrelevant (Kuhn 1996[1962]: 98ff). In an economic context, Hall 
applies this notion by pointing out that while for Keynesians, who question the stability 
of the private economy, calibrations concerning public spending were meaningful (e.g. 
How? When? How much?), Monetarists that assume an economy in an equilibrium 
state deemed such questions nonsensical. This is because in their paradigmatic view 
public spending is always an impediment to economic performance (cf. Hall 1993: 






 Incommensurability leads then to paradigm shifts becoming Gestalt switches 
or “all or nothing affairs” (Blyth 2013a: 208). Hence, treating policy paradigms as 
incommensurable results in a punctuated equilibrium model, which, as the critics point 
out, is unable to accommodate observations about hybridity, bricolage, layering and 
regional adaptation (cf. Allan 2019; Ban 2016; Carstensen 2011a; Carstensen and 
Matthijs 2018; Schmidt 2011). A corollary of the Kuhnian approach is that battles 
between paradigms can only have two contestants: one incumbent and one challenger. 
However, Schmidt, echoing Kuhn’s assessment of the pre-paradigmatic stage of the 
social sciences, has observed that this is rarely the case with economic theories 
(Schmidt 2011: 42). Instead, she argues that multiple and partly overlapping and thus 
at least partly commensurable Lakatosian research programmes are a more accurate 
metaphor for describing the contests between economic ideas (Schmidt 2002: 223). 
Moreover, if applied to the individual, the incommensurability thesis leaves us with a 
highly unrealistic account of agents’ cognition.  
 Another criticism of Hall’s framework relates to the confusion of academic 
schools of thought with the policy structuring devices that he calls policy paradigms 
(Allan 2019: 186). Keynesianism and Monetarism are names that describe both 
research traditions and policy paradigms. Yet does that mean that the policy paradigm 
of Monetarism is a direct implementation of the findings from monetarist scholars? By 
alluding to political and sociological processes of paradigm shifts, Hall himself seems 
to suggest that this is not completely the case (Hall 1993: 280). Nevertheless, the 
identity between schools of thought and policy paradigms has led to much confusion. 
This confusion is amplified by the fact that there is a lack of consensus and in many 
cases even a lack of thought about how to measure the presence of policy paradigms 





 To resolve this confusion, I suggest to analytically separate schools of thought 
from policy paradigms. Both schools of thought – which I will refer to as academic 
paradigms since in the philosophy of thought literature paradigm is better defined than 
school of thought – and policy paradigms matter for ideational explanations. Yet, while 
connected, they have different characteristics, which lead to confusion if they are 
brought together within one concept. The tension between these two different concepts 
that are brought together under the name of policy paradigm can also be observed in 
Hall’s contribution. First, he identifies which ideas matter by sorting them into the 
academic paradigms of Keynesianism and Monetarism. Second, he describes how 
these ideas matter by elaborating the framework of first, second and third order policy 
change. The criticisms outlined above argue that the Kuhnian framework is inadequate 
for the how question and their arguments concerning evolution, incommensurability 
and internalisation are convincing.  
 Yet the critics remain relatively silent on the academic paradigms, which are 
instrumental for the sorting of ideas. As argued in section 2, such sorting exercises are 
necessary to study the contestation between ideas within a system. To underline the 
necessity of conceptualising ideational systems, I also pointed out that IPE research on 
ideas has time and again recurred to the study of schools of thought.  
 This leads to a reassessment of Hall and his critics. As shown above, the 
criticisms of the Kuhnian framework are accurate when it comes to policy paradigms. 
However, to determine the categories of an academic paradigm much can be gained 
from Kuhn and other philosophers of science. And Hall’s article is insofar right as it 
highlights that academic and policy paradigms are interlinked. However, the logics of 





Braun 2014: 60-61 on the neoclassical synthesis), when compared to policy paradigms, 
academic paradigms are more cohesive, stable and incommensurable.  
 It thus makes sense to apply concepts from Kuhn and the broader philosophy 
of science literature to establish the categories for comparing different academic 
paradigms. As illustrated above in Hall’s example of Keynesianism and Monetarism, 
when it comes to assessing the content of academic paradigms rather than only the 
actors applying them, a Kuhnian notion of incommensurability is warranted. This 
means that the processes like hybridisation or bricolage that have been emphasised in 
the literature on policy paradigms cannot be applied here. After all, such 
incommensurabilities are one of the major factors for why we see little research 
collaboration between Marxism and New Institutional Economics or between Austrian 
and New Keynesian approaches. Furthermore, the ideas inside of academic paradigms 
are structured hierarchically.  
 Establishing categories for ideas from the philosophy of science literature also 
enables us to eclipse millennia-old debates about what ideas are and where they come 
from (cf. Carstensen 2015: 285ff for a discussion of this problematic). By narrowing 
down the ideas inside an academic paradigm to those that can be sorted and compared 
across a limited number of categories, the tangled web of ideas is ordered and thus 
reduced to manageable levels of complication. 6  
 This subsection established that academic paradigms are analytical devices to 
categorise economic ideas. Policy paradigms, on the other hand, are subject to 
evolution, layering, hybridisation and political contestation. Also, it is policy 
 
6 The emphasis on philosophy of science criteria to structure systems of economic thought is also 
present in Schmidt’s early treatment of paradigms. Drawing from Hempel, she emphasises the triad of 





paradigms that influence policies via the transmission routes examined in the previous 
















Academic paradigms are 
more stable and cohesive 
and can be traced back 
analytically  
 
The stability of policy 





No or limited Yes Academic paradigms are 
incommensurable to the 
extent that they rely on 
different ontologies and 
epistemologies 
 
Policy paradigms are 
subject to layering, 
hybridisation, and 
regional translations   
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Indirectly Directly Academic Paradigms or 
the ideas ordered in them 
influence frames, which 
then influence policy 
paradigms 
 
Policy paradigms consist 
of persuasive and 
performative processes  
(cf. section 5) 







How to Spot an Academic Paradigm When We See One? 
As argued above, academic paradigms bring ideas together in larger thought systems. 
Examples of academic paradigms are Keynesianism, Neoliberalism, Institutionalism, 
Mercantilism or Developmentalism. To determine what makes up a system of thought, 
philosophers and historians of science have developed the concepts of thought 
collective (Fleck), research programme (Lakatos) and, most famously, paradigm 
(Kuhn).  
 One way to identify the characteristics of academic paradigms is to follow the 
logical framework that Imre Lakatos developed in his treatment of research 
programmes. Accordingly, the manifestation of an academic paradigm in its purely 
ideational dimension can be determined by logically reconstructing the derivation of a 
concept or argument to the core assumptions of the paradigm (cf. Lakatos 1970, see 
also Masterman 1970: 78-83). This approach follows the hypothetico-deductive 
method, where statements are derived from established premises using logical 
operators. If the deductive character of all parts of a paradigm was to hold, then a 
logical reconstruction could be undertaken. However, there are both theoretical and 
empirical limitations to such an approach.  
 The arguments against identifying paradigms through the process outlined 
above boil down to the observation that the hypothetico-deductive method is neither 
an accurate description of what scientists do nor of the evolution of a paradigm. 
Concerning the first criticism, it has been observed that neither natural scientists (e.g. 
Latour and Woolgar 1986; Masterman 1970: 60) nor economists (McCloskey 1983: 





have identified as the ‘scientific method’. As to the second criticism, Ludwig Fleck 
argued against a strictly logical and derivative approach stating that7:  
“The more detailed and differentiated the description is for any field 
of thought, the more complex, interrelated, and mutually dependent in 
definition will be its concepts. They become a tangle impossible to 
unravel logically, an organic structure produced by mutual 
development and with interacting components. At the end of the 
process, the beginning cannot be understood any longer or even 
properly expressed in words. If at all, it will be understood and 
expressed differently than it was originally.” (Fleck 2008[1935]: 53) 
 Fleck’s argument points out that a purely deductive definition of an academic 
paradigm is at best insufficient as it would ignore that concepts are also a reflection of 
the time and the sociological characteristics of the scientific community. At worst, it 
would be a misrepresentation of the academic paradigm.  
 To remedy these defaults, both Fleck and Kuhn have emphasised the 
sociological aspects of paradigms. Examples are shared institutions like academic 
journals as well as common metaphors and terminology (cf. Fleck 2008[1935]: 103ff; 
Kuhn 1996[1962]: 44). These criticisms and observations notwithstanding, the 
ideational part of the paradigm – what Fleck calls the thought style (Fleck 2008[1935]: 
110) – remains relevant and cannot be subsumed under the sociological categories. 
 Hence, a definition of academic paradigms must incorporate the role of social 
institutions. At the same time, it should be able to operationalise the ideational 
dimension of the paradigm in a non-strictly logical manner. The second demand can 
 
7 Fleck speaks of thought collectives and thought styles rather than paradigms, but for the purpose of 





be addressed by replacing the concept of axioms at the core of the paradigm. 
Alternatives to axioms, which have been proposed by Fleck, Masterman and 
Schumpeter respectively, are proto-ideas (Fleck 2008[1935]: 23ff), crude analogies 
(Masterman 1970: 84ff), and pre-analytic visions (Schumpeter 1986[1955]: 39ff). 
These concepts maintain the emphasis on a set of core ideas. They, however, propose 
a different mechanism for understanding how these ideas influence the expansion of 
the paradigm. Proto-ideas and the like are formulated in a very crude manner and do 
not lend themselves to a transformation into logical or mathematical statements. 
Instead, they come in the form of stylised facts, images or metaphors that serve as 
inspiration for theory development. Importantly, the translation from proto-ideas to 
secondary theoretical statements is carried out in an associative rather than in a 
derivative manner. 
 Proto-ideas are seldom spelt out explicitly. This means that they cannot be 
taken directly from texts that describe academic paradigms. Instead, they have to be 
constructed as analytical devices. For the operationalisation, this means that it is the 
task of the researcher to isolate proto-ideas from representative texts. Subsequently, 
these ideas serve as the basis for establishing the presence of the academic paradigm 
in the data under analysis. As to the isolation of proto-ideas, I follow Kuhn, who 
emphasises that paradigmatic ideas are conveyed to members of the scientific 
community through textbooks (Kuhn 1996[1962]: 165ff). Textbooks are 
complemented by field-surveying and intervention articles by adherents or critics of 
academic paradigms (see chapter 5).  
 To narrow down what constitutes proto-ideas, common ideational dimensions 
that must be addressed by all economic paradigms have to be identified. Likewise, the 





dimensions, must be assessed. The literature on pluralism in economics, the history of 
economic thought as well as descriptions of specific schools of thought in comparison 
to others offer a wide menu of dimensions and indicators (Chang 2014; Costanza 1991; 
Dobusch and Kapeller 2012; Marieta and Perlman 2000; Resnick and Wolf 2006). 
Table 2.3 orders the above-mentioned literature by providing a selection of the 
ideational, sociological and terminological dimensions and their respective questions 
or indicators.  
 The ideational dimension queries the self-identification of the paradigm, i.e. its 
claim of how it contributes to knowledge. In addition, the ontological assumptions 
concerning questions like which units of analysis (e.g. individual, group, system) and 
actors are deemed most important are assessed. The same goes for the selection of 
paradigmatically meaningful time intervals and geographical scales.  
 Two further indicators for the ideational dimension are Lakatos’ positive and 
negative heuristic. These heuristics provide an academic paradigm with a direction 
that guides its expansion (positive) and at the same time with a red line that cannot be 
crossed (negative). Lakatos points to Newton’s three laws of motion as an example of 
a negative heuristic. Accordingly, a scientist working within the Newtonian paradigm 
would swiftly abandon or redirect any research that violates of these laws (Lakatos 
1970: 133). Meanwhile, he defines the positive heuristic as a metaphysical principle 
consisting of “a set of initial conditions (possibly together with some observational 
theories) which one knows is bound to be replaced during the further development of 
the [research] programme, and one even knows, more or less how.” (Lakatos 1970: 
136, original italics). Lakatos takes the consecutive developments of Newton’s 
planetary model as an example. While the first iteration started with a model of two 





relevant categories like spherical planets and interplanetary forces (Lakatos 1970: 
135).  
 The final category inside the ideational dimension are analytical concepts and 
measurement units. This category captures prominent theoretical developments of an 
academic paradigm as well as the operationalisation of these concepts. 
 The sociological dimension of an academic paradigm can be assessed by 
looking at the institutional infrastructure of the academic community. One indicator 
for this dimension are the journals through which the members of the academic 
paradigm exchange their ideas. A further sociological aspect of academic paradigms 
is that they often are associated with a core set of foundational scholars. As the 
members of the paradigm tend to acknowledge these scholars in their writings, 
references to eminent scholars can be taken as an indicator.    
 Lastly, the terminological dimension is concerned with linguistic markers of 
academic paradigms. One indicator are idiosyncratic terms that are used frequently by 
the members of the academic paradigm. Metaphors, on the other hand, are thought 
structuring devices that are not only terminological but also express core ideas of the 
paradigm in a non-formalistic way (cf. Hodgson 2008).  
 In terms of operationalisation, the sociological indicators, i.e. paradigmatic 
journals and eminent scholars, will be queried through a quantitative corpus analysis 









Ideational Sociological Terminological 
Definition (what is the 
paradigm about?) 
Journals Typical language 
Unit of analysis and actors Eminent scholars Metaphors 
Time and scale 
Analytical concepts and 
measurement units 
Positive and negative 
heuristic 
Table 2.3 Selected Ideational, Sociological and Terminological Indicators of 
Academic Paradigms 
 
2.4 Where Ideas Matter: Policy Subsystems and Frames 
Policy Subsystems 
While the preceding sections have discussed ideational transmission channels and 
academic paradigms, the question of how to conceptualise the environment where 
these processes take place remains open. I already specified that I understand 
sustainable finance as an evolving system, in which the positions of different actors 
are defined in relation to each other. A formalisation of such an understanding is 
provided by the concept of policy subsystem. Sabatier has described such subsystems 
in his work on advocacy coalitions. Policy subsystems are populated by actors with 
material or normative stakes in the issue that is governed by the system. Actors can be 
public or private entities as well as CSOs and International Organisations (IOs). These 
actors work together in so called actor coalitions or else compete to affect policy 
outcomes (Sabatier 1998). Shared beliefs on core elements of policy in the subsystem 
are, in turn, the ‘glue’ that binds them together (Sabatier 1998: 103; see also Blyth 





 Conceptualising sustainable finance as a policy subsystem provides a useful 
analytical framework since it allows for the connection of different actor types. The 
incorporation of different actor types is beneficial as empirical investigations on the 
interaction between actors from market and environmental backgrounds have shown 
the existence of fragmented networks that are bound together by lose frames like 
‘liberal environmentalism’ (Hoffman 2011). As sustainable finance is connected to the 
broader systems of both environmental and financial governance, one can expect that 
similar dynamics might be taking place.  
 A second advantage of the policy subsystem concept is the emphasis that it 
gives to technical expertise in linking policy actors (Sabatier 1998: 99). This focus 
integrates well with the literature on the sociology of expertise that was introduced 
above. In addition, it is well-positioned to represent the dynamics of the financial 
system, which has been found to be relatively isolated from democratic political 
processes. Instead, finance is characterised by elite interactions and technical discourse 
(Baker and Widmaier 2014; Scholte 2013).  
 While the concept of policy subsystem is helpful for understanding the social 
space in which the dynamics of sustainable finance unfold, it has to be complemented 
by other concepts. To connect policy subsystems with the discussion on academic and 
policy paradigms, I introduce the concept of framing below.  
 A final thing to notice on policy subsystems is that Sabatier’s original 
framework is designed for what he calls ‘mature’ policy subsystems, i.e. systems 
which have existed in a stable configuration over a prolonged period. Mature systems 
are characterised by an established and distinguishable population of actors as well as 
by clearly defined conflict lines that often arose through watershed events (Sabatier 





contrast, has been anything but stable over the last decades. Whereas there has been a 
community of actors that has linked finance with sustainability concerns for at least 
four decades, the actor population and the interactions among actors have undergone 
significant changes. I will come back on how these differences in maturity are likely 
to influence the transmission of ideas in the fifth section of this chapter. 
 
Frames  
In mature policy subsystems, the shared beliefs that link actors within policy 
subsystems are not articulated through the concepts of either academic or policy 
paradigms. Instead, Sabatier refers to them as ‘policy core beliefs’, which represent 
basic normative and empirical commitments (Sabatier 1998: 103). Sabatier suggests a 
list of up to 11 categories of policy core beliefs that relate inter alia to the identification 
of the causes of the problem, choices of which groups’ welfare counts most and the 
appropriate role of markets and governments. They find, however, that the 
operationalisation of two or three of these categories is normally sufficient to identify 
actor coalitions (Sabatier 1998: 112-113; Sabatier and Weible 2007: 195ff). Sabatier 
also notes that these belief systems are routinely defined as actors sharing a “set of 
basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions” (Sabatier 1998: 115).  
 As sustainable finance presents a case of an immature policy subsystem, it can 
be assumed that the category of problem perception plays a particularly important role. 
This is because actors have yet to develop a shared understanding of the meaning of 
the policy subsystem. To highlight this characteristic, I adopt the concept of framing 





 Framing has been defined as individuals’ response to the question “What is it 
that’s going on here?” (Goffman 1974: 8), social movement actors’ construction of “a 
shared understanding of a problematic situation that they define as being in need of 
change” (Benford and Snow 2000: 615), the selection and making salient of aspects of 
a perceived realty (Entman 1993: 52) and the “selecting, organizing, interpreting and 
making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing and 
acting” (Rein and Schön 1993: 146). A commonality of these definitions is that they 
emphasise frames’ function as uncertainty-reduction devices that enable actors to 
understand and transform their environment. This approach reflects a constructivist 
understanding as actors cannot perceive their interests and motivations before they 
interpret the reality and their position in it by means of ideas (cf. Broome 2013: 193 
for an overview, see also Blyth 2002; Widmaier et al. 2007). Frames are thus close to 
what constructivists have classified as “ideas as blueprints” (cf. Blyth 2001). If we 
adopt a narrower understanding of actors’ environment being the policy subsystem of 
sustainable finance (cf. chapter 3 on the empirical operationalisation), applying the 
conceptual language of framing can be utilised to understand the shared ideas that bind 
actors together.  
 Using frames instead of academic or policy paradigms to denote joint ideas, 
addresses the criticism concerning individuals’ (and organisations’) incapability to 
internalise highly abstract thought structures (Carstensen 2011a).8  At the same time, 
the concept of framing incorporates the notion that actors still rely on existing thought 
structures such as academic paradigms to interpret their surroundings. This is because 
framing agents are understood as being both consumers of the existing knowledge 
stock and producers of novel meanings (Benford and Snow 2000: 629). Second, 
 
8 Exceptions are mature and highly technical issues like central banking and macro-modelling 





starting with the identification of frames allows for an inductive research strategy, 
which is better suited to understand the emergence of the sustainable finance policy 
subsystem and the role that economic ideas played in this process than a deductive 
testing of hypotheses (cf. chapter 3).  
 
How to Spot a Frame When We See One? 
Benford and Snow (2000: 615ff) suggest that frames can be conceptualised according 
to three dimensions, which capture the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
functions of framing. Diagnostic framing is about the identification of a problem, 
whereas prognostic framing concerns itself with the question of “what is to be done?” 
Since naming the problem frequently implies the solution, diagnostic framing 
constrains prognostic framing. Vanhala and Hestbaek provide an example of this 
dynamic. They observe in their study of the UNFCCC negotiations that a diagnostic 
frame focusing on risk leads to a prognostic frame that emphasises insurance, whereas 
a diagnostic frame that highlights liability is connected to a prognostic frame that 
prioritises compensation (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016: 121). Motivational framing, 
finally, is about the deployment of vocabularies that convey the importance of taking 
action. Motivational framing is, however, more attuned to the study of social 
movements and has received less attention by researchers studying elite settings. These 
analyses have either focused on diagnostic and prognostic frames (Vanhala and 
Hestbaek 2016) or have adopted an inductive approach that does not explicitly account 
for the three dimensions (e.g. Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008; Crespy 2010; Ban 
2015; Hjerpe and Buhr 2014).  
 I thus focus on the diagnostic and prognostic dimension when looking at the 





relational dimension. Drawing from Goffman’s (1974) early work on frame analysis, 
Hasselbalch has recently emphasised the role of relational dynamics in the framing of 
governance systems that are disrupted by technological innovations (Hasselbalch 
2016: 68ff). Since the uncertainty that comes from technological novelties is 
comparable to the uncertainty that is present in an immature policy subsystem, I expect 
that relational framing complements actors’ diagnostic and prognostic efforts. 
Relational processes can materialise either through an alignment with prestigious 
actors (e.g. the UNFCCC or the World Bank) or through the dissociation from actors 
that are perceived as not trustworthy (e.g. a global bank from the perspective of an 
environmental CSO) or non-expert (e.g. a small ethical bank from the position of a 
large asset manager).  
 
2.5 Which Ideas Matter How and Where: A Transmission Mechanism 
Having defined the transmission channels of ideas (institutionalisation, persuasion, 
performativity), the sorting of ideas (academic paradigms, frames) and the locus of 
ideational collaborations and contestations (policy subsystems), it is now possible to 
construct a transmission mechanism (figure 2.1) that links these concepts. Importantly, 
the transmission channels are ordered in a different way than in the discussion of 
Berman and Hirschman (2014) that was revisited in the second section of the chapter. 
The right-hand side of figure 2.1 separates between a performative and persuasion 
transmission channel (cf. sections 1 and 2). Meanwhile, the distinction between 
academic and policy paradigms, which is the subject of section 3, is visualised by 
putting academic paradigms as a separate concept on the left side of the figure. 
Whereas academic paradigms are ideational systems that can be assessed through 





denote the transmission of ideas to policy outcomes via persuasive and performative 
processes. 
 Importantly, the mechanism that is outlined below separates the transmission 
of ideas into two parts. In the first part, ideas flow from academic paradigms to the 
actors inside the policy subsystem of sustainable finance via frames. The second part 
of the transmission is about how these actors transmit their frames to the governance 
of sustainable finance by means of persuasive and performative processes.  
 
 












Part 1: Transmission from Academic Paradigms to Frames 
On the left side of figure 2.1, there is an equivalence sign between the box labelled 
academic paradigms and the box labelled frames. In addition, there is an arrow from 
academic paradigms to frames. The equivalence sign indicates congruence between 
the ideas that are present in academic paradigms and the ones that are present in 
frames. Academic paradigms are thus used to sort the stock of available economic 
knowledge, from which the proponents of a specific frame draw.   
 Yet academic paradigms are also reproduced by the academic community. 
Members of the academic community can influence other actors in the policy 
subsystem via socialisation and institutionalisation. Hence, the arrow denotes an 
actual transmission rather than a mere congruence. Both the equivalence sign and the 
arrow allow for the sorting of frames into an academic paradigm. The important 
difference is that the sorting via equivalence remains agnostic about how the 
transmission of ideas occurs.  
 As opposed to academic paradigms, which are (re-) produced by the scientific 
community, frames are created by actors within the policy subsystem. These actors 
reassemble existing knowledge to understand their environment. Henceforth, frames 
take ideas out of the hierarchical and structured context of academic paradigms. As 
such, frames provide a more realistic description of how ideas are incorporated at the 
individual or organisational level. In addition, the introduction of frames as an 
intermediary step can provide insights as to why policy paradigms are not subject to 
the logic of incommensurability. This is because if policy paradigms are stitched 
together from the frames that have been formerly cut loose from academic paradigms, 
there is no reason to expect that the structure of a policy paradigm should resemble the 





 Nevertheless, as indicated by the arrow and the equivalence sign in figure 2.1, 
frames are not independent from existing knowledge. Rather than coming up with 
original ad hoc explanations, actors that employ framing can be actively influenced by 
academic paradigms. Alternatively, they come up with ideas that on the grounds of 
philosophy of science categories can be sorted into an academic paradigm.  
 
Part 2: Transmission from Frames to Policy Paradigms  
Competing Debate Positions 
While Hall’s original three-tiered structure of paradigm change has led to much 
confusion, a modification of it can be used to order the transmission channels that 
enable frames to influence policy outcomes. Importantly, I focus on Hall’s 
differentiation of processes rather than on his treatment of sequence. In Hall’s 
conceptualisation, third order changes occur when a shift of policy goals and a shift in 
the hierarchy of these goals takes place. Policy makers also change their causal beliefs 
about how the economy functions in the course of third order shifts (Hall 1993: 279-
280).  
 Furthermore, third order shifts require the involvement of an audience that is 
broader than the expert community of economists and civil servants (Hall 1993: 287). 
Widmaier et al. (2007) emphasise that for such processes of major change, persuasion 
that occurs as actors interpret crises is instrumental. For them, persuasion takes place 
both at the elite level and at the level of the broader public. Similarly, Schmidt has 
highlighted that, unlike with Kuhn’s scientific revolutions, major changes in policy 
ideas require the involvement of a community of actors that goes beyond experts 





degree of paradigm shift cannot be easily separated along these lines. Instead, 
paradigm shifts are messy and complex processes, in which ideational contestations 
might as well take place inside the government machinery and must not necessarily 
entail an involvement of the broader public (Oliver and Pemberton 2004: 435). 
 I will return to the question concerning the difference between elite and public 
audiences below. For now, we can conceptualise the ideas that are mobilised in 
persuasive shifts as debate positions. These positions offer different accounts about 
issues that are deemed important by the actors inside the policy subsystem. Depending 
on which position prevails, policy changes or, alternatively, existing policy is 
reproduced. In other words, the process through which winning a debate matters is 
akin to ‘traditional’ policy making. If the proponents of a position can convince a large 
enough fraction of their audience that their ideas are sensible, the government 
machinery will be mandated to implement them.  
 Debate positions are, however, not the same as frames. As outlined in section 
4, frames are inward-oriented uncertainty-reduction devices that provide actors with 
blueprints of how to understand a hitherto unknown situation.9 And while it is likely 
that empirically there is no neat separation between understanding a situation and using 
such an understanding to persuade others, I choose to analytically separate both 
processes to emphasise that inward-looking frames also structure immature policy 
subsystems, in which an initial absence of contestation has been observed (Sabatier 
1998: 114). As the policy subsystem matures, frames inform more controversial debate 
positions that are aimed at the persuasion of other actors that are outside the coalition 
that is connected through a frame.  
 
9 This conceptualisation differs from some uses of framing, where the concept has been expanded to 





 Debate positions are also not the same as academic paradigms. Drawing from 
Hay, who argues that accounts of crises need not to correspond with material policy 
failures (Hay 1999), Neep notes that what he calls “crisis narratives” do not have to be 
congruent with academic paradigms, nor do they have to display the logical 
consistency that was discussed in the third section (Neep 2018: 498). This also 
resonates with the points that Hall’s critics have raised. Debate positions are distinct 
from academic paradigms as they need not to be coherent nor stable, nor 
incommensurable.  
 An understanding that comes close to debate positions is Widmaier’s 
description of how economic orders are established by value-laden exercises in 
‘principled construction’. Widmaier uses Kahneman’s work on fast thinking and 
affective heuristics to emphasise that such debate positions are not sophisticated 
suggestions of a fine-tuned policy mix, but value-laden shortcuts for establishing 
causal links (Widmaier 2016: 16ff). In this dynamic, the boundaries between what 
Schmidt has called ‘principled’ (i.e. normative) and ‘causal’ (i.e. means-ends) beliefs 
become blurred (Schmidt 2008).  
 To give an example from Widmaier’s empirical investigation: In the beginning 
of the Keynesian era in the US, promotors of a Keynesian approach like President 
Roosevelt highlighted the importance of thinking in macro terms and adopting 
collective (i.e. government) actions to address inflation. On the other hand, critics of 
government measures to inflation like price controls would mark them as an attack on 
free enterprise and the “American way of life” (Widmaier 2016: 57-58). Likewise, the 
neoliberal economic order was constructed by the emphasis on individual utility and 





as a “purely monetary phenomenon” served as heuristic devices (Widmaier 2016: 
138).  
 In summary, debate positions are ideational tropes that actors use in public 
debates. They are principally aimed at the persuasion of other actors and as such they 
are akin to “ideas as weapons” (Blyth 2001) or “communicative discourses” (Schmidt 
2008). Debate positions are informed by frames, which precede them in time as they 
materialise already when an actor ventures into the policy subsystem for the first time.  
 
Socio-technical Instruments 
Whereas third order shifts are situated in the realm of public debates, Hall’s first and 
second order changes occur at the technical level of policy instruments and their 
calibrations. According to Hall and others (Lindvall 2009; Mandelkern 2015), ideas 
matter through this channel, because they inform instruments that alter the economy 
in a means-end way. Lindvall, for instance, describes demand management as an 
instrument from the Keynesian paradigm that is used to influence the level of domestic 
economic activity (Lindvall 2009: 710, my emphasis).10 Similarly, Mandelkern’s 
instruments are provisions that hard-wire the tenets of the neoliberal paradigm into law 
and shift decision-making power towards institutions that are staffed with adherents to 
Neoliberalism (Mandelkern 2015: 933). 
 This view of instruments stays close to the meaning of the word. Instruments 
are ‘instrumental’ for achieving a desired outcome. However, such a definition cannot 
be applied to policy paradigm shifts in policy subsystems that are ill-defined and lack 
 
10 Note that Lindvall defines the Keynesian paradigm as the school of thought (i.e. the academic 
paradigm in the language of this thesis), whose predicaments about causal mechanisms can be used by 





the presence of would-be policymakers and would-be technicians that adhere to a 
challenger paradigm. Thus, this view of instruments is also an outcome of the all-or-
nothing perspective of the punctuated equilibrium model. Accordingly, causal beliefs 
become enshrined in instruments, which govern the economy until they are replaced 
with challenger instruments during a crisis. This view assumes that such beliefs are 
well developed and need only be applied. Yet situations of major crisis, where 
alternative instruments are ready to use, are the exceptions rather than the norm. So, 
how can ideational factors impact economic policy in areas where evolutionary 
dynamics and uncertainty play a much greater role? 
 The role of instruments based on competing ideas in a more evolutionary and 
uncertain situation can be illustrated by considering the shift from microprudential 
towards macroprudential regulation, which is studied by Baker. Before the shift, 
researchers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) took inspiration from the 
Post Keynesian and Austrian academic paradigms. The ideas derived from these 
paradigms stood in opposition to the traditional regulatory instruments, which were 
informed by the academic paradigm of neoclassical economics (Baker 2013: 117). As 
a result, macroprudential policy retained an experimental character and actors needed 
to develop concepts and instruments rather haphazardly. Baker illustrates this by citing 
a paper of Bank of England (BoE) researchers, who emphasise that “the state of 
macroprudential policy resembles the state of monetary policy just after the Second 
World War, with patchy data, incomplete theory and negligible experience, meaning 
that MPR [Macroprudential Regulation] will be conducted by trial and error.” (Aikman 
et al. 2011, quoted in Baker 2015: 355; see also Thiemann et al. 2018 on the 
exploratory character of the academic debate on macroprudential issues). But how can 





causal relationships stipulated by an academic paradigm be applied, if these very 
variables are not yet stable concepts? 
 I suggest that to answer this question one needs to broaden the definition of 
policy instruments. I argue that this can be achieved by departing from the 
‘instrumental’ view, which assumes that the normative and causal beliefs of an 
academic paradigm are neatly translated into the instruments of a policy paradigm. By 
contrast, the dynamics of immature policy subsystems are less about the choice 
between well established ‘policy instruments’ and more about developing and 
stabilising ‘socio-technical instruments’. While socio-technical instruments translate 
ideas from an academic paradigm, these ideas are not the only factor that plays a role 
in their construction. I thus make a similar argument to Kranke and Yarrow (2018), 
who problematise the link between discursive shifts and performative practices in 
macroprudential policy. In the performative view, ideas do not matter because they are 
translated into policy instruments that act upon the economy (cf. Braun 2014: 49; 
Braun 2016: 259). Instead, the socio-technical instruments themselves are a part of the 
infrastructure that makes up the economy (Callon 1998; Mitchell 2008). This 
‘ideational infrastructure’ is used by market participants and regulators to reduce 
uncertainty, foster communication and make material investment decisions (Braun 
2014: 50).  
 The literature on the performativity of economic models provides a good 
starting point for understanding the link between academic paradigms and socio-
technical instruments. Performative models like the Taylor Rule at central banks 
(Braun 2014), Value at Risk calculations in financial institutions (Lockwood 2015), 
macroeconomic models inside state bureaucracies (Henriksen 2013) and the 





contributed much to the understanding of economic governance.  To illustrate the 
performativity of economic models, I draw on the recent work of Huber et al., who 
investigate the connections between academic paradigms and the European 
Commission’s Potential-Output Model (PO-Model) (Huber et al. 2017, see also 
Heimberger and Kapeller 2017).  
 For Huber et al., models function as connectors between the abstract 
assumptions of the academic paradigm that cognitively constrain agents’ thinking and 
the active programmes that provide prescriptions for policy. They occupy this middle 
ground by defining problems through the formalisation of paradigmatic assumptions. 
This formalisation results in a quantitative output that gives a clear course for policy 
action (Huber et al. 2017: 3-4). This description of models as translation devices 
represents a solution to a hitherto missing link in the transmission chain from academic 
paradigms to economic policy. However, the narrow focus on models should be 
relaxed in favour of a more comprehensive understanding of socio-technical 
instruments.  
 Instead of ascribing performative status only to economic models, socio-
technical instruments can be split up into different levels, all of which can receive input 
from academic paradigms and frames. Hansen and Porter provide a typology of 
calculative devices, which differentiates between the specific and localised counting 
of objects, the more abstract collection of such counts in databases, and, finally, the 
incorporation of database records into predictive models (Hansen and Porter 2012). 
Similarly, Latour discusses the hierarchy of what he calls “inscriptions of the n-th 
order” where e.g. a bar chart is based on the calculation of totals, which are based on 





2003: 234). Latour makes the point that these devices, which he calls ‘black boxes’, 
are based on other black boxes (cf. Latour 2003: 80).  
 Frames influence these black boxes via the same mechanism that Huber et al. 
identified for the case of academic paradigms and economic models. A model 
translates the assumptions of an academic paradigm by stipulating a particular 
relationship between variables.  In the case of the PO-Model, this relationship is 
between the factors of production and potential output (cf. Heimberger and Kapeller 
2017). If the black box approach is applied to this model, going down to the n - 1 order 
implies that the definition of the categories in question, i.e. the factors of production 
and potential output as well as the indicators measuring them have to be problematised. 
Huber et al. actually take this step by critically examining one of the concepts that is 
used to estimate the quantity of labour, namely the Non-Accelerating Wage Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU) (Huber et al. 2017: 9-10).  
 The point I want to make here is that in the model there are two different stages 
of paradigmatic influence that do not necessarily have to occur together. The 
neoclassical paradigm is mapped onto the PO-Model on the n-th order through the use 
of a Cobb-Douglas growth function.  Yet even without the Cobb-Douglas function, 
the lower order concept of NAWRU, in its shape of a descriptive statistic of the n - 1 
order, is already a calculative device that translates input from neoclassical economics. 
In other words, whereas a model performs by selecting and formalising the 
relationships between certain variables (thereby omitting others), lower level 
calculative devices like categories and measurement methods perform by selecting 
these very variables and by establishing measurement conventions.  
 In the case of models, performative processes receive direct input from 





and experimental instruments that are produced inside of emerging policy subsystems 
such as sustainable finance. This does not mean that academic paradigms do not 
matter. It only means that there is an intermediary step where the assumptions of an 
academic paradigm are first translated into a frame that, subsequently, influences the 
design of a seemingly practical instrument. One example of how relatively 
unsophisticated socio-technical instruments are reflecting paradigmatic assumptions 
are benchmarks, such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index. While the 
indicators of this benchmark do not postulate any relationship between variables, 
choosing e.g. states’ treatment of Foreign Direct Investment as a relevant indicator is 
still based on the assumption of allocative efficiency that is part of the neoclassical 
paradigm (cf. Broome et al. 2018).  
 
Part 3: Interactions Between Persuasive and Performative Processes 
One final channel of influence is represented in figure 2.1 as the arrow that flows from 
persuasive to performative processes. This influence occurs because debates act as 
reference points for the development of socio-technical instruments. Accordingly, 
socio-technical instruments try to operationalise the arguments that are voiced in 
abstract debates by providing unambiguous measurements and definitions. This 
channel of influence is well established in the literature on policy paradigms, where 
3rd order shifts are assumed to be translated into the appropriate policy instruments for 
implementation. Yet in contrast to Hall’s framework, where the technical 
implementations are linear derivations from 3rd order goals of policy paradigms, the 
relationship between debates, frames and academic paradigms is more complex in this 
case. Once performativity is introduced, the hierarchy of Hall’s orders of paradigm 





Scoping Conditions and System Characteristics  
The problems that Hall’s framework encounters when confronted with performativity 
can be addressed by loosening the emphasis on the sequence of paradigm change. 
Notably, Blyth (2013a) has argued that Hall’s original sequencing runs into a paradox. 
This is because the incremental process of social learning and the radical changes of 
paradigm shifts cannot be brought together within the same process. I suggest that 
focusing on the distinctness of persuasive and performative processes as well as on the 
characteristics of the policy subsystem is an alternative conceptualisation that can help 
us to understand the mechanisms of ideas-inspired shifts in policy paradigms.  
 In the traditional, i.e. non-performative, interpretation the ordering from 1st to 
3rd order processes denotes the degree of change. Consequently, the fiercest political 
contestations can be expected in the high stakes 3rd order debates. Apart from its 
conceptual difficulties, the notion of such a universal sequence of policy paradigm 
change has also been challenged empirically. Oliver and Pemberton (2004) find 
instances of paradigm changes that lie between 2nd and 3rd order when expanding the 
timeframe of Hall’s original case of shifts in the UK’s macroeconomic policy. Another 
finding that does not fit well with the notion of a universal sequence is provided by 
Baker’s comparison of the classical case of the UK’s transition from Keynesianism to 
Monetarism in the 1970s with the shift of financial regulators from microprudential to 
macroprudential regulation after the GFC. Baker finds that in the latter case the 
political contestation occurs at the level of 1st and 2nd order instruments. At the same 
time, 3rd order ideational changes were relatively uncontested. To explain these 
differences, he points to a Variety of Crisis that is indicated by variations in the time 





burning crisis) as well as by differences in the institutional and political context of the 
policy subsystem (Baker 2015: 343).  
 In light of these findings, there is value in exploring alternatives to the 
sequencing model of paradigm change. The Varieties of Crisis concept provides a 
good starting point. However, due to the problem of arriving at exogenous categories 
for what makes a crisis a crisis (cf. Hay 1999) and in order to not confine the 
application to cases of extraordinary change, I contend that the characteristics of policy 
subsystems and institutional fields can be useful for finding variations that favour 
different transmission channels from ideas to policy outcomes.  
 Importantly, variations in these categories influence the second part of the 
transmission mechanism outlined in figure 2.1, where ideas from policy actors are 
influencing governance. As such they concern academic paradigms only indirectly 
insofar as they explain how ideas from these paradigms that have been incorporated 
through framing by policy actors are translated to policy. They are, however, not aimed 
at explaining the transmission of ideas from academic paradigms to the actors in the 
policy subsystem in the first place.  
 With these caveats in mind, a category that is highlighted both in Sabatier’s 
work on policy subsystems and by field theorists is the level of institutional maturity 
(Sabatier 1998; Zietsma et al. 2017: 28). Mature systems are characterised by 
established hierarchies and stable actor populations. They have infrastructures that 
belong to the system itself such as specialised units in government organisations 
(Sabatier 1998: 111). As suggested in the literature on issue and interstitial fields, the 
opposite are immature institutional arrangements, where actors need to draw from the 





identities, practices, meanings and governance mechanisms may be ambiguous, 
unelaborated, provisional, [and] subject to reflexive debate” (Zietsma et al. 2017: 30).  
 Henceforth, in mature policy subsystems actors have sufficient knowledge on 
the issues that are subject to debates. Problems that merit attention (e.g. 
unemployment, inflation) are defined in an uncontroversial way and delineated from 
other issues. Policy paradigm shifts are about the priorities that should be given to 
established problems and about what should be done to address them. In addition, 
mature policy subsystems are often characterised by bipolar structures (Sabatier 1998: 
102). This means that the adherents of the incumbent paradigm make policy while the 
advocates of the alternative policy paradigm have an established arsenal of socio-
technical instruments at their disposal and are ‘waiting in the wings’ (cf. Schmidt 2002: 
204).  
 All of this makes (3rd order) changes in debate positions the more powerful 
mechanism in mature policy subsystems. As institutional infrastructures are 
established and meanings are clearly delineated, the proponents of competing policy 
paradigms put forward their debate positions to persuade the public to entrust them 
with the governance of the policy machinery. In emerging subsystems, by contrast, the 
performative dimension of delineating how the issues that are to be governed are 
actually understood and measured takes precedence.  
 A second variation that is likely to influence the relative strength of the 
different transmission channels is the size and cohesiveness of the audience. In a small 
and cohesive policy subsystem we can expect that socio-technical instruments matter 
more. Yet the more diffuse the audience becomes, the more stakeholders have to be 
brought on board through persuasion. Debates about policy design or what Schmidt 





connected policy subsystems. As more actors become enrolled in the governance of 
these systems, ‘communicative discourses’ that are aimed at persuasion rather than at 
the clarification of technical detail gain importance (cf. Schmidt 2008). Thus, large 
audiences that can, for example, be observed in established systems like 
macroeconomic policy display a greater propensity for persuasive processes.11 
 In summary, the second part of the transmission mechanism seeks to 
understand how changes in the frames inside the policy subsystem influence the 
persuasive and performative processes of policy paradigms. This makes policy 
paradigms distinct from the previously discussed academic paradigms, which denote 
a stock of highly structured economic knowledge. As outlined in the first part of the 
transmission mechanism, actors develop and deploy frames with inputs from academic 
paradigms. When doing so, they can in principle stitch together knowledge from 
multiple academic paradigms. However, this will require greater expenses of energy 
and time than a simple translation of existing knowledge to a new situation.  
 Importantly, the process that is depicted in the transmission mechanism is not 
explicitly aimed at understanding how the actor population inside the policy subsystem 
developed. Nor does it address the question why an actor adopts one frame and not 
another. While the empirical chapters suggest that both developments inside the 
system as well as changes in related systems and the broader political context matter 
here, a detailed exploration of these dynamics is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 The foregoing discussion on the scoping conditions has highlighted that 
sustainable finance as an emerging policy subsystem with a relatively small but 
 
11 A different way to look at the size of the audience is the notion of salience. Small and cohesive 
policy subsystems are characterised by “quiet politics” (Culpepper 2011), where levels of politization 





growing audience can be expected to be more influenced by the performative dynamics 
of socio-technical instruments than by persuasion through debates. And while the 
sorting of the case of sustainable finance according to the scoping conditions of 
institutional maturity and audience size is solely a typological undertaking, future 
research could adopt a comparative perspective to gain further knowledge on how 
variations in those conditions affect the relative importance of ideational transmission 
channels.    
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for the empirical part 
of the thesis. First, the complementarities of constructivist IPE, the sociology of 
professions and STS for studying emerging systems of expertise were discussed. This 
literature review concluded that an explicit system-based conceptualisation of actors 
paired with a sorting of ideas that is inspired by constructivist IPE holds promise for a 
fruitful research design. In addition, a separation of the ideational transmission 
mechanism into two parts was suggested. First, ideas from academic paradigms are 
reflected in the frames that bind the actors inside of the policy subsystem together. 
Second, persuasive and performative channels enable the actors to transmit their 
frames to policy outcomes. In addition to that, I suggested scoping conditions that 
make either of the two channels of the second part of the transmission more 
meaningful.  
 In the next chapter, I will describe how a systems perspective can be 
operationalised by using social network analysis, content analysis, interviews and 
participant observation data. In addition, the next chapter will further elaborate on why 





the understanding of how ideas matter in non-crisis situations. The constituent parts of 
figure 2.1 will be further explored in the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 4 starts 
from the middle of the figure. In this chapter, I identify the frames that are present in 
sustainable finance and trace their connections and relative power positions over time. 
Chapter 5 then moves towards the left of figure 2.1 by querying the ideational 
congruence of the frames with academic paradigms. The sixth chapter moves towards 
the right side of figure 2.1 and investigates how frames connect with the persuasive 

















3. Methods and Data 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to understand how economic ideas from academic 
paradigms influenced the evolution of sustainable finance. The first step of this 
analysis consists of establishing where this transmission between ideas and policy 
takes place. In chapter 2, I outlined the concept of policy subsystem to specify the 
location, where the transmission is situated. To visualise the structure of the policy 
subsystem of sustainable finance as well as the positions of its actors, I use network 
analysis. However, mapping the evolution of the policy subsystem is only one part of 
the analysis. Network analysis alone cannot tell much about the content of the frames 
that bind actors together. Nor can it establish linkages between frames and both 
academic and policy paradigms. For this second analytical step, I rely on quantitative 
and qualitative content analysis, interviews and participant observation data.    
 In this chapter, I outline how each of these methods as well as the 
corresponding data links with the research objective of this thesis. In the first section 
I, however, take a step back to revisit the literature on case studies and situate my 
treatment of sustainable finance in it. Subsequently, I point out why a multimethod 
strategy comprising network analysis, interviews, content analysis and participant 
observation is well suited to study the evolution of sustainable finance. The second 
section discusses how network analysis can be used to analyse the policy subsystem 
of sustainable finance. Here, I introduce some foundational concepts of network 
analysis as well as some network measures. In the third section, I discuss the data 
collection strategy that follows from understanding the policy subsystem in network 
terms. The fourth section concerns itself with qualitative and quantitative text analysis, 





of the networks that constitute the policy subsystem and thus can be mobilised to 
establish the linkages between academic paradigms, frames and policy paradigms. The 
fifth section concludes the chapter.   
 
3.1 Selection of Case and Methods  
Case Selection 
When the research priority rests with theory building and with understanding so far 
understudied (or for that matter just emerging) phenomena like sustainable finance, 
case study designs are able to yield rich insights. This stands in contrast to large-n 
comparative research designs, which are well equipped to test alternative hypotheses 
that are derived from established theoretical frameworks (Gerring 2004: 346). As 
opposed to the adjudication between different hypotheses, the in-depth study of a case 
addresses how-questions that uncover the mechanisms that make a specific 
phenomenon happen. In this context, the case study method has also been linked to 
research designs that aim for establishing causal mechanisms (cf. Goertz 2017, Gerring 
2004: 349ff). Importantly, for researchers in the positivist tradition, case studies’ 
abilities to make causal inferences rest on an ontology of independent units. 
Henceforth, variations within one case over time (diachronic) or across cases 
(synchronic) must be observed to make causal claims (cf. Gerring 2004: 343).  
 This ontological assumption does encounter some complications when applied 
to the case of sustainable finance. First, as implied by the name, the policy subsystem 
of sustainable finance is not a variable but a system. As I will discuss in more detail in 
the next section, this is problematic as observations on the actors inside a system are 
relational. This means that they violate the assumption of independence that is required 





reconcile between the relational nature of systems and the quest for establishing 
correlations (see section 2), the separation between what happens inside the system 
and what outside factors impact the system or are impacted by the system remains a 
challenging task (see section 4). Second, the ‘outcomes’ that are influenced by 
variations in the policy subsystem are policy paradigms. Yet the constituent parts of 
policy paradigms as understood in this thesis are not easily reduced to variables either. 
As argued in chapter 2, socio-technical instruments make the governance of an issue 
possible in the first place. It is thus hard to imagine that one could come up with a list 
of variations of socio-technical instruments on a common category given that the very 
definition and existence of such categories is dependent on the socio-technical 
instruments in question.  
 The foregoing discussion does not mean that I refrain from making claims 
about how the policy subsystem of sustainable finance and the actors and frames inside 
of it affect policy. It means, however, that instead of looking for co-variation, I focus 
on transmission channels such as the persuasive and performative processes. Thus, my 
understanding of the relations between the structure of the policy subsystem, academic 
paradigms, frames and policy paradigms is closer to the “complex view of causality” 
that can be found among critical realists and scholars adopting a process-tracing 
research design (cf. Welch et al. 2011: 754ff for examples). Accordingly, causation 
depends on the interplay of multiple factors and can be established by explicitly 
considering the context rather than by abstracting from it.  
 Apart from making claims about causation, the methodological literature on 
case studies points to the issue of sorting a case into an existing, i.e. studied, population 
of cases. The question that arises from this part of the literature thus is: What is 





response to this question is that sustainable finance is a case of ideas from academic 
paradigms influencing policy. The distribution of cases studying this phenomenon 
covers the spread of Keynesianism across the world in the aftermath of the 2nd world 
war (Hall 1989; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Widmaier 2016), Keynesianism’s 
replacement by neoliberal policies in different historical and geographical contexts 
(Ban and Blyth 2013; Ban 2016; Babb 2013; Blyth 2001; 2002; Carstensen and 
Matthijs 2018; Chwieroth 2010; Hall 1993; McNamara 1998; Mirowski and Plehwe 
2009; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Röper 2018; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; 
Widmaier 2016) and the more recent work on the challenges to and the reproduction 
of Neoliberalism in the aftermath of the GFC (Baker 2013; 2015; 2018; Blyth 2013a; 
2013b; Helgadottir 2016; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).  
 Much of the above-mentioned literature on how economic ideas matter is 
skewed to the extent that it focuses on situations of crisis rather than of evolution. As 
I discussed in chapter 2, this focus makes it open to the punctuated equilibrium 
critique. Studies that cover extended time periods (often in book-length, e.g. Ban 2016; 
Chwieroth 2010; Widmaier 2016) remedy this bias to a certain extent. Nevertheless, 
even in these cases the presence of extraordinary situations of ideational rupture 
structures the argument. Furthermore, most of the studied cases focus on historical 
developments. This means that the operationalisation often relies on archival materials 
and retrospective interview testimonials of involved persons. Studies on the rise of 
Keynesianism and its replacement with Neoliberalism have often a time lag of decades 







 The literature that has studied the aftermath of the GFC (Baker 2013; 2015; 
Blyth 2013a; 2013b; Helgadottir 2016; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013) has addressed this 
issue by studying the (non-)transition of ideas in its historical context. Studying 
phenomena as they evolve is a valuable undertaking as it prevents researchers from 
engaging in ex-post rationalisations. This notwithstanding, as the post GFC literature 
is mostly focused on debates in the established system of macroeconomic policy, it 
has emphasised crises rather than evolutions. Studies that emphasise the emergence of 
new systems like the recent contributions on “macro-finance” (e.g. Gabor and Ban 
2016; Braun et al. 2018), on the other hand, have so far covered the influence of ideas 
only in passing. To date, Baker’s studies on the emergence of macroprudential policy 
remain the major exception as they integrate ideational explanations with a case of a 
still evolving policy subsystem.  
 Studying sustainable finance addresses the crisis bias of the existing literature 
as well as the relative absence of treatments of recent and ongoing cases of ideational 
influence. By closing these gaps in the case distribution, it can be potentially useful 
for future research that compares the conditions that make one channel of ideational 
influence more successful than others (cf. chapter 2 on scoping conditions).  
 
Method Selection 
The selection of methods should derive from their potential for gathering insights that 
are relevant for the research question and not from the prestige and elegance that they 
command. Echoing this position, Flyvbjerg has argued that “Good social science is 
problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods 
that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand” 





produced research that integrates this advice relatively well insofar as it has been quite 
pragmatic in its choice of methods. It has thus largely avoided the narrowing down of 
what counts as an acceptable research question to accommodate a (potentially ill-
conceptualised) understanding of ‘rigour’. Accordingly, the selection of methods has 
varied considerably depending on the case and the research question.  
 Research on historical cases of ideational transitions has utilised archival data 
and content analysis to query how ideas matter (e.g. Blyth 2002; Widmaier 2016). This 
is frequently complemented by elite interviews with persons who participated in the 
historical episodes. Moreover, secondary sources such as newspaper articles or 
memoirs are routinely mobilised. Instead of incorporating the data into a formalised 
transmission mechanism, researchers using these data sources have often relied on 
holistic descriptions of ideational change, which are closer to methods from the 
discipline of history. As explained by Widmaier (2016: 24), these more interpretative 
methods can account for the complex interplay of multiple factors. Rather than 
specifying and probing a particular transmission channel, the findings that are obtained 
from such methods are used to classify and partition the case under analysis according 
to ideational categories.  
 The questions and methods of historical and often interpretative treatments 
differ significantly from the study of transmissions, where individuals act carriers of 
ideas (see chapter 2). Such analyses are usually more formalised and tend to treat ideas 
as variables. By assigning numerical values to the ideational credentials of an 
individual, which, for example, are operationalised by coding the training at a specific 
university, regression models can be utilised to establish ideas as independent variables 





 More recently, the strand of research that integrates insights from the sociology 
of professions has brought some methodological innovations to IPE. Notably, network 
analysis (see next section) and methods that draw on biographical data and the coding 
of career trajectories have been incorporated. Much of this research is based on 
concepts like ecologies (cf. Abbott 2005; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2020), which treat a 
system as the main unit of analysis. To understand the dynamics of these systems and 
describe the actors that operate within them, researchers then draw on multiple 
methods. The blending of methods often brings together more formalistic assessments 
of a system like network analysis with either positivist or interpretative analyses of 
ideas.  
 One example of such a blending of methods is Ban et al.’s (2016) article on the 
governance of shadow banking. In this study, the authors combine a network analysis 
of citations with a content analysis that codes the cited texts into three categories. In 
addition, they use biographical data to code the career trajectories of the authors of the 
cited texts. The analysis of the evolution of carbon pricing experts that is provided by 
Paterson et al. (2017: 183) follows a similar methodological strategy as it integrates 
social network analysis and the coding of biographical data with interviews and 
archival materials. A different combination of methods is undertaken by Seabrooke 
and Tsingou (2014: 391), who utilise document analysis (coding), network analysis, 
semi-structured interviews and first-hand experience (participant observation) to map 
ideational differences that are present in expert group responses to the GFC. Yet 
another example of multimethod integration is Morin et al.’s (2016) study of the 





“boundary organisation”. Morin et al. combine three different network measures with 
a biography-based coding of the individuals present in these networks.12  
 A final strand of ideational research that is also linked to the concept of policy 
subsystem concerns itself with so called discourse networks. Here, discourses from 
political actors that are obtained, for example, from newspaper articles or 
parliamentary debates, are coded. Subsequently, actors that vocalise a common 
discourse are linked in the network. Discourse networks have been used to study 
amongst others the change of German pension systems (Leifeld 2013), the evolution 
of ideological cleavages on climate change in the US Congress (Fisher et al. 2013) and 
the conflicts about regulating software patents in the EU (Leifeld and Haunss 2012).  
 The preceding discussion of methodological choices outlines a rich menu of 
approaches that are apt to query the role of ideas in evolving policy subsystems. Rather 
than departing from existing research and engaging in methodological innovation, I 
mostly rely on tried and tested approaches. I use network analysis, content analysis, 
semi-structured elite interviews and participant observation. This combination of 
methods is a commonly applied strategy for understanding ideational factors in system 
contexts. 
 Despite these commonalities, my approach differs from the ones outlined 
above in several aspects. First, I refrain from assigning numerical or categorical values 
to ideas. This is due to the complexity and the possible overlaps between different 
academic paradigms and frames, which prevent the unambiguous assignment to crisp 
and exhaustive categories. To avoid these kinds of problems, I adopt a mostly 
 





qualitative form of content analysis, which is integrated with network analysis, 
interview data and participant observation transcripts (see section 4).  
 Second, I do not systematically collect biographical data, nor do I use methods 
to code and aggregate such observations. This is because if one wants to understand 
the role of ideational factors it is difficult and potentially more obscuring than 
enlightening to develop codes that relate the training and professional stages of an 
individual career to certain ideas. As I argued in chapter 2, such a strategy would rely 
on potentially unjustified assumptions that a priori equate disciplines, universities, 
IOs, firms and other actors with an idea. The complications that such an approach 
entails are neatly illustrated by the dispute between Ban and Nelson (cf. Ban 2018) 
about the usefulness of educational and professional proxies for Neoliberalism that 
was briefly discussed in the last chapter. 
 A final departure from most of the above-cited studies is that I give more room 
to data that I obtained through participation observation. Ethnographic methods have 
been routinely employed in STS both in classical studies of the natural sciences (e.g. 
Latour and Woolgar 1986) and in research on financial practices (e.g. Beunza and 
Stark 2004). In addition, in European Studies, scholars, who advocate for giving more 
importance to the study of “everyday practices”, have emphasised the insights that can 
be gathered from participant observation (Adler-Nissen 2016). As further described in 
section 4, the observations that I undertook are a long way off the best practices of 
ethnography. Nonetheless, data that is gathered through the attendance of events, 
where different parts of the actor population come together, can be used to observe the 






3.2 Conceptualising the Policy Subsystem: Network Analysis  
Definitions and Network Types 
In its most basic form, a network describes a system by looking at its individual parts 
and their interaction. Identifying patterns in the interactions between the individual 
parts can increase our understanding of the behaviour of the system as a whole 
(Newman 2010: 1-2). Newman (2010) makes a distinction between technological 
networks (e.g. railroads, the internet’s physical infrastructure), biological networks 
(e.g. neural networks, predator-prey networks), information networks (e.g. citation 
networks, hyperlink networks on the internet) and social networks (e.g. friendship 
networks, networks of organisations). As this thesis is concerned with the role of ideas, 
the networks that I analyse can be grouped into the category of information networks. 
Yet since I also investigate how common frames bind individuals and organisations 
together, the analysed systems also display some dynamics of social networks.  
 The differences among the types notwithstanding, a common feature of all 
networks is that one has to specify the parts of the system and the nature of their 
interaction. In other words, the nodes (parts, actors) and the edges (links, ties, 
connections) have to be defined. To illustrate the build-up of networks one can look at 
a predator-prey system: Here the nodes are living organisms. The links, meanwhile, 
represent ‘who eats whom’. While this relationship is sufficient to represent a 
biological network as a system, one could go further and quantify what ‘flows’ when, 
for instance, a seal devours a fish.  This flow can be conceptualised as energy, which 
is measured in Joules or Calories. If a numerical value of a common category like Joule 
is assigned to the links, the network is weighted. It is important to note that the link 
that represents energy exchange through eating goes only in one direction, i.e. from 





The opposite is an undirected network where whatever flows through the connections 
can go in either way. In a friendship network, which connects individuals (nodes) 
through mutual friendship (links), the flows (for instance, time of friendship) are 
usually not thought to be directional.  
 A final definitional issue relates to the amount of different node types that are 
present within a network. In the two examples above there is only one type of node: 
Living organisms in the predator-prey network and individuals in the friendship 
network. The examples are thus one-mode networks. Yet one can also construct a two-
mode network in which two different types of nodes interact. Imagine that one wishes 
to represent the membership of individuals in different sports clubs in a network. Here 
there two types of nodes, namely the individuals and the clubs. Importantly, in this 
network there can only be links between the two different node types. Individuals can 
be members of clubs, but neither can individuals be members of individuals nor can 
clubs be members of clubs.13  
 Two-mode networks can be transformed into one-mode networks. The 
example of individuals’ membership in sports clubs could be either transformed into a 
network that provides information about how sports clubs are connected through joint 
members or, alternatively, a network that details connections among individuals 
through joint club membership. The conversion of a two-mode to a one-mode network 
results in an undirected, weighted network. The weights represent the sum of the nodes 
that have been collapsed from the two-mode network. In the above example, the link 
between two sports clubs with three joint members would have a weight of three. In 
formal notation, the conversion from two-mode to one-mode networks is carried out 
 
13 Though one could hypothetically introduce a third type of node, where clubs can be members of 





by multiplying the affiliation matrix, which records the links between the two types of 
nodes, with its transpose.14  
 
Network Measures: Descriptive and Inferential Network Analysis  
The properties of nodes, links and groups of nodes as well as the structure of the 
network as a whole can be measured. These measurements can be used descriptively 
to make statements about the shape of the system and the attributes of the actors inside 
of it. Alternatively, network statistics can be used in an inferential way. In the latter 
case, actors’ network attributes are influenced by non-network observations or vice 
versa. An example of such a relation would be the case where people with similar 
education establish friendship links. Alternatively, causation can flow from the 
network to a dependent variable outside of the system. This configuration would be 
present in the case where a central position in a friendship network increases 
individuals’ happiness (cf. Borgatti et al. 2013: 15, 137ff). In addition, networks as a 
whole might be related to external observations. One can, for instance, imagine a case 
where the structure of a railway network is correlated with political and economic 
conditions.  
 Inferential network analysis is mostly operationalised through formal, 
regression-type models that integrate network statistics with non-network variables. 
Examples are Exponential Random Graph Models, Permutation Tests and Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure regressions (Borgatti et al 2013: 137ff; Desmarais and Cramer 
2012; Leifeld et al. 2017; Lusher et al. 2013). As I argued in section 1, the processual 
understanding that I adopt as well as the hard to quantify nature of both ideas and 
 






socio-technical instruments means that these formal tools are less well suited for 
studying the role of ideas in the evolution of sustainable finance. Instead, I choose a 
similar approach as the IPE studies revisited in section 1, which integrate descriptive 
statistics from network analysis with other sources of data in a non-formalistic manner. 
For the representation of such descriptive statistics, the visualisation of networks can 
be helpful since the human eye is extremely good at detecting patterns in such spatial 
representations (Newman 2010: 8). Nevertheless, also the application of descriptive 
network statistics needs a prior discussion of the assumptions on which their 
calculation is based as well as of the meanings that they convey.  
 
Node Level Measures: Degree Centrality 
One of the most basic properties of a node in a network is its degree. The degree of a 
node is defined as the sum of its edges. Degree is an easy to understand and easy to 
operationalise measure of the importance of an actor in a network. More connections, 
i.e. higher degree, are often linked to greater relevance of a node for the functioning 
of the system. In addition, a look at the degree distribution can give insights about the 
structure of the system. Long-tailed degree distributions, where most nodes have zero 
or few links and a small number of nodes have extremely high degree values, are 
indications of systems that display core-periphery dynamics (Newman 2010: 8). 
Citation networks (Newman 2010: 64), corporate ownership networks (Vitali et al. 
2011) and elite networks (Knoke 1993: 34) have been found to be characterised by 
such core-periphery structures. In many network configurations, degree is also highly 





An example of how to calculate degree is given in the hypothetical network of figure 
3.1, where the node B has a degree of three. This is because it has three edges, which 
connect it to the nodes A, C and D.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Hypothetical Network  
 
In formal notation degree is defined by the equation 
Degree:  𝑘𝑖 =∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
  (Equation 1) 
where the degree (k) of node i is defined as the sum of the edges it has to the n nodes 
of the network that are recorded in the adjacency matrix A. If the network in question 
is weighted, it is also possible to not just sum up the amount of edges but also their 
values. The network measure that captures this relation is called graph strength and is 
calculated in an analogous way to degree. In directed networks, the calculation of 
degree can be split into two measures for every node. First, there is the out-degree 





degree of an article is equivalent to the number of articles that it cites. In-degree, by 
contrast, measures the sum of incoming edges. The in-degree of the article would 
correspondingly be the number of times the article is cited by other articles.  
 
Node Level Measures: Betweenness Centrality  
Betweenness centrality is a measure that assigns high values to nodes that link parts of 
the network that would have been disconnected otherwise. In social networks and 
information networks, high betweenness centrality scores identify nodes that 
aggregate information and occupy positions that bridge otherwise separate 
communities (cf. Borgatti et al. 2013: 185ff; Burt 1992; Seabrooke 2014). Tracking 
the evolution of betweenness centrality over time is a commonly used method for 
determining privileged positions of actors in information networks (e.g. Ingold and 
Leifeld 2014: 16; Paterson et al. 2014). Applied to sustainable finance, high values of 
betweenness centrality can thus indicate actors that possess large amounts of 
knowledge about the policy subsystem. Moreover, these actors can potentially use 
their information advantage to shape the development of sustainable finance. 
 Betweenness centrality measures the number of shortest paths that a node is 
part of. That means that in the hypothetical network in figure 3.1 node B would have 
a betweenness centrality of 5 as it is part of the shortest paths AD, AE, CA, CD and 
CE. Node D would equally have a betweenness centrality of 5, whereas A, C and E 
would have a betweenness centrality of 0. For cases with more than one shortest path, 
e.g. if there was a path from A to D via F in two steps (dashed lines), both F and B 
would increase their betweenness centrality by ½ from the connection of A and D. In 
the case that the edges have weights, these weighted edges are taken into account by 





where the sum is smaller will be used as the shortest path. Going back to the 
hypothetical network in figure 3.1, this means that if AB and BD both had a weight of 
2 and AF and FD both had a weight of one, the relative sums of each path would be ½ 
+ ½ = 1 for ABD and 1+1 = 2 for AFD. Thus, ABD, due to its lower score, would be 
the shortest path.  
Betweenness Centrality: 𝐶𝐵(𝑝𝑖) =∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑝𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘𝑖≠𝑗≠𝑘
   (Equation 2) 
 
 The formal definition of betweenness centrality (CB) of node I (pi) is given in 
equation 2, where gjk denotes the number of shortest paths between nodes J and K and 
gjk (pi) is the number of shortest paths passing node I.
15  
 
Network Level Measures: Size of Largest Component 
A component is a set of nodes that are connected with each other through at least one 
edge. If one does not consider the dashed lines, the hypothetical network in figure 3.1 
would consist of three components: One consisting of five nodes (ABCDE) and two 
consisting of only one node (F and G). In this example the five-node component would 
be the largest component, whereas the single-node components are so called isolates. 
Counting the nodes that are part of the largest component as a fraction of all nodes 
provides information about a network’s cohesion. In a fragmented network this ratio 
will be relatively low, whereas in a well-connected network it will be higher (Borgatti 
et al. 2013: 164). And while there are no general thresholds for what counts as 
cohesive, a longitudinal approach that compares different states of the same network 
 
15 For further specifications on maximal path lengths for calculating betweenness centrality in 





can provide information about the relative cohesiveness (see chapter 4). Applied to the 
case of sustainable finance, a very fragmented network could be a sign of various 
competing frames and communities none of whom is able to acquire a dominant 
position. A cohesive network, on the other hand, can indicate that communities start 
to collaborate and that a dominant frame is emerging.  
 
Group Level Measures: Girvan-Newman Community Detection Algorithm  
Network statistics can also convey information about groups of nodes. These groups, 
which are also referred to as communities or clusters, are part of the overall system but 
have more connections among themselves than to the rest of the network. Hence, they 
can be conceptualised as separate entities. Examples of such groups are a clique of 
close friends in a friendship network or articles covering the same topic in a citation 
network (cf. Borgatti et al. 2013: 193ff).  
 Looking at groups can be valuable to identify actors that share common traits. 
In their treatment of social networks, Borgatti et al. note that “Actors within cohesive 
subgroups tend to share norms and often have common goals and ideals” (Borgatti et 
al. 2013: 193). This sharing of norms might result from a selection process, where 
actors with similar non-network attributes like common beliefs establish links in the 
network. Alternatively, it might come from a process of diffusion, where the 
connection of actors leads to a convergence of their beliefs (Borgatti et al. 2013: 144-
145). The tendency of groups to be characterised by common beliefs makes them a 






 The literature on network analysis suggests various methods for finding such 
groups. A clique is a group of nodes, in which each node is connected to every other 
node (Newman 2010: 193). Alternatives to such formal definitions are hierarchical 
clustering algorithms, which compare the properties of nodes by using measures of 
node-similarity like ‘Euclidean Distance’ or the ‘Jaccard Coefficient’. Through a 
repeated calculation of these measures, first at the node level and subsequently at the 
level of ever larger clusters, the nodes are iteratively assigned to groups (cf. Leifeld 
2013 for an application). Hierarchical clustering algorithms have, however, been 
criticised for assigning wrong memberships to nodes in known group structures. For 
example, they tend to cut off nodes that are at the periphery of a group (Girvan and 
Newman 2002: 7822).  
 To remedy this tendency, Girvan and Newman propose an alternative 
algorithm that is based on the concept of betweenness centrality that was introduced 
above. In their initial application they also applied their algorithm to an information 
network that sorts the publications of researchers into clusters that are based on 
common topics and methodologies (Girvan and Newman 2002: 7825). As their data is 
quite similar to the co-publication networks that I use to conceptualise the policy 
subsystem of sustainable finance (see section 4), the Girvan-Newman Algorithm 
appears to be a good choice for finding communities that are bound together by 
common frames.  
 The Girvan-Neman Algorithm calculates the betweenness centrality of all 
edges in a network. This works in analogy to the notion of betweenness centrality that 
was introduced above. The only difference is that it is the edge rather than the node, 
whose betweenness centrality is defined as the number of shortest paths that pass 





highest value is removed from the graph. Then centrality scores are re-calculated and 
edges are removed iteratively until no more edges remain (Girvan and Newman 2002: 
7283). Just as with hierarchical clustering, the result of this algorithm is a tree diagram 
or dendrogram. In contrast to other hierarchical clustering methods that iteratively 
assign nodes into every more inclusive groups, the algorithm works in the opposite 
direction. The removal of edges results in communities that become smaller with each 
iteration.  
 Rinscheid (2015: 47ff) applies the Girvan-Newman Algorithm to a discourse 
network on the issue of nuclear power in the pre- and post-Fukushima period in Japan 
and Germany. The algorithm allows him to check for variations in the structure of the 
discourse communities across both time and geography. In the Japanese case, he finds 
that the pre-Fukushima, pro-nuclear consensus (represented by one single community) 
was replaced by a more contested situation, in which the pro-nuclear community 
shared the discursive space with an anti-nuclear community and a third community 
that emphasised the need for a review of nuclear policy.  
 To determine which level of partition within the dendrogram is the most 
meaningful, the implementation of the Girvan-Newman Algorithm that is available in 
the igraph package in the programming environment R also calculates the ‘modularity 
value’ for each partition and chooses the partition with the highest modularity value as 
output. Intuitively, modularity can be understood as being high when there are many 
connections within the communities that are specified by the algorithm and few 
connections across communities.16  
 
 





3.3 Delineating the Policy Subsystem: Data Collection  
Types of Data: Co-publication and Citation Networks 
To represent the policy subsystem of sustainable finance as a network, I draw on co-
publication and citation measures. These measures have mostly been applied to study 
knowledge production in scientific contexts. An early example is Crane (1972), who 
constructs citation networks to assess the development, growth and social structure of 
sub-disciplinary communities that she calls “invisible colleges”. With the proliferation 
of widely accessible databases of scientific papers and their citations like the Web of 
Science, the feasibility of such research projects has increased markedly.17 Bearman 
and Shwed (2010), for instance, use citation data and the above introduced notion of 
modularity to assess the degree of consensus within different research themes. Other 
applications that are closer to IPE are Seabrooke and Young’s (2017) citation-based 
sorting of the IPE discipline itself into different communities as well as Morin et al.’s 
(2016) use of co-publication data in the study of IPBES experts.  
 A commonality of these analyses is that proximity in network terms is taken as 
an indicator of epistemic agreement. For Bearman and Shwed, high modularity scores 
signify the existence of competing research communities that address the same issue 
in different ways. The clusters that Seabrooke and Young observe are groups of 
scholars working on common topics or within a shared methodological (in this case 
meaning quantitative vs. qualitative) framework (Seabrooke and Young 2017: 20ff). 
The same goes for the community of co-publishing researchers in the application 
exercise that Girvan and Newman used to test their algorithm.   
 
17 Another facilitating factor is the increase of computing power. This is nicely illustrated by the fact 





 If these considerations are applied to sustainable finance, the epistemic 
agreements can be reconceptualised as actors having common frames. Similar to the 
assessment of academic consensus, measuring the cohesion of the overall network can 
be taken as a proxy for the dominance of one particular frame. A more accentuated 
community structure, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a sign of greater 
fragmentation with multiple frames competing over the definition of what sustainable 
finance means and is.  
 
Boundary Specification and Data Collection 
Network analysis is a tool to describe systems and the interactions of actors situated 
within them. This focus has implications for the collection of data. First, unlike other 
methods, network analysis cannot rely on statistical sampling techniques. As the 
system is the unit of analysis, the entire population that makes up the system has to be 
considered. The relational nature of network analysis means that omitting well-
connected actors might misrepresent centrality attributes as well as the grouping of 
actors. Second, since most social and natural systems are open, i.e. they are related to 
other systems, to define where a system ends is a complicated matter. This notion of 
demarcating what is inside the system and what is outside of it is also known as 
boundary specification. If one, for example, wanted to study the interactions amongst 
employees of a firm, decisions on whether part-time staff and contract agents should 
be included have to be made. And while in some research projects it is possible to draw 
on official records like membership lists to identify a system, ‘virtual’ phenomena like 






 Using official or consensus definitions for delineating a system is also referred 
to as the “realist” approach of boundary specification. The alternative, which is 
mobilised for systems that lack such a definition, is the “nominalist” strategy (cf. 
Rinscheid 2015: 44). In the nominalist approach, membership in the system is 
determined by the research question. In this context, it is noteworthy to recall that 
sustainable finance, as understood in this thesis, is a system that covers both the 
linkages in knowledge production and the interactions among individuals and 
organisations. To cover this characteristic, I first apply a system definition strategy 
that comes from the study of elite networks. Subsequently, I use a topic-matching 
approach as used in the study of information networks to delineate the knowledge 
production activities of these actors.  
 Knoke (1993: 30) summarises four commonly used methods for boundary 
specification in elite networks. Positional methods identify an actor population by 
looking at official sources like registries. Decisional methods focus on the actors that 
have in the past participated in binding decisions of a formal governance system. The 
reputational method relies on expert judgements to determine the members of the 
network. These judgements can either come from outside observers like academics 
and journalists or from actors in the network themselves. The relational method, 
finally, starts from a set of actors that have been found with the use of another method 
and subsequently includes those who cooperate with these actors as new members.  
 The absence of formal registries or similar sources that are a characteristic of 
mature rather than of evolving policy subsystems makes the use of the positional 
method impossible. Similarly, the evolving nature of sustainable finance also means 
that for the time being there are no records of major decisions and the actors that were 





method by including actors that were present at high-level events on sustainable 
finance. This notwithstanding, the definition of the system relies mostly on the 
reputational and relational methods.  
 In accordance with these two methods, I first assembled a list of organisations 
that can be attributed to sustainable finance. The organisations were sampled by 
looking at scholarship (e.g. Clapp and Thistlethwaite 2012; Hoffmann 2011; MacLeod 
and Park 2011; Newell and Paterson 2010; Thistlethwaite 2011; 2015), newspaper 
articles and ‘community mapping reports’ produced by actors from the field of 
sustainable finance (e.g. Dupré et al. 2013; UNEP Inquiry 2015; UNEP Inquiry 2016).  
Furthermore, in what can be called a modification of the decisional method, I included 
organisations that were present at events on sustainable finance like the launch of the 
European Commission’s High-level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance’s (HLEG) 
interim report in July 2017, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (CoP) 23 in November 
2017 and the Finance Day at the One Planet Summit in December 2017. The collection 
of actors was carried out on a rolling basis from May 2017 until the end of December 
2017. Stock taking exercises were undertaken in September 2017 (185 organisations) 
and in January 2018 when the complete dataset included 242 organisations. 
 In the second stage, I assessed the knowledge production of these organisations 
by looking at their publications. I rely on texts that are published under the name of 
one or more of the sampled organisations and are freely available. Rather than 
including all publications from the 242 organisations, I collected only those texts that 
match previously specified keywords. Keyword-based boundary specification is often 
applied to study knowledge production. In their study of ‘cognitive domains’, Bearman 





systems of knowledge production than data collection strategies that start from a core 
set of authors. 
 The keywords that I use to determine whether a text is about sustainable finance 
are “sustainable finance”, “green finance”, “climate finance”, “sustainability” and 
“climate change”. In addition, I initially added the search term “Capital Markets Union 
(CMU)”, which is linked to the EU’s HLEG that started in late 2016 as well as to the 
EU’s subsequent actions on sustainable finance. I included this term because I used 
the work of the HLEG as a starting point for ‘snowball sampling’ (i.e. the relational 
method), since it can be expected that many actors would seek connections to such a 
high-level initiative.  
 While in light of the transnational nature of the sustainable finance policy 
subsystem I did not explicitly restrict data collection to a specific geography, the 
privileged position of the HLEG might have introduced a European bias to the 
networks. Since Europe has long been the geography that accounts for the greatest 
share of sustainable finance – 46% of sustainable assets in 2018 according to the 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA 2018: 9) – I expect, however, that most 
of the actors in the global policy subsystem have a presence in Europe. Consequently, 
they should be included in the data. Finally, I also included keywords on “alternative” 
or “ecologically reflexive” economic and financial systems to account for the different 
terminology that is used by some civil society and activist organisations that concern 
themselves with sustainable finance.  
 I collected the publications by visiting the website of each organisation and 
checking whether there was a section that explicitly reflects one of the keywords. If no 
such separate section was available, the search function of the website was used by 





more by looking at the title and summary. The types of documents that were included 
in the dataset are reports, policy briefs, consultation notes, literature reviews, strategy 
documents, declarations and speeches. Texts like journal articles, which are aimed at 
an academic audience rather than at the actors in the policy subsystem, were excluded. 
Likewise, assessments of individual projects, companies or countries that mostly 
present data on one specific issue without engaging in the broader debate on 
sustainable finance were excluded. Lastly, I excluded documents that do not deal with 
finance (e.g. sustainability literature focusing on trade) or with sustainability (e.g. 
alternative economies literature focusing on unemployment). In this process, I 
collected 891 documents18  from 152 of the 242 organisations for the period between 
1998 and 2018. The timeframe arose from the availability of data from the actors that 
were identified in the first step.19   
 I focused on publications in English and included translated documents 
whenever available. Yet while English language documents account for more than 
95% of the corpus that was eventually used for the network analysis, I also included 
32 German language texts and one document in Spanish. This inconsistency in 
language is a reflection of a bias from the researcher. However, since most existing 
research on sustainable finance has been conducted in Anglo-American and French-
speaking contexts (e.g. Sparkes 2002; Déjean et al. 2004, see chapter 4 for an 
overview), I contend that this slight skew towards German language documents can 
deliver added value that outweighs the problems of the bias.  
 
18 See Appendix C for the names of the 242 organisations and the number of documents that were 
initially obtained from them.  
19 For a more detailed description on how the selection of actors and publications was carried out see 





 In summary, the shape and size of a network are always an artefact of the 
delineation of a system and its boundaries. In the absence of easy to find or 
conventionally agreed on boundaries, networks reflect the research interest as well as 
the availability of data. This does not mean that such networks are idiosyncratic and 
incomparable representations of phenomena. As I discuss in chapter 4, comparing the 
networks that I construct in this thesis with descriptions on the emergence of 
sustainable finance that are based on different data sources can give insights into 
omissions and biases on both sides. This can then lead to complementary insights about 
the different dimensions of sustainable finance.  
 
Coding of Links  
The relations between the publications on sustainable finance that act as raw data can 
be either conceptualised as co-publication links or as citation links. Whereas citation 
networks focus on the flow of information, co-publication links also indicate a social 
dimension. This is because people producing a joint publication can be expected to 
engage in social interaction. While I created both citation and co-publication networks, 
the communities of actors forming around shared frames are best understood through 
the latter type.  
 
Co-Publication Networks 
I coded co-publication links manually by identifying the individuals that are listed as 
contributors in the collected texts. In doing so, I relied on a more inclusive definition 
of who can be counted as a ‘co-publisher’. This is because many of the collected texts 





whom will end up in marginal positions in the networks, was deemed less a risk than 
to exclude potentially important nodes. I operationalised this broad definition of 
authorship by not only coding links between texts and authors but by also linking texts 
to the individuals that are identified as contributors in the acknowledgements section. 
Wherever such details were provided, I excluded individuals responsible for layout, 
proofreading and translation as well as lists of interviewees. These exclusions leave 
authors, researchers, reviewers, editors, advisors, data providers from third parties, 
project leaders and working group members as the types of individuals most frequently 
identified in the co-publication networks. 
 From the 891 collected publications, 666 are included in the co-publication 
networks. The most frequent reason for the exclusion of the remaining 225 texts was 
that no contributor names could be found. Additionally, some texts were excluded, 
because they were duplicates of other publications or upon closer inspection did not 
match the keywords. After finalising the assignment of individuals to texts, the data 
was inspected for errors and misspellings. Examples of such errors are apostrophes, 
special characters or middle names. Using different linguistic measures of similarity 
from the software OPEN REFINE, 119 potential instances of identical names were 
identified. Matching was undertaken manually and only after a background check in 
the cases that could not be identified as simple spelling mistakes.20 
 The heterogeneity of the publications that are the basis for the co-publication 
networks is reflected in the long-tailed distribution of contributors per text. Whereas 
most texts have between one and three contributors, extreme values exceed the mark 
 
20 The raw data of the co-publication networks are so called “edge lists”, where the first column lists 
the contributor names and the second column lists the text names. I separated edge lists by year and 
then aggregated them into the different periods discussed in chapter 4. See also Appendix B on the 





of 200.21 In the literature on social networks, normalisation constants have been 
suggested to mitigate the influence of such extreme cases (e.g. Leifeld 2013: 176). 
Normalisation in its most basic form assumes that all nodes in a network have equal 
resources that they then devote to the establishment of links, whose strength is inverse 
to their number. This is clearly not the case in the co-publication networks. Such a 
treatment would obscure that texts and actors become central because of their ample 
participation. This is, however, a crucial feature that can help us understand how 
frames become dominant and integrate with actors that advocate other frames.  
 A second modification that has been suggested to mitigate the influence of 
extreme observations is to decrease the weights of links once they reach a certain 
threshold (e.g. Larsen and Ellersgaard 2017: 58-59). This reasoning is based on the 
observation that the meaningfulness of social interactions decreases once the amount 
of people involved passes the threshold. The interactions arising from co-publication 
are likely to also be affected by such ‘decreasing marginal returns’. Yet since the node 
attributes that were obtained from applying decreasing node weights to texts with large 
numbers of contributors correlate highly with the ones where no thresholds and weight 
manipulations were introduced, in the following analysis I refrain from introducing 
any additional weights.22   
 A final question in the coding of links relates to their age. Existing scholarship 
suggests that it is not unreasonable to assume that more recent social interactions 
matter more (cf. Young et al. 2017: 346). While it is feasible to address this issue, 
again, through a modification of the edge weights (e.g. through a decay function), I 
deal with the issue of time by partitioning the data into three different periods. This 
 
21 For the distributions, see Appendix C. 





means that connections only appear in the time-window that they are part of. Rather 
than assigning a fixed time period such as a 5-year rolling window, I base the partition 
on patterns in the data as well as on changes in the overall political context (see chapter 
4).  
 
Citation Network  
The citation network is based on a subset of the 666 texts from the co-publication 
networks. A link is established if one of these texts cites the name of another text. 
Citations were found by applying a string-matching algorithm. A list of the 666 titles 
was supplied to the algorithm that recorded how often any of the titles appeared in a 
document. I used the output of this search by establishing a link if one or multiple 
references to a title were found, thereby constructing a directed, unweighted network. 
To remedy for errors from the ‘encoding’ of texts that might arise when special fonts 
are transferred into a machine-readable format, spot checks were carried out 
manually.23 In total, 409 of the 666 texts form part of the citation network. For this 
network no periodisation was applied.  
 
Construction and Description of Networks: Raw Data 
Whereas the citation network is a one-mode network (i.e. texts citing texts), the co-
publication network is two-mode (i.e. individuals publishing texts). And while some 
information can be obtained from representing the network in its two-mode form, the 
centrality measures and the sorting algorithm introduced above work best on one-mode 
networks. The conversion from an unweighted two-mode network to a weighted one-
 





mode network can thus either represent texts linked by joint contributors or individuals 
linked by joint publications (see section 2). As argued in chapter 2, I focus on the 
organisational level to keep the actor population manageable. Furthermore, the 
organisational level is more stable (cf. Young et al. 2017: 340).  
 The raw data for the three types of networks (citation, co-publication two-mode 
and one-mode) that were constructed with the igraph package in the programming 
environment R is summarised in table 3.1.24 As chapter 4 separates the co-publication 
network into three different periods, I also provide the raw data for these. Whereas I 
relegate the detailed analysis of the evolution of the networks to the empirical chapters, 
the raw data shows that there is a growth in the number of nodes and edges, i.e. the 











24 See Appendix C for further details on the construction of the networks and the computation of 










publication Networks  
One-mode (texts) Co-
publication Networks  
Nodes 
1998-2018 
409 629525 666 
1998-2008   616 61 
2009-2014  2201 247 
2015-2018  4082 359 
Edges 
1998-2018 
864 8891 891926 27 
1998-2008  726 266 
2009-2014  2604 998 
2015-2018  5563 3574 
Table 3.1 Raw Data for Citation and Co-publication Networks  
 
3.4 Studying the Policy Subsystem: Content Analysis, Interviews and 
Participant Observation 
Measuring the size of the network, its cohesion and the centralities of actors can reveal 
much about the evolution of the policy subsystem of sustainable finance. Moreover, 
community detection methods can point towards coalitions of actors that frame 
sustainable finance in a similar way. Yet left on their own, network measures cannot 




25 Note that the number of nodes for the entire period is smaller than the sum of the three periods, 
since individuals that are present in more than one period are counted twice or three times.  
26 Links are unweighted.  
27 The overall period has more edges than the sum of the three periods, because the partition does not 
account for edges between different periods. If person A wrote a text in 2000 and another one in 2010, 





 As the co-publication networks link texts through individuals, two obvious 
strategies to understand the meaning are content analysis and interviews. Analysing 
the content of the publications that form communities within the network can reveal 
what brings them together. Content analysis thus allows for sorting communities of 
texts – and by extension of the individuals and organisations responsible for publishing 
them – into frames. The second strategy for understanding the dynamics of knowledge 
production is to focus on the individuals who author the texts. Interviewing members 
belonging to the different communities can give further insights on the characteristics 
of a frame as well as on its relation to academic paradigms and policy paradigms. 
Finally, participant observation can provide additional information on the debates that 
occur within the sustainable finance system. Moreover, it can remedy potential biases 




Methodological guidance on how to treat textual data suggests that before starting the 
analysis, the researcher must specify the units of a document that carry meaning 
(Krippendorf 2004: 98ff). Textual data can, for example, be separated by syntactical 
units like sentences, paragraphs or chapters (Krippendorf 2004: 104). In the analysis 
of the publications, I focus on two units of analysis. First, in chapter 5, I use individual 
words and word sequences to establish congruence between texts and academic 
paradigms. These individual words and word sequences are the names of scholars and 
journals that can be sorted to academic paradigms. As such, they can be utilised as 
markers, whose presence indicates that the text in which they appear is at least aware 





assumed that such an awareness can be found by merely detecting marker words 
without considering their embeddedness in larger units of text, the task of finding and 
counting them can be automatised (cf. chapter 5).  
 Yet the automated counting of academic paradigm markers can only capture a 
small fraction of the meaning of the texts. Thus, the greater part of the thesis relies on 
qualitative content analysis. In this case, the textual units are entire publications. These 
documents often combine the categories that I seek to identify (i.e. academic 
paradigms, frames and policy paradigms) in a complex fashion. Moreover, the formal 
properties of the documents vary greatly. This is because the selection criterion that I 
applied relies solely on content (i.e. the keywords on sustainable finance) and not on 
form. Therefore, text sizes range from a couple to well over 300 pages. In addition, 
unlike with legal documents or scientific journal articles, the document type varies 
greatly. Documents range from short statements on specific policies to lengthy 
assessments of the global problems and solutions for sustainable finance. All of this 
means that formalised coding techniques (cf. Krippendorf 2004: 125ff) are hard to 
operationalise in the corpus.  
 An alternative that can accommodate the flexibility that the heterogeneity of 
the texts and the complex nature of the research question demands is qualitative 
content analysis. This technique allows for the inductive and recursive development 
of categories (Mayring 2000: 3). Rather than counting the occurrences of categories, 
qualitative content analysis allows for a more contextualised reading of the empirical 
materials. Accordingly, the analytical concepts start from an initial research puzzle but 
are refined through the interaction with the data (cf. Welch et al. 2011: 743). In 
addition, qualitative content analysis pays attention to linguistic categories without 





analysis also integrates well with the detection of frames. Entman (1993: 52) notes that 
one sentence can fulfil multiple functions of a frame, while many sentences might not 
fulfil any. This means that a qualitative selection of meaningful sentences is better 
suited to capture frames than a formalised technique that gives equal weights to textual 
units and thereby misses their meaning and role in the document.  
 A specific variation of qualitative content analysis is Critical discourse 
Analysis (CDA). CDA mobilises qualitative interpretations to bring attention to the 
foregrounding and backgrounding of certain aspects in the description of an issue. In 
addition, CDA emphasises over/underlexicaliation, that is the over- and underuse of 
certain words (Machin and Mayr 2010: 2ff, 30ff). Attention to these dynamics is well 
suited to establish the presence of the different frames as well as the terminological 
dimension of academic paradigms.  
 
Data 
The population of texts that I considered for content analysis is equal to the one that is 
the basis for the co-publication networks (666 texts). For the quantitative analysis of 
marker-words I mobilise the whole corpus.28 The qualitative content analysis is based 
on far fewer texts. The selection of relevant publications was carried out with the help 
of network measures. I considered texts that are important in any of the three periods 
of the co-publication network as well as in the citation network. As a measure for the 
importance of these texts, I looked at their degree and betweenness centrality scores. 
In addition, I analysed the texts that are representative of the different communities 
that were obtained through the sorting algorithm in the co-publication networks. 
 






Finally, I analysed texts that other data sources such as interviewees, participant 
observation transcripts and news coverage identified as relevant. Notably, some of 
these additional texts are outside the time interval that underlies the text analysis. This 
discrepancy arises from the fact that I extended the data collection from interviews and 
participant observation until autumn 2019, whereas the systematic data collection for 
the co-publication networks was halted at the end of 2017. 
Apart from the texts of the corpus and additional documents that were 
published by the actors from the policy subsystem, I also followed the news coverage 
on sustainable finance as a complementary source of information. While this data 
source was not analysed systematically, I gathered 360 newspaper articles that were 
published between January 2017 and February 2020.29 Most of these articles were 
obtained by subscribing to tags related to sustainable finance on the Financial Times 
(FT). As of June 2019, this also included the weekly ‘Moral Money’ newsletter that is 
coordinated by the FT journalist Gillian Tett. Apart from the FT, I also included 
articles from specialist outlets like Responsible Investor and Bloomberg as well as 
from generalist newspapers such as the Guardian, the Economist, the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, die Zeit and Euractiv. In the thesis, I differentiate references to 













The interviews that I conducted with the members of the sustainable finance expert 
community can be classified as elite interviews. Their contribution can be separated in 
two categories. First, I use interview material to obtain information about the system 
of sustainable finance and its history. Accounts from interviews are thus used as 
complementary data source to bring attention to points that network and document 
analysis might have missed. This first use of interviews is essentially positivist (cf. 
Mosely 2013: 10). The information that is obtained from the interviewee is taken as 
an unproblematic representation of real developments and contextual factors that are 
likely to influence the interviewees’ responses are bracketed. While this treatment of 
interview data has been criticised for misrepresenting the characteristics of the 
complex social situation of interviews (cf. Alvesson 2003), I take a pragmatic stance 
insofar as I opine that this use of interview data is still superior to the alternative, which 
would be the lack of data. Moreover, by checking the veracity of interviewees’ claims 
by mobilising alternative data sources, I adopt the best practices of the positivist 
approach (cf. Mosley 2013: 22; Roulston 2010: 205).  
 The second use of interview data differs substantially from the positivist 
approach. Here, I am interested in the interviewee as representative of a particular 
frame. The interview can thus give insights on the thinking that is present within a 
community. In other words, interviews can reveal the articulation of frames in a way 
that might not be openly presented in this way in written text but seem natural within 
the respective community. This use of interviews is similar to what has been described 
as the “romantic” method, where the interviewer engages in a “real conversation” with 





from some uses of the romantic method insofar as I am less interested in getting access 
to the genuine feelings and thinking of the interviewee (cf. Alvesson 2003: 29 for a 
critique of this approach). Instead, I interpret the interview material as reflecting the 
discourse of the social group and hence the frame that the interviewee belongs to.  
 
Data 
The two intended uses of interview data have implications for the identification of 
potential interview partners. To satisfy the positivist search for information, 
interviewees should be knowledgeable about sustainable finance and its evolution. On 
the other hand, when it comes to the representation of frames, interviewees should be 
embedded in a community. To operationalise the first demand, I looked at the measure 
of betweenness centrality in the co-publication networks. This is because nodes with 
high betweenness centrality scores can be expected to receive information from 
multiple sources and should thus display high degrees of knowledge of the overall 
system. 
 Concerning interviewees’ representativeness of frames, the selection process 
requires a purposive or quota sampling strategy, where interviewees are selected on 
the basis of a dimension that is relevant for the research question (Lynch 2013: 32). In 
the context of the thesis, this dimension is constituted by the frames. Based on these 
considerations the sampling proceeded in an iterative manner. Since the frames were 
repeatedly reconceptualised during the research process, at first, I targeted 
interviewees based on the type of organisation they were working for. After identifying 
the frames in the co-publication networks with the help of the community detection 





 In practice, this theoretically informed strategy for the selection of interviewees 
was, however, complicated by the problem of access. In total, I sent out 60 
personalised requests for interviews, which were accompanied by a tentative list of 
questions. Since more than half of the requests were not answered even after multiple 
reminders or were positively answered but scheduling did eventually run into a dead-
end, I had to rely on alternative ways to avoid non-response bias (cf. Lynch 2013: 41).  
To obtain otherwise missing information on some communities and frames, I recruited 
people at conferences or made use of snowballing sampling via already established 
contacts.  
 In summary, targeting the 60 potential interviewees resulted in a total of 25 
semi-structured interviews that I undertook between November 2017 and February 
2019.30 The interviews were carried out in person in Berlin, Brussels and Geneva as 
well as over the phone. The length of the interviews varied between 20 minutes and 
1.5 hours. The structure of the interviews was similar as interviewees received a 
template with tentative questions beforehand. To take the embeddedness of the 
interviewees in their respective communities into account, I updated the questions for 
each interviewee bearing in mind their position in the network, the content of their 
publications and their CV. Moreover, in accordance with best practices associated with 
the romantic method, I aimed for creating a natural flow in the conversations rather 
than for covering all my questions. I also tried to minimise the time taken up by my 
questions and maximise the time of the interviewee talking (Roulston 2010: 202).   
 During the interviews I abstained from taking audio recording and instead took 
manual notes. This strategy was chosen so that interviewees would converse more 
freely and ‘speak their mind’. Afterwards, I digitised the notes into transcripts that are 
 





organised according to the different themes that were raised during the interview. If 
interviewees wanted to read the transcript, I made it available to them and if they chose 
to make clarifications and corrections, the corrected versions were used. Interviewees 
were also provided with an informed consent form that was drafted by the Principal 
Investigator of the Horizon 2020 project that funded my PhD (GEM STONES). This 
form explained the research project and gave them three options regarding their level 
of anonymity.  
 The further treatment of interviews evolved over time. After the first interviews 
I did not compose any memos. Once I had about 10 interview transcripts, I started to 
organise them in a spreadsheet where I categorised them. The categories are both 
deductive as they cover themes related to the research question and the concepts 
introduced in chapter 2 as well as inductive as they include topics that were mentioned 
by multiple interviewees. In later interviews, I also added questions concerning the 




Both content analysis and interviews are fraught with the danger of missing out on 
some parts of the social reality that they ought to represent. Documents might offer an 
official and sanitised account of what their authors ‘really’ want to communicate. 
Interviewees, on the other hand, may at best provide a subjective description of what 
they perceive to be the interest of the researcher. At worst, elite interviewees will 
misrepresent reality and try to manipulate the researcher for their own purposes (cf. 





 One method that can help to obtain otherwise hidden data is ethnography and 
more specifically participant observation. This strategy rests on the assumption that 
experiencing the reality of the research subjects in the sites where they operate 
provides information that is essential for understanding the phenomenon in question. 
As such, it is well equipped to gather unexpected observations that can help with 
theory building. An example from the study of finance within an STS framework is 
provided by Beunza and Stark (2004). In their ethnographic study of arbitrage trading, 
they set out to understand the role of socio-technical instruments such as mathematical 
formulae and information processing machines. Using participant observation, they 
were receptive to the counterintuitive finding that the organisational and spatial 
arrangements of the trading firm played an equally important role as the dynamics that 
the research had initially prioritised (Beunza and Stark 2004: 372-373).  
 Apart from its theory building strengths, ethnographic research can also 
remedy the misrepresentations of official documents and interview accounts that I 
described above. This is because a researcher, who is embedded in a process where the 
research subjects perform their everyday work, is less likely to be subject to intentional 
misrepresentations than a researcher who relies on the written and oral accounts that 
the research subjects present to the outside world (cf. Harrington 2017: 42-43).   
 Yet while ethnographic methods have strong analytical credentials, their 
operationalisation comes with considerable challenges. To conform with best 
practices, participant observation should span extended periods with repeated visits to 
the same research site. The study on arbitrage trading introduced above is based on 60 
site visits over the course of two years (Beunza and Stark 2004: 373). This indicates 
that ethnographic work is associated with substantial time investments on behalf of the 





issue of access, i.e. the researchers being allowed to enter the site. These problems are 
compounded when the research site does not have a fixed geography but is dispersed 
internationally. Harrington observes that the study of highly mobile transnational 
elites, who travel between financial and political centres such as London or Zurich, 
leads to significant expenses for researchers (Harrington 2017: 44-45).  
 When it comes to sustainable finance, the evolutionary nature of the policy 
subsystem complicates participant observation even further. The absence of an 
organisational home or a clearly defined group of experts means that site visits to 
multiple organisations and communities would need to be undertaken to get an 
adequate understanding. And while, in theory, this would make for a promising 
research design, in practice, the constraints on time and expenses make such an 
approach infeasible.  
 In light of the complications of a fully-fledged ethnography, I adopt a 
compromise approach which consists of attending events where different parts of the 
sustainable finance community assemble. While the short nature of these events and 
lack of repeated observation of the same community means that a true ‘immersion’ of 
the researcher cannot occur, this strategy nonetheless offers insights that are attuned 
to the analytical framework that I pursue.  
 An important property of (especially large and high-level) conferences is that 
individuals from different communities come together. Thus, in a format that is aimed 
at discussion such as a panel debate one can observe differences in opinions, arguments 
and vocabulary. Within the analytical framework introduced in chapter 2, observing 
these debates can help to determine the persuasive processes of the policy paradigms. 
This is because cleavages that might be hidden in interview or written material as 





chapter 6). Attending smaller events that are more explicitly appropriated by one 
particular community can, on the other hand, add to the understanding of common 
frames that represent an implicit consensus among the participants. 
 
Data  
Between April 2017 and October 2019, I attended a total of 18 events on sustainable 
finance. These events were labelled as conferences, workshops, fora, public hearings 
and conventions. They were organised by EU institutions, IOs, universities, think 
tanks, industry associations and civil society actors and took place in Berlin, Brussels, 
Oxford, Paris and Zurich. This strategy of following experts in settings across events 
that are organised by different types of organisation is similar to the one that was 
adopted in a recent study that queried the dynamics among professionals in the 
governance of corporate taxation (Christensen 2020). 
 I transcribed these events using bullet points and indicated direct quotes as well 
as research notes separately. The transcription resulted in a total of 194 pages of 
material. To analyse the material, I worked first with colour codes, which were 
subsequently incorporated into a spreadsheet. The categories in the spreadsheet are 









In chapter 2, I outlined that I understand sustainable finance as a policy subsystem. In 
this system shared frames bind actor coalitions together. In addition, I argued that the 
knowledge production that the actors undertake to advance their framing of sustainable 
finance receives input from academic paradigms and, on the other hand, constitutes 
the input for policy paradigms. 
 In this chapter, I first situated this theoretical understanding in the general 
literature on case studies and method selection. I argued that the evolution of 
sustainable finance as studied in this thesis can be considered as a single case of 
economic ideas from academic paradigms influencing policy. As it represents a still 
emerging policy subsystem and dynamics of evolution rather than of crisis, studying 
sustainable finance can add to our understanding of ideational dynamics in such 
circumstances. Furthermore, I argued that the conceptualisation of sustainable finance 
as a system as well as the incorporation of socio-technical instruments into the 
explanation preclude the use of case study research designs that are aimed at 
establishing co-variation. Instead, the evolution of sustainable finance can be better 
understood in processual terms. This more complex understanding of causality 
requires the use of multiple methods.  
 To operationalise the evolution of sustainable finance, I mobilise network 
analysis, content analysis, interviews and participant observation. Network analysis 
acts as a starting point as it defines the actors inside the policy subsystem as well as 
their relations. The co-publication and citation networks that underlie the analysis link 
information exchanges between individuals and organisations. Importantly, they also 
have a social dimension. By detecting cohesive communities within these networks, I 





feature of operationalising the concept of policy subsystems through network analysis 
is that it leads to an explicit definition of the system. To specify the boundaries, I rely 
on practices from the study of elite and information networks.  
 Yet while network analysis can reveal much about the structure of the policy 
subsystem and the positions of the various frames, it remains agnostic about the 
meaning that flows through them. To assess this meaning and to link it to academic 
and policy paradigms, I use content analysis, interviews and participant observation 
data. Quantitative and qualitative text analyses give insights about the content of the 
corpus that provides the basis for the information networks. Interviews, on the other 
hand, can be used to gather additional data on issues that the document analysis might 
have missed. In addition, interviewees can act as the representatives of frames and 
reveal thinking that is characteristic of a frame but might remain unsaid in the 
documents. Finally, participant observation is a way to observe an expert community 
consisting of various frames as it comes together. It also helps to guard against 














4. Who and What Made Sustainable Finance an Issue? 
 
Wo Starkes sich und Mildes paarten 
 da gibt es einen guten Klang.  
 
[Where strong itself with mild doth couple, 
The ringing will be good and strong] 
Friedrich Schiller, Das Lied von der Glocke.31 
 
When attending a meeting, a workshop or a conference on sustainable finance in 2017 
or 2018 one could hardly escape the remarks by the moderator or one of the keynote 
speakers on how stellar and rapid the growth of this issue was. Valdis Dombrovskis, 
vice-president in charge of financial policies of the Juncker Commission32, took the 
high turnout at one hearing on sustainable finance as proof that “sustainable finance is 
no longer a niche – it is going mainstream.”33 Michael Liebreich, founder of 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, commended developments such as the rise of green 
bonds from “nowhere” and the movement of mainstream investors like Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan into sustainable finance.34 Evidence for such 
claims can be found when looking at the market for certified green bonds, which grew 
exponentially over the past decade from a couple of billion dollars in 2008 to US$ 389 
billion of outstanding bonds in 2018 (Filkova 2018). Similarly, the amount of assets 
 
31 Translation by Marianna Wetz, Schiller Institute, 
https://archive.schillerinstitute.com/transl/trans_schil_1poems.html#song_bell.  
32 Mr. Dombrovskis has maintained this position under the incoming van der Leyen Commission.  
33 Notes EU Public Hearing: Final Report of the HLEG on sustainable finance, Brussels March 22nd, 
2018. For a list of transcripts see Appendix E.  





managed according to broadly defined sustainability criteria grew from US$ 13.3 
trillion in 2012 to US$ 30.7 trillion in 2018 (GSIA 2018).   
 Mark Lewis, global head of sustainability research at BNP Paribas Asset 
Management and member of the Financial Stability Board’s Taskforce on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (FSB TCFD), gave an even more laudatory assessment 
of the evolution of sustainable finance by labelling it as “an idea whose time had 
come.”35 And while it is conceivable that these keynote speakers would exaggerate, 
interviewees tell a similar story. One researcher from the Grantham Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment of the London School of Economics remarked 
that while writing a paper on the connection between finance and climate in 2014, it 
seemed that there was nothing else on the topic.36 Less than three years later, a CSO 
representative expressed that “everybody [in finance] is excited about sustainable 
finance” and a think tank researcher working on climate risk methodologies was 
amused at the thought of people still talking about  ‘mainstreaming’ (i.e. large financial 
institutions integrating ESG concerns, cf. Dumas and Louche 2016: 428)37 as the topic 
had already moved from a niche to receiving attention from BlackRock and the 
European Central Bank (ECB).38  
 Lieberman suggests that the phenomenon of “an idea, whose time has come” 
does not only depend on the idea itself but also on the history of the idea and the 
institutional context (Lieberman 2002: 709). Indeed, the Schiller quote at the 
beginning of this chapter does not just relate to the making of bells and the German 
 
35 Notes EU Public Hearing: Mid-term review of the Capital Markets Union, Brussels, April 11th, 
2017. 
36 Interview Emanuele Campiglio, WU Vienna. For a detailed list of interviews see Appendix A.  
37 Dumas and Louche explain that mainstreaming is a widely discussed concept, which is defined as 
mainstream financial institutions integrating ESG considerations. However, while widely used, the 
literature has been largely silent on how such a mainstreaming occurred (Dumas and Louche 2016: 
428-429). 





poet’s general views on life. It also was cited by an interviewee to illustrate that the 
emergence of sustainable finance can be attributed to the working together of 
heterogeneous actors. These actors include financial supervisors, portfolio managers, 
civil society, environmental scientists and credit rating agencies. Through their 
different perspectives these actors contributed to innovation.39 Another interviewee – 
formerly working in academia – likened the emergence of sustainable finance to Bruno 
Latour’s Actor Network Theory (cf. Latour 2003), in which actors form a network 
without necessarily knowing each other, nor necessarily agreeing with each other.40 
 To understand who (i.e. which actors) and what (i.e. which ideas) contributed 
to the rise of sustainable finance, I will map its evolution and its constituent parts over 
three periods from the late 1990s until 2018. As will be shown below, sustainable 
finance, just as environmental governance in general (cf. Bernstein 2011), has for a 
long time been a relatively fragmented field of activity. In the absence of a hierarchical 
or until very recently even a coordinative governance structure, actors have taken 
different approaches to understand and promote sustainable finance. This diversity is 
an indication that sustainable finance is not yet a mature policy subsystem with a clear 
definition.  
 The remainder of the chapter is organised into three sections. I first briefly 
revisit the concept of frames and provide a working definition of the term ‘sustainable 
finance’. The second section occupies the largest part of this chapter and divides the 
evolution of sustainable finance into three periods. Each period describes the actors 
and frames by using network analysis, interview data, qualitative content analysis and 
 
39 Interview Jakob Thomä. 





participant observation transcripts. I summarise the chapter by listing the dominant 
actors, concepts and frames throughout the analysed periods.  
 
4.1 Revisiting Concepts and Definitions: Frames and Sustainable Finance 
While the transmission model that I outlined in chapter 2 starts with academic 
paradigms, it is important to begin the empirical assessment by looking at frames. The 
alternative strategy of deductively constructing hypotheses about how the different 
academic paradigms might frame sustainable finance and then looking for the presence 
of these hypothetical frames in the policy subsystem faces the problem of potentially 
missing most of the relevant interactions. This is because the relations between 
academic paradigms and frames are likely to be complex and non-linear combinations 
that differ from the ones specified deductively.  
 A more promising strategy that is frequently applied in frame analysis (e.g. 
Crespy 2010; Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016) is to inductively identify the frames and 
then trace them backwards to broader ideational structures such as academic 
paradigms. In the context of sustainable finance, a similar strategy has recently been 
applied by Mangat et al. (2018) to differentiate between storylines in the fossil fuel 
divestment discourse. Hence, the main part of this chapter is concerned with the 
different frames that actors displayed between the late 1990s and 2018. Sorting the 
frames into academic paradigms and relating them to policy paradigms will be the 
subjects of the next two chapters.  
 To identify frames, I follow an inductive approach that classifies textual data 
according to the three dimensions outlined in chapter 2 (diagnostic, prognostic and 
relational). Entman suggests that frames manifest themselves through the presence of 





1993: 52). Instead of looking for the frames across the whole corpus, I first apply the 
clustering algorithm on the co-publication networks to preselect communities that are 
likely to be connected by a shared frame (cf. chapter 3). Subsequently, I mobilise 
qualitative content analysis, interviews and participant observation to determine which 
frames bind the identified clusters together. While the number of identified clusters is 
derived from the maximisation of the modularity value and hence completely data-
driven, the sorting into frames is superimposed on those results interpretatively. This 
means that a frame might cover several clusters. Discrepancies between clusters and 
frames can arise in situations, where actors working within the same frame focus on 
different aspects or geographies.  
 Before starting the description, it has to be noted that the definition of what 
sustainable finance is and what belongs to it is itself a topic for discussion. As outlined 
in chapter 3, I answer this question empirically by specifying the actor population in 
accordance with boundary specification methods from the study of networks. 
Henceforth, when talking about ‘sustainable finance’ I refer to the entire policy 
subsystem. A more conceptual working definition that comes close to this meaning is 
provided by the United Nations Environment Program’s Inquiry Into a Sustainable 
Financial System (UNEP Inquiry). This definition, which is also broadly in line with 
interviewees’ accounts, maintains that sustainable finance is about the connection of 
all parts of the financial system with the environmental, social, economic and 
governance dimensions of sustainability (Forstater and Zhang 2016). 
 The following section proceeds by identifying and describing three periods of 
sustainable finance. The description highlights the different frames that are present in 
the policy subsystem in the period under analysis. At the end of each period, the 





addition, the actors that are associated with a frame are recorded in a table. The 
tabulation of the frames is followed by a visual representation of the co-publication 
network of each period. Here, the frames are attributed to clusters in the network and 
their position inside the policy subsystem is established.  
 
4.2 Three Periods of Sustainable Finance 
Existing periodisations of sustainable finance vary since researchers look at different 
timeframes and geographies. Dumas and Louche (2016), who study UK newspaper 
discourse on responsible investment, identify five periods between 1982 and 2010. 
Their chronology begins with the civil rights discourse linked to divestment from the 
South African apartheid regime (1982-1991). This was followed by a period of green 
niche investments (1992-1997). The late 1990s (1998-2000) witnessed a 
professionalisation of the sector. Subsequently, a discourse that replaced ethical issues 
with a focus on “responsibility” rose to prominence (2001-2004). The last period they 
study (2005-2010) was characterised by the emphasis on ESG criteria. Among these 
criteria, corporate governance and climate change were the most salient (Dumas and 
Louche 2016: 439). Crifo et al. (2019), who look at the evolution of sustainable finance 
in France, find a steady but slow increase of market participants and Assets Under 
Management (AUM) until 2012. From this time onwards, they observe a steep increase 
in their measurements. To sort this development, they partition French sustainable 
finance into four stages: an introductory phase (late 1990s-2001),                                                                           
an early adaptation phase (2002-2007), a diffusion phase (2008-2011) and, finally, a 
standardisation phase (2012-2016).41  
 





 Robins and McDaniels (2016) from the UNEP Inquiry provide a conceptual 
rather than data-driven assessment of sustainable finance in the UK. They identify five 
waves between 2000 and 2015. Their chronology also starts with ethically motivated 
investment in the early 2000s. This was, however, soon overtaken by a focus on ESG 
issues and corporate disclosures. In the late 2000s, the reforms addressing the GFC 
also impacted sustainable finance. The latest, and according to their assessment 
currently most important, development occurred from around 2012 onwards, when the 
discussion about carbon and climate risks gained momentum (Robins and McDaniels 
2016: 13).  
 Many of the concepts identified by these studies will resurface in the following 
description. Furthermore, the observed acceleration of activity on sustainable finance 
from around 2012 onwards can also be seen in the data presented below; albeit with a 
slight time lag. These communalities notwithstanding, the analysis in this chapter 
focuses on a different unit of analysis (knowledge production) and a different 
geography (no explicit geographic focus but with a European bias, cf. chapter 3). 
Henceforth, while the general trends that were observed in past studies should be 
reflected in the data examined in this chapter, slight variations in the observed ‘growth’ 
of sustainable finance as well as in the periodisations can be expected.  
 The bar plot in figure 4.1 displays the publications and their contributors that 
underlie the co-publication networks. The level of knowledge production, which is 
measured by those statistics, rose steadily from 1998 until 2013. In 2014, a major 
expansion of publications and experts occurred with both categories increasing almost 
twofold. In 2015, another increase by the factor two can be observed. Since then 





 The following description of the evolution of sustainable finance is separated 
into three periods, which are indicated in figure 4.1 by the black-dotted lines. The first 
period starts in 1998. This is one year after ‘Sustainable Investment’ made its first 
appearance on the European political landscape with the publication of a study by the 
European Commission (Delphi and Ecologic 1997)42 and one year before the term 
‘Responsible Investment’ appeared for the first time in the continental mainstream 
news (i.e. in Le Monde, cf. Gond and Boxenbaum 2013: 711). The endpoint of this 
first period is the year 2008. This cut-off point was chosen to check whether the GFC 
that started in 2007 had an impact on sustainable finance. 2009 to 2014 are the start 
and endpoint of the second period, which comprises the aftermath of the GFC. In the 
European context, this includes the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, 
this period marks a new epoch in climate politics, which began with the (perceived) 
failure of interstate bargaining at the Copenhagen CoP in 2009 (Bernstein et al. 2010: 
162ff). The last period begins in 2015 and ends in 2018 when data collection was 
halted with the publication of the EU’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth 
(EC 2018a). 2015 as a starting point reflects a major shift in the data, i.e. the two-fold 
increase of contributors and texts. Moreover, the Paris Agreement and the publication 
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the UN in 2015 mark the start of the 
third period. These global events are likely to have influenced the subsequent 
development and direction of sustainable finance. 
 






Figure 4.1 Evolution of contributors and texts that are subject to the network analysis per 
year. In total 666 texts and 5629 individuals were identified. While some observations from 
2018 are included in the discussion below, they are not represented in figure 4.1, because I 









1998-2008: From Socially Responsible Investment to Responsible Investment 
Academics as well as members from the sustainable finance community often start 
their chronological treatments of sustainable finance with a discussion of Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI)43(e.g. Robins and McDaniels 2016; Schoenmaker 
2017). While the first ethical funds have been dated back to 1928 in the US and to 
1948 in the UK (Gond and Boxenbaum 2013: 710; Sparkes 2002: 27, 48), SRI started 
to grow in the 1970s and 1980s in the Anglo-American context. SRI has its roots with 
ethical and often religious investors, most of whom have an evangelical Christian 
background (Sparkes 2002: 48ff; 2006: 43).44 These actors seek to align their activities 
on the capital markets with their beliefs (Sparkes 2002: 27ff). As a consequence, SRI 
pioneers like the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility try to exclude the 
financing of sectors and products that they consider harmful or unethical. Examples 
are tobacco and armaments but also contraception.45  
 To achieve a congruence between values and investments, religious and other 
ethically-minded asset owners adopted investment strategies like the opening of  
‘sustainability themed’ funds that bet on the success of specific sectors or kinds of 
economic activity that are considered to be ethically flawless (Sparkes 2002: 28-29, 
see also Micilotta and Howard 2018). An alternative strategy is to perform a negative 
screening exercise that excludes undesired sectors and companies from the investment 
 
43 Since then SRI has been ‘rebranded’ by eurosif as “Sustainable and Responsible Investment”. see: 
http://www.eurosif.org/about-us/  
44 While this period coincides with another intersection between finance and religion, namely the rise 
of Islamic finance (Rethel 2011), connections between SRI and Islamic have been sparse. Indeed, 
Islamic finance entered the field of sustainable finance as described here only in the last period 
through actions like the first issuance of an Islamic (sukuk) green sovereign bond by Indonesia in 
2018: See. Emma Dukley, “Indonesia Issues World’s First Green Sukuk Bond” Financial Times, 
February 23rd, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/e38ea51c-184c-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44. Accessed 
October 7th, 2019. See also Bandar Hajjar, “It is time to position Islamic finance as sustainability 
leader”, Financial Times, November 3rd, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/8190401b-8ee0-42a1-
89d5-945b7b3fe256, Accessed November 29th, 2019. 






universe. Afterwards, the portfolio manager would try to obtain the desired risk/return 
profile based on purely financial considerations, albeit with fewer options for 
diversification (see Cowton 1999 for an early in-depth case study). Another variation 
of SRI are so called best-in-class approaches. This method also consists of a screening 
exercise, but instead of excluding certain sectors altogether the screening is ‘positive’. 
Subsequently, the portfolio manager, whose job again is to deliver financial 
performance, is given an investment universe, in which only assets of the best 
companies (e.g. in terms of low pollution or respect for labour rights) of each sector 
can be chosen (Sparkes 2002: 29, see also Déjean et al. 2004: 721).46  
 These three approaches are arguably the traditional strategies for SRI. The 
European SRI Study that measures the volumes of responsible investments and is 
published bi-annually by eurosif, the European umbrella trade association of SRI 
firms, identified these approaches as ‘core’ SRI strategies (de Marcillac et al. 2008: 
11). Opposed to this are ‘broad’ strategies such as simple exclusions, which do not 
feature a holistic assessment and, instead, only exclude a limited number of categories 
such as weapons. Another broad strategy is engagement and voting. This means that 
investors talk with investees’ executive boards about ethical issues, file shareholder 
resolutions and integrate sustainability issues into their voting strategy at annual 
meetings (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion). A final broad strategy is ESG 
integration, which means that investors adopt a screening process that assesses whether 
an investment will pose a financial risk that arises from ESG factors (de Marcillac et 
al. 2008: 13).  
 
 





 As sustainable finance evolved, the SRI studies notably dropped the dichotomy 
between core and broad. In the 2016 and 2018 editions, exclusions, best-in-class and 
ESG integration appear next to each other without any qualifiers. In addition, the more 
recent SRI studies have added two new categories. With norms-based screening, 
financial institutions check the compliance of investee entities with global standards 
such as the codes of conducts developed by the Global Compact or the International 
Labour Organisation. The second addition is impact investing, which uses instruments 
like social bonds to e.g. improve the living conditions in a community.47  
 In terms of magnitude, exclusion funds represented the largest share of SRI in 
Europe in 2017 with about EUR 10 trillion AUM. They are followed by engagement 
and voting (~ EUR 4.8 trillion AUM), ESG integration (~ EUR 4.2 trillion AUM) and 
norms-based screening (~EUR 3.1 trillion AUM). Best-in-class, sustainability themed 
and impact investing each account for less than EUR 1 trillion AUM (Micilotta and 
Howard 2018: 16).48 In total, eurosif estimates that EUR 11 trillion AUM were 
managed according to one of the responsible investment strategies outlined above. 
This represents 43.6% of the estimated total AUM (EUR 25.2 trillion) in Europe 
(Micilotta and Howard 2018:  14, 32). While this number sounds quite impressive, it 
is also a reflection of the broad scope of the measure as well as of double counting. A 
much lower ratio is obtained when only counting the financial products that explicitly 
target sustainable ends. Performing such a stocktaking exercise, the FNG, a member 
of eurosif representing Germany and Austria, calculates the share of these investments 
at 4.8% and 12.8% of AUM in those countries respectively (Tober et al. 2019).  
 
47 Cf. Hannah Murphy, “Social Impact Bonds: On the Margins”, Financial Times, September 24th, 
2018. https://www.ft.com/content/ddf55a2e-7472-11e8-bab2-43bd4ae655dd accessed December 21st, 
2018. for a description of a project on resocialisation in the UK.  
48 Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Investors using norms-based screening could, 
for instance, include this strategy as one input for their exclusion (cf. Methodology note in Micilotta et 





 Notably, even the core SRI strategies experienced some transitions. In Europe 
in the 1990s, SRI expanded its geographical scope from the UK to Germany, France, 
and Italy. While in the Anglo-Saxon context social and responsible issues had 
dominated SRI, in Germany environmental considerations were at the forefront.49 
While such national preferences persist, from the 2000s a process of convergence 
occurred. Anglo-Saxon investors started to incorporate environmental considerations 
and continental and in particular German actors moved their focus more to the social 
dimension.50 Despite this integration, regional differences persist when it comes to the 
preferred approach to sustainable finance. Anglo-American jurisdictions favour 
exclusion, whereas in the French context best-in-class strategies dominate (Gond and 
Boxenbaum 2013).  
 As SRI funds grew in volume, the topic appeared increasingly on the radar of 
larger financial institutions. The entry these actors brought the issue of how to frame 
sustainable finance to the forefront. The pioneering, ethical actors described above 
emphasised that the assets of a fund have to correspond to the ethical convictions of 
the investors. To collect information on the ethical credentials of security issuing 
entities, SR investors rely on external data providers that specialise in non-financial 
information. A case in point is the Quaker’s and Methodist church’s sponsorship of 
the UK data provider EIRIS (cf. Sparkes 2002, cf. chapter 6 on data providers).  
 Larger financial institutions had little sympathy for this way of approaching 
sustainable finance. These actors and their interlocutors sought to depart from the 
often-idiosyncratic definitions of ethical investment, which they did not believe to be 
scalable (e.g. the Universities Superannuation Scheme’s contribution in UNEP FI 
 
49 Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, Germany. 





2005: 1-3). One can thus observe a difference between a traditional SRI frame and a 
newly emerging frame that is championed by larger financial institutions.  
 The diagnostic dimension of the SRI frame highlights that ethically minded 
beneficiaries participate through their investments in economic activities that stand in 
stark contradiction to their values. As such, it is similar to what Mangat et al. (2018: 
197ff) identify as the morality narrative in the context of divestment. The prognostic 
dimension emphasises that a different form of investing, i.e. the various in- and 
exclusion strategies and the consideration of non-financial data obtained from special 
rating agencies, can reconcile ethical values with financial value creation. Finally, 
some SR investors (about 25% according to Markowitz 2007: 139ff) adopted a 
relational framing that emphasises their distinctiveness from large financial 
institutions. They present themselves as ethical alternatives to other investors, whose 
integrity they question. Furthermore, they see themselves as the representatives of 
environmental and social movements in the sphere of finance.51 
 The newly arriving larger financial institutions, by contrast, wanted to 
participate in sustainable finance without adopting the SRI frame. One actor that 
mediated between the SRI frame and the needs of larger institutions was the UNEP 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). The efforts by UNEP to persuade a larger fraction of the 
financial industry to integrate environmental and social considerations into their 
activities date already back to 1993. In the aftermath of the Rio Earth summit, UNEP 
partnered with 13 global financial institutions including UBS, Deutsche Bank, 
Santander and the Royal Bank of Scotland to create the Banking Initiative. In 2003, 
the Banking Initiative was merged with UNEP’s Insurance Industry Initiative, its 
 
51 See notes of Ö21 meeting Berlin 2018, where participants emphasized their connections to 
environmental social movements and where interventions reflected an environmentalist or even 





insurance homologue, which had been operational since 1997 and has been explored 
in greater depth by Paterson (2001), to form UNEP FI.  
 Apart from engaging with its membership organisations and raising awareness, 
UNEP FI acted as a secretariat for working groups composed of staff from the 
members that produced reports and analysis on various connections between finance 
and the environment. Working groups were active on the topics of climate change, 
asset management, biodiversity and insurance. A lasting contribution of this work is 
the abbreviation ESG, which has been attributed to the work of the asset management 
group (Bacani et al. 2009: 24 footnote). 
 UNEP FI did not see the relatively small part of the financial system that starts 
from ethical considerations and implements core SRI strategies as its main 
constituency. Instead, it focused on ‘market leaders’ among the mainstream financial 
institutions in banking, insurance and asset management. This insertion of large 
institutional investors into the SRI field can also be observed in the media data 
analysed by Dumas and Louche, who explain the expansion of news coverage on SRI 
by an “invasion” from institutional investors from 2001 onwards (Dumas and Louche 
2016: 449).  
 To engage these actors, UNEP FI publications addressed environmental issues 
in a language and conceptual framework that is familiar to these institutions. Reports 
from the early 2000s emphasise amongst others the opportunities of the Clean 
Development Mechanism and other cap and trade mechanisms for the financial sector 
(Basson et al. 2005; Boal et al. 2005; Dlugolecki et al. 2002). However, oversupply 
resulting in low prices, volatility and constant political reform have since disappointed 
the most optimistic proponents of trading schemes for environmental (and in particular 





 A second emphasis of the UNEP FI publications of this period are the risks 
linked to ESG factors. One publication predicts, for example, increased losses for 
insurers as natural catastrophes linked to climate change such as Hurricane Katrina 
will occur more frequently (Dlugolecki et al. 2002: 2-3). Another assessment focuses 
on risks related to water management (e.g. regulatory, infrastructure, resource 
availability) (Jensen and Namazie 2007). And yet another study outlines the risks 
related to biodiversity and ecosystem services (Clements-Hunt et al. 2008). 
 From this discussion, the diagnostic and prognostic dimensions of the newly 
emerging frame can already be outlined. The diagnosis emphasises that the non-
financial information that is recorded in ESG criteria is not only about the ethics of 
beneficiaries. Instead, it can be mobilised to identify risks and opportunities. The 
prognostic framing highlights that market leaders that are already able to assess and 
integrate ESG considerations today will later have an edge over their competitors. The 
above described perspective on sustainable finance that was co-developed by and for 
large financial institutions under the coordination of UNEP FI can thus be 
conceptualised as a risks and opportunities frame.  
 When it comes to the application of the risks and opportunities framing, one 
commonality of the approaches developed by UNEP FI is that they are often 
conceptual, i.e. mapping the political, social and environmental context of an issue and 
identifying and classifying possible risks (e.g. Dlugolecki et al. 2002; Clements-Hunt 
et al. 2008). Other reports focus on the benefits of ESG strategies in sectoral, company 
or country case studies (e.g. Barron et al. 2006). As such, they are mostly qualitative 
assessments that often point to broad trends but emphasise the need for additional data 





 Paterson highlights that ideas on the physical risks of climate change as well 
as on the risks of climate-related regulations were already present in the 1990s in the 
insurance industry (Paterson 2001: especially 21-25). This shows that the language of 
risks is by no means new. Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between these 
early attempts and the developments in the following periods, when the quantification 
and standardisation of risks into categories like physical and transition risks became 
the centre of attention.  
 Another aspect of the risks and opportunities frame relates to the legal 
infrastructure that governs investment. In this context, UNEP FI started to contribute 
to the discussion on the fiduciary duties of institutional investors that had already 
started in the 1990s. The debate on fiduciary duties is concerned with the question 
whether trustees such as pension funds are supposed to adhere to Friedman’s famous 
prescription to only to maximise financial (risk-adjusted) returns for their beneficiaries 
(cf. Friedman 1970) or whether they were allowed or even obliged to take broader 
considerations such as ESG issues into account.52  
 While smaller SRI funds that are based on voluntary rather than mandatory 
contributions took a broader interpretation of their fiduciary responsibilities, many 
other asset owners argued that these responsibilities constitute a legal barrier to the 
integration of ESG issues.53 Entering this conversation, UNEP FI commissioned two 
opinions that cover the legal systems of nine developed countries in 2005 and 2009. 
The first report points out that the interpretation that only financial returns have to be 
maximised, which was informed by the UK case Cowan vs. Scargill54, is based on a 
 
52 Interview Remco Fischer, UNEP FI.  
53 Cf. Interview asset management, Western Europe (2).  
54 Cowan vs. Scargill is a case about a coal miner, who argued that his union’s pension fund should 





misunderstanding, which had even been pointed out by the judge presiding over this 
seemingly landmark case. Emphasising the importance of ESG issues for financial 
performance, the report argued that “integrating ESG considerations into an 
investment analysis so as to more reliably predict financial performance is clearly 
permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions” (Watchman et al. 2005: 13). 
 The second report (Clements-Hunt et al. 2009) followed this reasoning and 
argues for the integration of ESG issues into the contracts between beneficiaries and 
intermediaries. Despite these efforts for legal clarification, fiduciary duties remained 
a contested issue. UNEP FI and other actors continue to publish and advocate on 
fiduciary duties to the present day (Sullivan et al. 2015, see also Berry 2013).55 
 Another development that shows increasing prominence of the risks and 
opportunities frame are the efforts to standardise company disclosures. Initiatives like 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that was founded in 1997 or the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), established in 2001, tried to address the data requirements 
of the risks and opportunities frame. In 2000, the GRI proposed a common framework 
for non-financial companies to voluntarily report on sustainability issues. The 
initiative was created by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(CERES) with the support of UNEP and the Tellus Institute before it became 
incorporated into UNEP FI. The GRI aims at the standardisation of corporate data that 
mainstream financial institutions require to frame ESG issues as a matter of risk. 
Brown et al. note that while the GRI was initially set up as a multi-stakeholder 
audience of corporates, SR investors, and CSOs, it soon became captured by the logics 
of corporates, investors and consultancy firms (Brown et al. 2009: 572).  
 





 The CDP, on the other hand, is an investor backed CSO that sends out 
questionnaires that ask companies about their environmental and social credentials 
(see also Newell and Paterson 2010: 65). As Pattberg (2012) argues in his study of 
CERES, the CDP and the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), these 
organisations were instrumental in the first attempts to present climate change as a 
business risk. They achieved this by proposing a list of risk categories that were 
couched in a language that was known to financial institutions and by trying to 
standardise the non-financial reporting of corporations in a way that could be 
integrated with traditional risk assessments. Notably, the drive for standardisation that 
can be seen with both initiatives is different from the holistic assessment of the ethical 
credentials of investee companies that early SRI data providers like EIRIS provided. 
As I will explore in more detail in chapter 6, this differentiation in the framing of 
sustainable finance has had implications for the design of the socio-technical 
instruments that were created to address the data needs of either frame.  
 Yet another development related to the risks and opportunities frame is the 
launch of the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) in 2006. The PRI 
consists of six principles concerning the integration of ESG issues into the practices 
of financial institutions.56 UNEP FI together with the Global Compact provide 
secretariat and monitoring functions. Starting from 63 signatories with US$ 6.5 trillion 
AUM in 2006, the PRI had reached 2372 signatories representing US$ 86.3 trillion 
AUM in 2019.57 This makes the PRI the largest sustainable finance initiative in terms 
of membership and assets.  
 
56 The six principles are listed at https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri  
57 Data downloaded from: https://www.unpri.org/Uploads/n/l/l/PRI-Global-growth-2006-2018.xlsx. 





 While ethically motivated SRI investors appeared uneasy with the broadened 
scope of ESG investment that initiatives like the PRI stand for, actors like UNEP FI 
sought to distance themselves from the old-style ethical investors. As such, the less 
rigid approach of the PRI can be seen as a strategy to address the dissociative relational 
framing that large financial intermediaries had employed towards traditional SRI 
actors. Mainstream financial institutions treated SRI approaches at first – and some 
still continue to do so – with great scepticism.58 This criticism was and is often 
articulated in terms of the foregone benefits of diversification when using exclusion 
and best-in-class methods (UNEP FI and Mercer 2007: 7-8).59 Furthermore, the bad 
performance of green technology funds during the dot.com crisis of the early 2000s 
convinced many mainstream financial analysts to steer clear of this investing approach 
for many years to come (UNEP FI and Mercer 2007).60  
 One UNEP FI staffer described the framing that sought to integrate large 
financial institutions by cutting the link with the early ethical investors as a move from 
SRI to “just responsible investing”.61 Here, the legacy of the ‘socially’, which can be 
read as ‘ethical’, is dropped to allow for an interpretation of a financially responsible 
investment strategy, which incorporates an expanded list of financially material risk 
factors that are related to ESG issues.  
 Nonetheless, in terms of relational framing, UNEP FI found itself in a 
conflicted position. This is because it had to emphasise and celebrate the successes of 
the SRI frame to point out to financial institutions that there was something, which 
they could build upon. On the other hand, it had to rebrand ‘Responsible Investment’ 
 
58 Interview asset management, North America. See also Thomas Hale, FT Alphaville, September 27th, 
2018. https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/09/27/1538020801000/The-new-green-evangelism/. Accessed 
August, 25th, 2019.  
59 Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe.  
60 See also Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, Germany. 





so that it did no longer have the stigma of being an unprofitable, niche strategy that 
was only applied by (by now) middle-aged ‘hippies’, who had turned into boutique 
investors.62   
 The complementary story to large financial institutions trying to reframe 
sustainable finance as being about risks and opportunities is the reaction of the former 
incumbents. SRI actors like trade associations, (often small) private firms and CSOs 
had employed relational framing to define their identity as being in opposition to the 
mainstream financial system. Therefore, they were naturally sceptical of large 
financial institutions moving into their line of work. A member of the German SRI 
community, for instance, was puzzled by attempts of the financial industry to start 
from scratch with the definition of sustainability in finance and referred to the SRI 
community as the “good, that is green actors” as opposed to the mainstream financial 
institutions.63  
 While the dynamics between proponents of the SRI frame and the newly 
emerging risks and opportunities frame were the major issue in sustainable finance in 
this first period, there was yet another frame present in the policy subsystem. This third 
frame was advanced by civil society and research organisations like the British New 
Economics Foundation (nef). These actors approached the financial system out of an 
understanding that highlights its role in the creation and re-production of global 
inequalities. The involvement of social movements in initiatives for international debt 
forgiveness like the Jubilee Campaign and their criticism of the IMF’s structural 
adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s meant that these actors 
 
62 Cf. Comments by Jakob Thomä on the transition away from 40-50 years old impact investors that 
used to dominate the field to a new generation. See also Transcript Ö21 annual meeting, Berlin: 
September 21st, 2018.  





maintained both a diagnostic and a relational frame that was highly sceptical of the 
incumbent financial and regulatory institutions (e.g. Simms 2001). In terms of 
environmental sustainability and climate change more narrowly, the nef also 
questioned of the imperatives of economic growth and capital accumulation (Simms 
2001: 18; nef 2003).  
 This systemic criticism received new impetus through the GFC. In the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, a civil society campaign group that was coordinated 
by the nef called for a ‘Green New Deal’. In their diagnosis the members of the 
campaign emphasised that the increasing deregulation of the financial system since the 
1970s had not only led to the crash and exacerbated inequalities but was also linked 
with environmental issues. By fuelling overconsumption through the extension of 
credit, finance had contributed to the overburdening of natural systems (Elliot et al. 
2008; 9-12).  
 The understanding of the relation between the financial sector and 
sustainability of actors like the nef can be summarised as a framing that advances a 
systemic critique of the financial system. The diagnostic framing emphasises that the 
financial sector contributes to the undervaluation of the environment and to the 
reproduction of poverty and exploitation. The prognostic framing that is derived from 
this assessment maintains that a major reorganisation of finance is necessary. This 
might entail the break-up of large financial institutions, tougher regulations and war 
economy or New Deal type efforts to redirect money allocation to societal and 
environmental goals (Elliot et al. 2008; Simms 2001).  
 From the above description, I identify three frames in the first period and 
summarise them in table 4.1. First, there is the SRI frame that is associated with 





which is associated with UNEP FI and aims to persuade large financial institutions to 
embrace sustainable finance. Finally, the critical frame, which is advanced by CSOs, 
maintains that the financial system is detrimental to environmental and social 
sustainability and hence needs to undergo major reform.  
 The positions of these three frames in the policy subsystem can be visualised 
by constructing the the co-publication network. The network for the period between 
1998 and 2008 consists of 61 texts. 41 (67.2%) of these texts are connected in the 
largest component. Figure 4.2 depicts a reduced version of the co-publication network, 
which consists of the 44 most central texts64, 39 of which are part of the largest 
component. The nodes in the figure represent the publications, whereas the individuals 
have been collapsed to links. The application of the Girvan-Newman community 
detection algorithm resulted in the identification of six clusters, which are represented 
by the different node symbols (cf. chapter 3 for the methodology). The organisations 
that are present within each cluster are listed in the legend on the right side of figure 
4.2. Finally, a manual sorting of the clusters to the three frames is visualised by the 
coloured circles and ellipses.  
 
64 Links with a lower weight than 2 have been deleted and in the newly obtained networks, nodes with 




Table 4.1 Summary of the Frames Present Between 1998 and 2008
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Figure 4.2 Co-publication Network 1998-2008. Nodes are scaled by degree. Symbols 
correspond to community membership as detected by the Girvan-Newman Algorithm. 
Abbreviations in the legend: Global Climate Forum (GCF), Institutional Investor Group on 
Climate Change (IIGCC), Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), Schweizierische 
Vereinigung für Ökologisch Bewusste Unternehmensführung (ÖBU), United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI).
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 The figure shows a dominance of UNEP FI when it comes to the publication 
of expertise. The cluster in the middle of the graph, where nodes are symbolised by 
filled-out circles, consists of texts that were published by or in association with UNEP 
FI. In fact, 44% of the nodes that are depicted in figure 4.2 are related to UNEP FI. 
Meanwhile, the community of eurosif and its members – plus-shaped nodes – is 
located at the bottom of the UNEP FI cluster. In addition, the ÖBU, the Swiss trade 
association of SRI funds, that is represented with star-shaped nodes, forms a separate 
community at the left margin of the largest component that is dominated by UNEP FI. 
The publications from the nef (filled out rectangles) form an isolate cluster at the left 
side of the graph. Finally, there are two clusters that are situated at the margins of the 
largest component. First, the filled-out triangles represent publications from the 
Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), a private initiative of asset 
owners and asset managers, and the Carbon Trust, a UK government-industry platform 
that seeks to promote a green transition. Second, the rectangles with an “X” at their 
centre are one publication by the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), a 
research and advocacy group that was launched by the insurer Munich Re in the 
context of the UNFCCC negotiations in 2005 (cf. Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016: 116) 
and another publication from the Global Climate Forum (GCF), a German socio-
economic research institute that is associated with the Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research.  
 In terms of framing, risks and opportunities, which are the main focus of the 
UNEP FI publications, dominate. The two smaller clusters of IIGCC + Carbon Trust 
and MCII + GCF can also be sorted to this frame. The promoters of the SRI frame like 
eurosif, by contrast, maintain lose associations with the risks and opportunities frame. 





be validated when looking at figure 4.2. One of the reasons for this marginalisation of 
the SRI frame is that its focus on members’ values means that it struggles to engage in 
coordinated knowledge production. Indeed, most of the publications in the SRI clusters 
consist of general arguments about the relevance of SRI, which are then followed by 
explanations of the different investment approaches and stock-taking exercises of the 
AUM that each of them represents. The critical frame, finally, remains self-contained 
in this period. This should not necessarily come as a surprise, since the deep scepticism 
towards the financial sector and the diagnosis that the current financial system is 
essentially actively working against sustainable outcomes provides hardly a fertile 
ground for engaging with the other actors inside the system.  
 While the SRI frame was losing its discursive hegemony, it still dominated the 
efforts by several European states to regulate sustainable finance during this period. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of SRI as a clearly defined and regulated field of 
activity failed to materialise in the jurisdictions where it was attempted. In Germany, 
there was a general scepticism towards SRI from financial regulators. In addition, the 
installation of an official at the environment ministry, who showed little interest in the 
topic, meant that activity and conversations got into a dead end. All of this led to a 
quasi-abandonment of the topic by the early 2010s.65  
 In Belgium, an already fairly advanced proposal for the regulation of the SRI 
market lost its course during the period when the state passed a period of more than 
500 days without federal government.66 Lastly, at the EU level in 1997, a report was 
contracted to the German environmental consultancies Delphi and Ecologic Institut to 
explore ‘sustainable investing’ and make recommendations to policy makers. 
 
65 Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, Germany. 





However, a shift of priorities by the subsequent Commissions from growth, social, and 
environmental issues to only jobs and growth meant that the plans were shelved and 
ultimately abandoned.67 
 This subsection has argued that sustainable finance has a legacy in the practice 
of SRI and its corresponding frame. SRI has historically been practised by smaller 
financial institutions – often with a religious background – that aim to align their 
financial activities with their ethical values. As these institutions are mostly small and 
rely on voluntary contributions, they also had more regulatory and legal room for 
manoeuvring. The growth of SRI strategies meant that large financial institutions, IOs 
and some policymakers turned their attention towards sustainable finance. On the other 
hand, sustainable finance was met with suspicion and antagonism from mainstream 
financial institutions, which emphasise the benefits of portfolio diversification and 
shareholder value maximisation.  
 An alternative frame that sought to integrate the social and environmental 
concerns of SRI with the arrived wisdom at mainstream financial institutions focused 
on ESG risks and opportunities. This frame was operationalised through a relatively 
broad survey of reputational, legal and financial risks and opportunities. UNEP FI 
provided a coordinating function for this emerging frame, while institutional investors, 
commercial banks and insurance companies were the frame’s audience. Finally, some 
activist CSOs like the nef promoted a critical frame. This frame argues that there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between environmental and social aims and the way the 
financial system currently works. Based on this assessment they argue for a wholesale 
reform of finance. In terms of the positioning within the policy subsystem, the risks 
 






and opportunities frame is clearly dominant. The SRI frame, on the other hand, is 
increasingly pushed to the margins and the critical frame has so far remained an isolate.  
 
2009-2014: Two Crises and their Aftermath 
Many interviewees suggested that the GFC meant that people in the financial system 
started again to ask questions about the purpose, the efficiency and the functioning of 
finance (see also Baker 2013; 2018 on post-GFC discussions about purpose).68 
However, the system question was not asked in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.69 
Some CSOs like the nef (Elliot et al 2008), the Ecologic Institute (Meyer-Ohlendorf 
et al. 2009) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (French et al. 2009) as well as private 
banks such as HSBC (Robins et al. 2009) and research institutes like the Global 
Climate Forum (Jaeger et al. 2009) took the GFC as an opportunity to advocate for a 
Green New Deal. Moreover, some sustainable finance texts that were published in the 
aftermath of the crisis make the argument that this is the best time for a strategic reset 
of the financial system towards achieving sustainability (e.g. Clements-Hunt et al. 
2009).  
 Such calls for reform notwithstanding, overarching revolutions of both the 
financial system and the resource intensive world economy have arguably not occurred 
to this day. Some interviewees pointed out that from an ex-post assessment the GFC 
was a missed opportunity to reset the financial system towards the achievement of 
environmental priorities. Accordingly, the potential of the crisis was wasted as 
 
68 Interview Jakob Thomä, Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, Germany, Interview 
Jeremy McDaniels, UNEP Inquiry. 





political protagonists decided to patch up the existing unsustainable and ineffective 
financial system, instead of using their power to induce such a revolution.70  
 The GFC was not the only crisis that had an impact on sustainable finance. The 
failure of the international community to reach a binding agreement on the mitigation 
of climate change at the CoP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 constituted a crisis of the 
multilateral bargaining approach. As a result of this stalemate, non-state, market actors 
and complex governance structures were increasingly explored as potential 
alternatives (Bernstein et al. 2010; Hoffmann 2011). These developments also 
influenced the strategies of climate change advocacy organisations, which stepped up 
their engagement with multi-stakeholder and market-oriented experiments. 
Furthermore, reduced spending from states for development financing presented an 
incentive for actors from the development community to shift their focus away from 
the multilateral negotiations of the CoPs and towards the financial industry. 
 The frame that started to emerge within this context emphasised the necessity 
for additional climate finance. One of the main diagnoses of the climate finance frame 
is that the transition towards low-carbon economies requires investments at a scale that 
cannot be financed by public budgets. Illustrating this line of argumentation, article 8 
of the Copenhagen Accord states that “(…) developed countries commit to a goal of 
mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public 
and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.” 
(UNFCCC 2009). One interviewee pointed out that the US$ 100 billion commitment 
played an instrumental role in the development of the climate finance community. 
After the announcement, private and civil society actors emerged that track these flows 
 





and, perhaps more significantly, try to find ways to leverage them with private 
funding.71 
 The emphasis on the leveraging of public funds represents the prognostic part 
of the climate finance frame. If the diagnosis highlights the insufficiency of public 
funds, the solution is framed to lie with the mobilisation of private finance. More 
concretely, advocates of the climate finance frame point to new financial instruments 
that would be hybrids of public and private financing. Examples are green bonds, 
which are often issued by development banks and subsequently sold to private 
investors. Another kind of financial instrument that is proposed consists of mobilising 
a risk-sharing mechanism, in which scarce public money takes the riskiest tranche of 
an investment to make it attractive to investors (Holmes 2010a; Holmes 2010b; 
Buchner et al. 2012). Environmental and development advocacy organisations also 
followed the Green Climate Fund closely. The fund is operated by the UN and was 
established in 2010 to channel climate financing from developed to developing 
countries (cf. Bird et al. 2011; Watson et al. 2012).  
 The argument that is conveyed here is that due to the twin crises of the GFC 
and of multilateral climate governance, advocacy groups on climate and development 
started to engage with the financial system. On the recipient side of these arguments, 
parts of the investor community represented by bodies like the IIGCC or the INCR 
were quite sympathetic (IIGCC 2011). Individual financial institutions such as the 
French bank Caisse des dépôts and the British insurer and pension fund Aviva also 
supported or commissioned reports on the necessity of private finance for meeting the 
 





challenge posed by climate change (Leguet 2012; Morel and Delbosc 2012; Gazibara 
and Chapple 2011).  
 A variation of the climate finance frame can be found in the discussions about 
green growth. The (diagnostic) arguments about insufficient public development funds 
and the (prognostic) solution to tap private funding is often explicitly focused on the 
Global South. The notion of green growth could, by contrast, also be applied to the 
transformation of the European economies in the aftermath of the GFC. Faced with 
recession and austerity as well as with the fixing of the financial system, environmental 
considerations were not the first priority of European policymakers. The Barroso 
Commission, which came into office in 2005, largely abandoned the sustainable 
finance initiatives that had been incorporated into the Commission’s environmental 
and social policies in the 1990s.72 This shift in priorities meant that the promotors of 
sustainable finance had to alter their argumentation. An example of this changed 
context is a paper from a coalition of French research institutions that appeals to a 
“climate agnostic policy-maker” and highlights the co-benefits that regulatory 
interventions on sustainable finance could deliver for short-term policy goals like 
economic recovery and poverty alleviation (Hourcade et al. 2014: 5, 10).  
 Taking a similar framing to a global perspective, the New Climate Economy 
(NCE), a multi-stakeholder research collaboration that includes CSOs like the Climate 
Policy Initiative (CPI) as well as IOs such as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD, 
published a study titled ‘Better Growth, Better Climate’ on the question of whether 
climate mitigation is compatible with continued economic growth. Using economic 
modelling as well as country case studies, the study argues that the answer to this 
 






question is affirmative. This is because Pareto improvements to the current economic 
framework can be achieved and because sizable co-benefits such as reduced health 
costs can accrue from climate mitigation. Hence, the twin challenges of overcoming 
secular stagnation and combatting climate change can be solved by moving to a new 
growth model, in which externalities and other market failures are addressed by 
policymakers (NCE 2014: especially 25ff, 33ff).  
 To achieve this transition, a reform of the financial industry would be necessary 
so that productive investments can be channelled to the right places (NCE 2014: 
209ff). Notably, the diagnostic framing of the publications on green growth adds an 
emphasis on the positive macroeconomic effects of private green investments to the 
already examined argument that public funds are insufficient to meet the investment 
needs of greening the economy. The prognostic frame, which is about facilitating the 
flow of private investments towards sustainable investments, remains, however, the 
same. Finally, the relational dimension of climate finance emphasises the bridging 
position of the actors that employ this framing. Accordingly, their interlocutors are, on 
the one hand side, the (traditional) development community that comprises donor 
organisations, IOs, CSOs and project developers. On the other hand, there is the 
financial sector, which is represented in particular by cash-rich institutional investors 
that can bring private funding to the green development model.  
 The incorporation of co-benefits and a new growth model into the diagnostic 
dimension of the climate finance frame are arguably responses to a changed 
macroeconomic environment. The risks and opportunities frame, that had dominated 
the policy subsystem from the late 1990s to 2008, was also affected by these 
developments. Notably, the changed environment meant that new actors started to 





2011, universities and CSOs began to engage with the policy subsystem of sustainable 
finance through this frame. Against the background of the GFC, these actors suggested 
that environmental risks might be the subject of the next financial crisis. By outlining 
how environmental factors and climate change in particular relate to financial risk, 
they managed to attract the attention (albeit not yet the financial decisions) of financial 
institutions.73  
 The diagnostic framing of these actors holds that environmental factors 
represented a great source of risk for financial institutions. This is essentially 
equivalent to the efforts by the actors of the risks and opportunities frame in the first 
period. However, the new actors varied the emphasis slightly. First, their work gave 
much greater weight to the risk part and relegated opportunities to a secondary place. 
Second, the reformulation of the frame meant a reduction in scope and an increase in 
depth as environmental risks were narrowed down to a detailed examination of the 
financial risks of climate change.  
 This narrowing down is strongly associated with the concepts of ‘unburnable 
carbon’ and ‘stranded assets’. These terms were coined by the UK-based Carbon 
Tracker initiative. Carbon Tracker used the calculations on the ‘carbon budget’, i.e. 
the amount of GHG emissions still available to humanity under a below 2° scenario 
(Meinshausen et al. 2009), to quantitatively measure how overvalued carbon-intensive 
assets are. The logic behind this reasoning starts from the observation that under a 
below 2° scenario only one fifth of the available fossil fuel reserves can be burned. It 
follows that financial assets (e.g. shares, bonds), whose price is related to the valuation 
of fossil fuel dependent physical assets (e.g. oil tankers, coal mines) that cannot be 
utilised in a below 2° scenario are overvalued. In other words, this overvaluation 
 





constitutes a ‘carbon bubble’. This is because, once policy makers take actions to 
guarantee that the four fifths of carbon reserves are not burned (thus unburnable 
carbon), the assets based on them undergo a huge downward correction, i.e. they 
become stranded (cf. Leaton 2011; 2013).  
 Apart from qualitative judgments from interviewees74, the significance of 
Carbon Tracker and the stranded assets concept can be observed in the citation 
network. The 2013 update on ‘Unburnable Carbon’ (Leaton 2013) is the second most 
cited text with 23 citations, whereas the average publication receives only 2.1 
citations.75 Other prominent organisations that contributed to the reformulation of the 
risks and opportunities frame in this period are the University of Oxford’s Smith 
School that started its ‘stranded assets programme’ (now sustainable finance 
programme) in 2012 and the 2 Degrees Investing Initiative (2° investing), an initially 
France-based think tank that from 2012 worked on concepts, metrics, scenarios and 
indicators of climate risk (e.g. Dupré and Chenet 2012; Thomä et al.  2013; Thomä et 
al. 2014). 
 On the diagnostic side of the risks and opportunities frame, the work of these 
organisations contributed to a more homogenous conceptualisation of ESG risks. This 
was achieved through narrowing down ESG aspects to only environmental aspects and 
then to climate aspects (which, again, are mostly conceptualised as energy transition 
aspects).76 The emphasis on a data-driven conceptualisation of risk stands in contrast 
to the approach of the previous period. As noted before, the actors from the cluster that 
 
74 Interview Jakob Thomä, Interview MEP Greens/EFA. 
75 The first most cited text is a 2016 publication by the UNEP Inquiry. The Carbon Tracker report 
shares the second place with a publication by the UK prudential regulatory authority on the impact of 
climate change on the insurance industry. The great distance between the mean and the upper end of 
the distribution is a typical property of networks that display often so called ‘core-periphery 
structures’, in which the degree distribution is long tailed (cf. Newman 2010). The distribution is 
depicted in the Appendix C.  





was coordinated by UNEP FI had defined environmental risks much more broadly. 
They had also considered reputational risks to be one of the strongest motivations for 
enterprises to become active on ESG issues. By contrast, the stranded assets concept 
emphasises the financial losses that could accrue to investors as a consequence of 
transition risks. The term transition risk is used here to signify political interventions 
(e.g. a carbon price) and other societal responses to climate change. In addition to that, 
litigation risk, i.e. the risk of carbon financiers becoming legally responsible for the 
damages caused by climate change, is now emphasised as a potential link between 
climate change and financial losses (e.g. 2° investing 2013).  
 A second part of the diagnostic framing in this period highlighted the role of 
physical risks. This category refers to losses of financial value that result from a 
changing climate. Such financial losses would affect investors, whose portfolios are 
based on assets that would be destroyed by physical impairments (e.g. flooded real 
estate). In addition, financial assets linked to companies, whose business models could 
be affected by the physical effects of climate change (e.g. disruption of a supply chain 
or increase in prices of e.g. an agricultural commodity due to droughts) are exposed to 
physical risks (Caldecott and McDaniels 2014; see also chapter 6).  
 A final development in the risks and opportunities frame is the notion of 
universal ownership. This concept was explored by the community of sustainable 
finance experts in the aftermath of the crisis and is still used today, for instance, by 
representatives of the Japanese GPIF.77 Universal ownership stipulates that holders of 
large diversified portfolios over a long timeframe actually are holders of an entire 
 





national or world economy and, therefore, should care about systemic issues like 
climate change (Mattiston et al. 2011). 
 In this second period, the diagnosis of the most relevant risk categories and the 
transmission channels that translate between environmental dynamics and financial 
institutions has become narrower and more sophisticated. Nevertheless, the proposed 
solution still consists of financial institutions integrating these considerations into their 
risk management processes and asset allocation. As to the relational dynamic of the 
risk frame, the audience has remained relatively stable. The actors that produce 
knowledge on climate risks are more interested in mainstream investors than in niche 
SRI funds. A second constituency are financial regulators and supervisors. 2° 
investing, for example, described its objective in its initial publication as “connecting 
the dots between the +2°C climate goal, risk performance assessment of investment 
portfolios, and financial regulatory frameworks” (Dupré and Chenet 2012: 1).  
 Lastly, the critical frame also underwent some changes. Most notably, some 
actors started to critically assess the claims that the market leaders had made in the 
first period. Bank Track, urgewald, the Centre for Research on Multinational 
Corporations (SOMO), the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), Friends of the Earth 
(FoE) and Oil Change International are some of the CSOs that scrutinised the 
sustainability credentials of large financial institutions.  
 Apart from analysing the practices of financial institutions, these organisations 
also hosted public campaigns aimed at shaming commercial and development banks 
that did not fulfil their environmental promises and, instead, financed highly visible 
polluting projects like the exploitation of tar sands. Their diagnostic framing remains 
often limited to pointing out that financial institutions are not keeping their word. Their 





harmful activities such as fossil fuels and in particular coal (see chapter 6 on 
divestment).  
 Yet both the diagnosis and the solutions suggested by some of these actors also 
resonate with a criticism that goes beyond the narrow assessments of broken promises 
and, instead, points to the general problems of finance and capitalism. In terms of the 
relational dynamics, some of the mentioned CSOs posit themselves explicitly in 
opposition to financial institutions. This relational dimension resonates with the war 
metaphors (against the fossil fuel industry and its financiers) that are dominant in the 
divestment discourses of environmental campaigners (cf. Mangat et al. 2018: 194ff). 
Therefore, publications from this community (e.g. Dubey et al. 2011; Kornfield and 
Kresowik 2014; Van Gelder et al. 2010) can be sorted to the critical frame. 
 Table 4.2 gives an overview of the frames in the second period and figure 4.3 
locates them in the policy subsystem. Importantly, table 4.2 separates the risks and 
opportunities frame into two subcategories to account for the fact that the new actors 
contributed to a reconceptualisation that did, however, not result in the disappearance 
of the actors from the first period. The largest component in the second period accounts 
for 75.3% of all nodes. Hence, in spite of covering a larger membership the policy 
subsystem has become more cohesive. On the other hand, if one takes into account the 
weights which represent repeated interactions and the formation of distinct 
communities, one can also observe a much more marked community structure. This is 
represented in figure 4.3 by the increase of the number of clusters to 15 (up from 6 in 
the previous period). For reasons of space, I will limit the description of the clusters to 
the largest and most representative ones.
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Frame Actors Diagnostic Prognostic Relational 
SRI Eurosif and 
members  
Investments fail to reflect (our) ethical 
and religious views 
Financial assets should be screened according to 
our values 
We are the pioneers of responsible 
investment, sustainable finance or 
whatever it is called these days. 
We act out of genuine concern 
and not out of a fashion (like the 






Aviva, IFC  
Poor environmental and social 
credentials of companies can mean 
financial losses for investors. Insurers 
need to care about environmental 
catastrophes 
Environmental, social and reputational risks need to 
be internalised in investment decision making.  
We need better data and disclosure from firms as 
well as a clarification of legal obligations and 
regulations so that investors can integrate ESG risks 
We are a coalition of international 
organisations and market leaders, 
who move at the vanguard that 





Carbon intensive assets are mispriced We need to develop risk assessments that help 
financial institutions and regulators to see carbon 
risks 
We translate the science of the 
IPCC into the language of 
mainstream financial institutions 
and regulators 





Market leaders’ actions and voluntary 
codes provide at best cosmetic 
solutions to environmental and social 
problems. At worst they are outright 
frauds  
We need to watch financial institutions’ behaviour 
closely by quantifying the negative impact of their 
investments. The regulation, ownership structure 
and priorities of finance must be changed radically 
We are distinct from the large 
private financial institutions and 
complicit regulators, which 
reproduce a dysfunctional and 










Greening the world economy will 
require trillions, which austerity ridden 
governments do not have, but which 
private finance does have. Private and 
public investments are able to generate 
a new growth regime 
We need to address the financial plumbing so that 
money can flow where it is most needed  
We connect the development 
community with mainstream 
financial institutions (in particular 
institutional investors) and 
policymakers 





Figure 4.3 Co-publication Network 2009-2014. Nodes are scaled by degree. Symbols 
correspond to community membership as detected by the Girvan-Newman Algorithm. 
Abbreviations in the legend: Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), 
Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G), Global Climate Forum (GCF), Institute for 
Climate Economics (I4CE), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Institutional Investor 
Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), New 
Climate Economy (NCE), New Economics Foundation (nef), Overseas Development Institute 
(odi), Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSE),  World Business Council for Sustainable 




 In figure 4.3, the centre is occupied by a cluster of empty circles. Within this 
cluster there are texts from UNEP FI, the 2014 founded UNEP Inquiry, the IIGCC, 
and the CPI. As described above, some of the actors in this cluster (CPI and IIGCC) 
belong to the climate finance frame. UNEP FI and UNEP Inquiry, on the other hand, 
act as coordinators between the different actors and frames.  
 UNEP FI’s and UNEP Inquiry’s role as a hubs can also be illustrated by the 
measuring the betweenness centrality (see chapter 3) of their employees. In the first 
period, the highest betweenness centrality can be attributed to Paul Clements Hunt, the 
director of UNEP FI. In the second period, Hunt was relegated to the third place, 
whereas Nick Robins, co-director at the UNEP Inquiry and formerly head of HSBC’s 
unit on climate change took over the pole position.78   
 Moving from the empty circles to the upper right of the graph, a second central 
cluster of plus-shaped nodes appears. These shapes represent publications by Carbon 
Tracker, the nef, Aviva and ShareAction. The importance of the work of Carbon 
Tracker on stranded assets as well as the role of Aviva as one of the early movers on 
sustainability in the mainstream pension and insurance industry has been already 
described. Whereas Carbon Tracker was instrumental for the development of the risks 
and opportunities frame in the second period, Aviva was also involved in the climate 
finance frame. The nef, meanwhile, has been sorted to the critical frame in the first 
period. ShareAction, finally, is a CSO that helps environmental and social groups to 
translate their issues into the language of institutional investors and seeks to mobilise 
holders of pension plans on sustainability issues.79  
 
78 See Appendix C for betweenness centrality measures and Appendix B and chapter 3 for an 
explanation of their calculation and relevance. 





 At first sight the overlap within this cluster can be less attributed to a common 
frame, but to spatial proximity as all the member organisations are UK-based. 
Nonetheless, when looking at the content of the publications, one can attribute them 
to the risks and opportunities frame (which in this period is much more risk than 
opportunities). While two of the three publications of the nef in this cluster can still be 
sorted to the critical frame – one being concerned with wider system change (Kemp 
2010) and another one being about the Green New Deal (Simms et al. 2009) –, the 
third contribution links not only personally but also conceptually with Carbon Tracker 
as it covers unburnable carbon (Johnson 2012). This, notably, represents a connection 
between critical frame and the more mainstream risks and opportunities frame. A 
potential explanation for this connection is that the systemic implications of the 
stranded assets concept fit a wholesale criticism of the financial system much better 
than earlier and more moderate conceptualisations of environmental risks. Concerning 
the two remaining actors, ShareAction’s contribution (Berry 2013) also addresses 
climate risks. And while Aviva’s white paper (Waygood 2014) emphasises the need 
for private sector funding in accordance with the climate finance frame (Waygood 
2014: 9), it also elaborates on the risks of unsustainable economic activities (ibid. p. 
3) and stranded assets (ibid. p. 54).  
 Towards the right lower section of the largest component another cluster 
(empty rhombi) of the risks and opportunities frame is formed by the MCII and 
Germanwatch. As described in the first period, the MCII covers the insurance 
dimension of climate risks. Germanwatch, on the other hand, is a German CSO, whose 
contribution in this cluster is about the linkages between the EU ETS and Chinese 
emission trading schemes (Li and Grießhaber 2013). Therefore, it reflects the 





 The last bigger cluster inside the risks and opportunities frame is represented 
by upside-down empty triangles and is formed by publications from UNEP FI, Aviva 
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). This cluster 
is more a continuation of the risks and opportunities frame from the first period as it 
maintains a broader, i.e. not exclusively climate, focus. Aside from the topic of how 
climate change will affect insurance, the publications in this cluster also address 
ecosystem services, the financial materiality of ESG issues and integrated reporting.  
 Moving via the centre (empty circles) towards the upper left part of the largest 
component, one starts to leave the risks and opportunities frame and enters the climate 
finance frame. The rectangles with an “X” inside represent a cluster that is formed of 
the CPI, the NCE and Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G), a CSO. The 
contributions from these organisations connect climate change with development 
questions and advocate for policies such as private sector involvement through de-
risking. In addition, the argument that the move of large amounts of public and private 
investments can lead to a new (green) growth regime swings within this community.  
 The cluster, whose nodes take an “X” shape comprises the part of the climate 
finance frame that is invested in the new but rapidly growing asset class of green 
bonds. A notable member of this cluster is the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), a CSO 
that drafts standards for green bonds and promotes their issuance. In addition, E3G 
and the bank HSBC are part of the cluster. From the graph it can be observed that this 
community also provides a bridge between the climate finance frame and the risks and 
opportunities frame. One possible explanation for this position could be that green 
bonds, on the one hand, cater to the climate finance frame as they are an instrument 





the risks and opportunities frame since they are considered to be (and are marketed as) 
a hedge for climate-related risks.  
 The last cluster inside the largest component is located on the top left of the 
graph (rhombi with a plus inside) and includes the German green party’s Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, the British Overseas Development Institute (odi) and the World Resources 
Institute (WRI). This cluster mostly reflects the collaboration of the Böll foundation 
and the odi in establishing the Climate Funds Update (CFU), a research unit, which 
tracks climate development finance flows and their impact. Its connection towards of 
the centre of the largest component via the CPI and NCE reflects that this part of the 
graph is linked to the climate finance frame.  
 When looking at the isolates in the graph, the first thing that comes to mind is 
that the SRI frame has been further marginalised. This can be seen when looking at 
the eurosif cluster (empty rectangles) in the top left corner, which no longer has a 
connection to the largest component. The cluster made up by circles with an “X” inside 
on the upper right side of figure 4.3 is made of publications from Bank Track. This 
actor is one of the ‘watchdog CSOs’ that I sorted into the critical frame. 
Correspondingly, the publications in this cluster are assessments on how well the 
balance sheets of global banks like ING or HSBC integrate with their commitments 
made in frameworks such as the UN PRI.  
 The last major isolate is located at the top of the graph and is made up of star-
shaped nodes. The publications inside this cluster are from 2° investing, whose 
contributions on climate-related risk have been explored above. In addition, the cluster 
comprises texts from the Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), which before its 
independence in 2015 was a research branch of the French bank Caisse des dépôts, 





climat and later I4CE covers a broader range of issues including financial instruments 
for development finance (Morel and Delbosc 2012), green bonds (Leguet 2012), and 
unconventional monetary policy (Ferron and Morel 2014).  
 The overlap between the two organisations can be explained by their 
geographical proximity, which in this case is present as both actors are of French 
origin. Yet while their framing integrates well with the emphasis of risks and 
opportunities and to a lesser extent climate finance that is present within the largest 
component, the geographical divide between France and the Anglo-American (and 
within that mostly UK) discussion about sustainable finance can be seen in the figure.   
 In summary, the SRI frame was further marginalised throughout this period. 
The risks and opportunities frame, on the other hand, has expanded but was also 
transformed to account almost exclusively for risks related to climate change. CSOs 
and think tanks like Carbon Tracker and 2° investing played a role in popularising this 
approach. On the other hand, financial institutions like Aviva or Caisse des 
dépôts were a receptive audience. In addition, a new climate finance frame is focusing 
on the mobilisation of the financial sector for development projects related to climate 
change. Organisations from the development community (e.g. CPI), IOs like the 
OECD and multilateral development banks are central actors linked to this frame. The 
connection between finance and green growth is also a newcomer that most likely 
reflects the ramifications of the GFC and was advocated by the climate finance 
community to apply their framing outside of the development context. Lastly, the 
critical frame is more isolated but brings together a well-connected CSO community 
that monitors the promises made by financial institutions. However, inside the CSO 





taking a more antagonistic stance through campaigning, whereas ShareAction engages 
with actors from the financial industry.  
 
2015-2018: Explosion and Stabilisation  
The last period is noticeably shorter than the previous two. It is, however, also the 
period when sustainable finance ‘exploded’. Some parts of this explosion can be 
attributed to the extension of the frames and communities from the last period. 
Examples are further developments on the classification and quantification of 
environmental risks and the estimation of investment needs for green growth 
trajectories.  
 Next to these developments, there were also important enabling conditions 
outside the policy subsystem of sustainable finance. Many interviewees mentioned the 
Paris Agreement on climate change at CoP 21 and its explicit reference in Article 2.1 
to the role that finance has to play in the achievement of the below 2° goal as an 
important event.80 In addition, the SDGs, which were adopted by the UN in 2015, 
provided a broader framework for the sustainability agenda that extends beyond 
climate change. Lastly, the CoPs following Paris as well as the One Planet Summits 
hosted by the French president Macron in 2017 and 2018 were events that gave further 




80 Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe, Interview Board Member, SRI 
Association, Europe, Interview Jeremy McDaniels, Interview Cillian Lohan, Interview CSO staff, UK, 





 A contributing factor internal to the financial system that was mentioned by 
two interviewees was a speech that BoE governor Mark Carney delivered in September 
2015.81 This speech, which by now has become famous within the expert community, 
addresses the ‘tragedy of the horizon’. Carney likened this concept to the tragedy of 
the commons but with the difference that while the tragedy of the commons inflicts 
harm from resource overuse to a local community, the tragedy of the horizon inflicts 
the cost on future generations. Moreover, existing authorities (including central banks) 
lack an incentive to address the harm. This is because the time horizon of the costs 
extends beyond the business and political cycles as well as beyond the mandates of 
public institutions (Carney 2015).  
 Apart from singular events like the signing of the Paris Agreement, there were 
also some broader developments that provided the context for the expansion of 
sustainable finance. Technological changes such as artificial intelligence (e.g. Robo-
advisors), blockchain and new electronical payment systems were seen as a revolution 
that was occurring “anyway” in finance. The presence of such an “innovation field” 
meant that there was an opportunity to redesign the financial system with an eye 
towards sustainability (cf. Castilla-Rubio et al. 2016).82 Furthermore, a demographic 
change was underway with Millennials giving increasing importance to sustainability 
considerations both when choosing their investments and their employers.83  
 Another important factor for the institutionalisation of knowledge production 
was that resourceful and prestigious actors outside of the policy subsystem became 
increasingly interested in sustainable finance. The support from international actors 
 
81 Interview Board Member, SRI Association, Europe, Interview Emanuele Campiglio, Interview 
former central bank official, Western Europe, Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, 
Germany. 
82 Interview Jakob Thomä.  






like the G20, the OECD, UNEP and the World Bank alongside with the interest of 
China, France, the EU and the UK meant that those working on sustainable finance 
had both the financial resources and the attention they required.84 IOs like the G20 
were of special importance in this process. Their privileged function was, however, 
not derived from the usefulness or novelty of their reports (e.g. the G20 Study Group 
on Green Finance reports), but from their ability to put pressure on member states. 
Notably, the G20 or the OECD can initiate institutional processes. For sustainable 
finance, the attention of these organisation meant that national ministries and agencies 
needed to start paying attention and develop strategies on the topic.85 When it comes 
to the issue of funding, one interviewee mentioned that many [research and advocacy] 
actors were relying on the same pool of funding, which includes public grants as well 
as financing from private foundations like MAVA or the generation foundation.86 
 Concerning the content of sustainable finance in this period, it is noteworthy 
that only now the term ‘sustainable finance’ is used regularly to refer to all of the 
activities and discussions that have been described so far. Clarifications and definitions 
are, of course, also instruments for erecting and blurring boundaries. A UNEP FI 
publication acknowledged the conceptual fuzziness between green investment, green 
finance, climate finance, and sustainable finance already in 2013 (Zadek and Flynn 
2013: 7). The most widely used definition of sustainable finance that is roughly in line 
with the perception of interviewees, and which is also referred to by inter-  and 
supranational actors like the G20 and the EU, was developed by the UNEP Inquiry in 
2016 after reviewing definitions and concepts from governments and the financial 
industry (Forstater and Zhang 2016). As outlined in the introduction of this chapter, 
 
84 Interview Emanuele Campiglio. 
85 Interview Jeremy McDaniels see also Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe. 





this broad definition of sustainable finance covers ESG issues as well as an economic 
sustainability dimension. The concepts of green and climate finance, on the other hand, 
are narrower and are both part of the environmental dimension [of ESG] (Forstater and 
Zhang 2016: 10-11).  
 This overall definition of sustainable finance, notably, avoids the mentioning 
of risks, opportunities or financial instruments that are closer associated with one of 
the frames. In this context, one interviewee argued that the term sustainable finance 
provided an umbrella for different actors to come together.87 Hence, it differs from 
terms like SRI with its ethical roots or climate finance, which brings historical baggage 
from the UNFCCC and development contexts.  
 Accordingly, sustainable finance could be described as a ‘master frame’, which 
gave a more ambiguous name to the entire policy subsystem and thus established a 
common basis for erstwhile disconnected communities. Yet the inclusiveness of 
sustainable finance should not be overestimated. The interviewee, who made the 
observation of sustainable finance becoming an umbrella term, noted that while being 
inclusive, the concept is also a misnomer. This is because in practice sustainable means 
mostly environment, which in turn means climate, which in turn means emissions.88 
This assessment is seconded by another interviewee, who remarked that “80% of 
sustainable finance is climate.”89  
 Meanwhile, the risks and opportunities frame, which arguably occupied the 
greatest share of what now was called sustainable finance, continued its movement 
away from ambiguity towards more sophistication and specificity. An influential study 
by the consultancy Mercer, which was supported by the UK and German governments 
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88 Ibid. 





and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), estimated the potential gains and 
losses to different asset classes from the physical impacts of climate change 
(Ambachtsheer et al. 2015). A similar study was commissioned by Aviva in 2016 and 
carried out by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). This publication translated the 
physical costs of different climate change scenarios (e.g. 2° or 4° warming) to the 
financial metric of Value at Risk (EIU 2016, see chapter 5). The salience of these 
publications can be assessed by their high rank in the citation network (4th and 7th place 
respectively) as well as by the fact that they are repeatedly referred to in panel 
discussions and newspaper articles.90 
 For the purpose of the next chapter, which analyses the role of academic 
paradigms, it is noteworthy that both studies use Integrated Assessment Models 
(IAMs) to estimate the financial damages that result from climate change. IAMs are a 
common tool for policy analysis in environmental economics and have been used and 
developed most prominently in the Economics of Climate Change Review by Lord 
Nicholas Stern in 2006 and the work of the 2018 Nobel prize winner William Nordhaus 
(Nordhaus 1994; Stern et al. 2006). The application of these models to financial 
portfolios helped to further operationalise the risks and opportunities frame, which had 
already been narrowed down to climate-related risks in the previous period.  
 While these and other models operationalised climate-related risks, the precise 
meaning of this term was not yet well-defined. In this last period that started to change 
as some actors tried to standardise the categorisation of such risks. In 2015, the Bank 
of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) published a report on climate-
 
90Notes QED forum on sustainable finance, Brussels. June 5th, 2017. See also Anjli Raval and Attracta 
Mooney, “Money Managers: The New Warriors of Climate Change”, Financial Times, December 
27th, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/c245af4a-f875-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c. Accessed January 
5th, 2019; Chris Bryant, “We’re All Climate Catastrophe Preppers Now”, Bloomberg, November 5th, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-05/doomsday-investing-in-a-time-of-climate-





related risks for the assets and liabilities of insurance firms. In its assessment, the 
regulator differentiated between physical risks, transition risks and liability risks. 
According to both the citation network, where the publication shares the 2nd place, and 
the assessment of interviewees, the PRA was instrumental in defining and popularising 
the notion of climate-related risks.91  
 The fact that the PRA’s take on climate-related risks became widely used is 
also an outcome of the regulator’s power. After specifying what climate-related risks 
were, the PRA requested insurers to submit information on their exposure according 
to these categories (PRA 2015). This request had the effect to raise the awareness of 
financial institutions. One interviewee noted that the fact that climate change was now 
on the agenda of financial institutions could be attributed to a great degree to the 
actions of regulators.92 Since then the PRA has expanded the scope of financial 
institutions that are considered to be impacted by climate change by undertaking a 
similar exercise on the exposure of commercial banks (PRA 2018).  
 While this episode occurred in the UK, a similar development happened in 
France with the adoption of the 2015 Energy Transition Law. Article 173 of this law 
requires institutional investors to disclose information on their exposure to climate-
related risks. In addition, they have to report on how ESG considerations are integrated 
into their investment decision making process.  Despite the fact that there is still no 
standardised way for the assessment and stress testing of French financial institutions, 
the law led to awareness raising and learning. Just as the PRA, the French prudential 
regulation authority held bilateral talks with banks, insurers and investors on climate-
related risks and their management.93 This notwithstanding, the influence of regulators 
 
91 Interview CSO staff, UK, Interview Jeremy McDaniels. 
92 Interview CSO staff, UK, see also, Interview I17 (confidential).  





might be more a regional than a universal feature. An interviewee from the North 
American asset management industry questioned the relevance of regulators noting 
that while he would not rule out entirely the possibility, he had never experienced asset 
managers making strategic decisions due to the involvement of regulators.94 
 The move of regulators and central banks into sustainable finance in this last 
period meant also a transformation of the risks and opportunities frame. The main shift 
in the diagnosis concerned the unit of analysis. Following the GFC, central banks had 
been tasked with monitoring system-wide, macrofinancial risks (cf. Baker 2013). From 
this vantage point they located climate-related risks at the system level. As I will 
further outline in chapter 5, this conceptualisation is ontologically distinct from 
situating the same risks at the level of a financial institution’s portfolio. In short, the 
regulators’ diagnosis emphasises that climate-related risks have the potential to not 
only lead to losses for and failures of financial institutions, but also threaten the 
stability of the financial system. The prognostic frame, meanwhile, stresses that 
regulators need to increase their knowledge of the interactions between climate 
change, societies’ responses to it and financial stability. They also should ensure that 
the financial system increases its resilience towards such risks. Finally, regulators need 
to develop tools to both minimise climate-related risks before they materialise and to 
be able to respond to them if necessary.  
 The application of this variation of the risks and opportunities framing was not 
undertaken by all central banks in equal measure. In Europe, next to the already 
mentioned actors from the UK and France, the Dutch and Swedish authorities are 
frontrunners.95 The Dutch central bank (DNB) has mapped sustainable investing in the 
 
94 Interview, asset management, North America.  
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Dutch pension fund market (DNB 2016) and conducted a high-level analysis of the 
country’s financial system’s exposure to climate risks (Regelink et al. 2017). In 
addition, it created a sustainable finance platform in 2016 and is currently developing 
climate stress test methodologies.96 Another actor that started to look at the 
macroprudential consequences of climate and transition risks was the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which published a paper on three different transmission 
channels of climate change to the financial system (ESRB 2016).  
 The internationalisation and institutionalisation of these efforts by central 
banks and supervisors took place at the One Planet Summit in December 2017 with 
the establishment of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). The 
NGFS is a collaboration of financial authorities that coordinates the development of 
methodologies, supervisory practices and regulatory interventions on climate-related 
risks. In addition, and closer to the climate finance frame, the network explores the 
role that regulatory actions can play in scaling up finance for activities that contribute 
to an environmentally friendly transition (cf. NGFS 2018).  
 Central banks and financial authorities from the four leading European states 
(F, GB, NL, SWE) were among the founding members of the NGSF alongside with 
the German Bundesbank, the People’s Bank of China, the Bank of Mexico and the 
monetary authority of Singapore. As of March 2020, the NGFS counts 63 members 
from five continents – including the ECB and Western and Southern European 
institutions – and 12 observers amongst whom are the OECD, the BIS and the World 
Bank.97 Yet while the fast increasing membership of the NGFS paints a rosy picture, 
some observers have suggested that the “dirty secret” of the network is that its creation 
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became only necessary because the US Federal Reserve refused to discuss climate-
related risks inside the Basel framework and because after an initial surge the G20 
quickly lost interest in sustainable finance.98 
 The developments described above suggest that regulators and central banks 
have reframed the diagnosis of environmental and climate risks by shifting the unit of 
analysis from the individual financial institution to the financial system. The 
prognostic dimension of this frame emphasises the need to further refine the analytical 
tools to comprehend the systemic impact of climate-related risks. Based on these 
assessments regulators will then be able to either prevent these risks or at least respond 
to them. As to the relational dimension of their framing, regulators look to their 
international peers as well as to the entities which they supervise. While the NGFS 
highlights the willingness to cooperate, it has also been suggested that the political 
nature of addressing climate change might bring an end to the transnational community 
of technocratic central bankers.99 In addition, the perception that the answer to climate 
change is a political issue has brought the relation between regulators, central banks 
and governments (i.e. their principals) to the forefront (see chapter 6).  
 In parallel to the work on systemic risk, the already existing research stream on 
metrics for climate-related risks on the level of the individual financial firm continued 
to evolve (e.g. Dupré et al. 2015; Lewis 2014). One major development in this line of 
work was the development of forward-looking metrics that increasingly 
complemented assessments such as GHG foot-printing, which are based on historical 
 
98 Cf. Notes on Simon Zadek’s (UNDP, formerly UNEP Inquiry) remarks at OECD 6 th Forum on 
Green Finance and Investment, Paris: October 29th, 2019.  See also Gillan Tett, Billy Nauman and 
Patrick Temple-West, “Moral Money Special Edition: Bloomberg’s big day, impact bonds, the ‘other’ 
SDGs.” Financial Times, September 26th, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/cae3a64c-e001-11e9-
9743-db5a370481bc, Accessed December 4th, 2019. 
99 Claire Jones, “Splits over Green QE are a sign of the times”, Financial Times Alphaville, January 
15th, 2020. https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/01/14/1579014159000/Splits-over-Green-QE-are-a-sign-





data.100 The rationale behind forward-looking metrics is that for an ‘alignment’ to 
policy goals such as the Paris Agreement to occur, it is insufficient to only mobilise 
additional investments in green industries. Instead, the entire economy must be 
decarbonised. This then means that a major role is accorded to investments that fund 
the transitions of carbon-heavy sectors (see chapter 6). The actor that was arguably 
most influential in developing such methodologies is 2° investing (e.g. Höhne et al. 
2015; Thomä et al. 2015; Weber et al. 2017a). Importantly, the move towards 
transition scenarios modifies the risks and opportunities frame since the minimisation 
of risk and the maximisation of opportunities is equated with scenario compliance. 
 The significance of these developments lies less with a shift in the framing and 
more with changes in the socio-technical instruments. The diagnosis that financial 
institutions still fail to acknowledge climate-related risks and opportunities remains 
the same. Similarly, the prognosis that tools and processes that incorporate those issues 
into capital allocation need to be developed has not changed. Nonetheless, the change 
from past data to future projections marks a shift that matters for the design of socio-
technical instruments (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion).  
 The success of the 2° investing’s framework can be partly attributed to its 
technical sophistication. Another factor that contributed to the widespread adaptation 
of 2° investing’s methodologies and assessment tools by financial institutions but also 
by CSOs (e.g. Influence Map 2019) is that the think tank operates mostly on grant 
money (>70% from EU grants in 2017, cf. 2° investing 2017), which, in turn, allows 
for open access methodologies.101 2° investing thus played an instrumental part in 
 
100 Cf. Notes on talk by Michael Kopp (WWF) at the conference: Finance as a response to 
environmental crises? Critical analysis of the ‘economicization’ of carbon emissions and biodiversity, 
University of Hamburg, Hamburg, November 29th, 2017.   





translating the arcane language of climate and transition models to the (equally arcane) 
language of financial risk. One interviewee remarked in this context, that 2° investing 
would publish a paper “about every other week” and alongside with UNEP [FI] was 
occupying a space between academic research and practice.102 This indicates a 
potential bridging position between academic paradigms and the risks and 
opportunities frame, which I will further explore in chapter 5.  
 While 2° investing’s work was influential in crafting forward-looking 
methodologies of climate-related risks, another actor that also emphasises the future 
nature of these risks is the FSB TCFD. The TCFD was convened by the FSB in late 
2015 at the initiative of Michael Bloomberg and Mark Carney. The taskforce is led by 
actors from the private sector and its main objective is to standardise corporates’ and 
financial institutions’ forward-looking reporting on material climate-related risks 
(FSB TCFD 2017). In terms of framing, the FSB TCFD’s approach does not differ 
much from earlier manifestation of the risks and opportunities frame. In terms of the 
level of analysis, it works predominantly at the level of the individual company or 
financial portfolio.103  
 One special aspect of the TCFD is that it has forcefully emphasised the 
necessity of complete, accurate and standardised data so that financial institutions can 
do their job of pricing assets correctly. As such, the FSB TCFD fits into the field of 
data provision, which I have briefly discussed in the first section with regards to the 
GRI and the CDP. Notably, the FSB TCFD departs from these existing reporting 
frameworks by emphasising the relevance of forward-looking data. This is, for 
instance, reflected in the FSB TCFD’s recommendation of scenario analysis. 
 
102 Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe.  





 A general development inside the risk and opportunities frame that goes 
beyond the activities of single initiatives like 2° investing or the FSB TCFD is a 
refocusing on the opportunities. The increasing specification of how the transition will 
look like brought back the focus on the upside for investors. The growth opportunities 
in green technologies were frequently given as an example in this context.104 Second, 
one interviewee observed that a change in the motivation of sustainable finance experts 
had occurred. While earlier generations had been mostly concerned with risks, the 
interviewee argued that more recently “do-gooders” with a genuine concern for 
sustainability had increasingly moved into the sustainable finance community.105 
 A third dynamic that occurred towards the end of the third period is that the 
dominant focus on institutional investors was weakened a little as commercial banks 
received renewed attention. As described before, banks had been part of the focus of 
UNEP FI’s early work inside the risks and opportunities frame. In the following 
periods, banks that had signed up to sustainability initiatives were then scrutinised by 
CSOs that belong to the critical frame. 
 Both on climate-related risks and on ‘shifting the trillions’ towards climate 
finance, the main focus rested, however, on institutional investors. This changed 
throughout 2018 with e.g. the PRA assessment on climate risks for banks and the 
formulation of the Principles for Responsible Banking – in analogy to the PRI – by 
UNEP FI. The inclusion of banks meant also a further expansion of the international 
expert community on sustainable finance, which resulted in a break-up of a formerly 
close-knit community focused on the capital markets, where “everybody knew 
everybody.”106 Even so, at least on a national level the sustainable finance expert 
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community remained sufficiently small as evidenced by the remark of an interviewee 
stating that exaggeratedly speaking she knew of everybody “which beer he is 
drinking”.107 
 While the preceding paragraphs described developments within the risks and 
opportunities frame, these dynamics did not occur in isolation from the other frames 
inside the policy subsystem. The renewed emphasis on new investment opportunities 
connects, for example, well with the climate finance frame. The NCE continued its 
efforts with studies and policy suggestions on how to operationalise the new green 
growth regime (NCE 2015; 2016; 2018). Meanwhile, the OECD conducted its own 
economic demonstration of the positive GDP effects of climate mitigation (OECD 
2017). Observing the increasing interactions between sustainable finance and green 
growth, one interviewee noted that from 2015/16 onwards “sustainable finance 
[became] the new green growth” as many researchers that had published on green 
growth around 2011/12 were now publishing on sustainable finance.108  
 The discussion within the climate finance frame occurred against the 
background of a period, in which safe assets paid close to zero interest rates. On the 
other hand, the annual funding gaps for energy, climate or SDG investments were 
estimated in the range of trillions of US$. These two observations were almost 
routinely brought together in the prognostic dimension of the climate finance frame. 
The advocates of this frame emphasise the necessity of connecting the trillions of 
AUM that are in search of for safe, long-term return to the funding needs of the new 
global green growth regime (e.g. Moslener et al. for DG CLIMA 2015: 4ff; NCE 2016: 
16; UNEP Inquiry 2015: XIII; and Schoenberg 2015 for a focus on the EU context). 
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In addition, initiatives like the Multilateral Development Banks’ “Billions to Trillions” 
agenda and the G20’s “Infrastructure as an Asset Class” provided concrete roadmaps 
of how to operationalise this exercise in financial plumbing.    
 Regarding the critical frame, there are some indications that relatively central 
actors incorporated parts of its diagnosis and solutions in this period. The UNEP 
Inquiry, for instance, takes a systems approach that assesses the state of the financial 
system against its performance in producing the necessary environmental outputs 
whilst being effective, cost efficient and resilient (UNEP Inquiry 2015: 54). Starting 
from this, the Inquiry has repeatedly criticised developed financial systems in terms of 
their disconnection from the real economy and their short-termism (UNEP Inquiry 
2015; 2016). Moreover, it questioned the usefulness of concepts like the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) that had been used to justify the principles on which the 
financial system was built in the past (Zadek and Robins 2018: 12, on the EMH cf. 
Baker 2010: 653-654). Furthermore, based on the argument that financial systems are 
the outcome of past institutional and political developments, it recommends an 
interventionist approach. The Inquiry also argued that rich economies could learn from 
emerging and developing economies, which had already transformed their financial 
systems according to development priorities (Zadek and Robins 2018).109  
 The more critical argument that the financial system is not connected 
sufficiently with the real economy and is fraught with short-termism was also voiced 
by the EU’s HLEG (HLEG 2017: 15, 19; HLEG 2018: 45ff) and its subsequent action 
plan (EC 2018a: 12). In addition, the HLEG, which was mostly composed of 
representatives from the financial industry110, also justified its recommendations for a 
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more systemic reset of finance by referring to the experiences of the GFC (HLEG 
2017: 8).  
 Table 4.3 summarises the main frames of this last period. The table excludes a 
repeated discussion of the SRI and critical frame. This is because most of the 
developments in this last period occurred in the risks and opportunities frame and the 
climate finance frame. To account for these developments, the risks and opportunities 
frame is partitioned into three subcategories. While the first part outlines the traditional 
preoccupation with ESG issues, the second subcategory highlights the position that 
argues for a forward-looking perspective. The last modification of the frame is 
concerned with the position of central banks and regulators that emphasise the 
systemic aspects of climate-related risks. In addition, table 4.3 discusses ‘sustainable 
finance’ as a master frame. Actors that have increasingly seen their role as being hubs 
that link the different communities belong to this master frame. While some the actors 
in this category have an own perspective on sustainable finance and can hence be 
attributed to another frame (e.g. the FSB TCFD to risks and opportunities), they also 
see it as their mission to promote the entire policy subsystem of sustainable finance.  
 Figure 4.4 describes the network of texts linked by co-publication. As the 
publishing activity as well as the interlinkages between authors increased dramatically 
in this third period, I also visualise the core of this network in figure 4.5.
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Table 4.3 Summary of the Frames Present Between 2015 and 2018 
 





UNEP FI, G20 study 
group, HLEG, FSB 
TCFD 
Finance plays a role in transitioning to a 
sustainable future. But the actors that can enable 
this shift are disconnected or unaware of each 
other 
 
We need to connect the community of 
sustainable finance. Sustainable 
finance as a whole needs to grow 
We also promote sustainable 
finance to actors like 
policymakers and not yet 
integrated financial institutions 
Risks and 
opportunities 
UNEP FI, FSB 
TCFD, Mercer, 
WWF 
Poor environmental and social credentials of 
companies can mean financial losses for 
investors. Insurers need to care about 
environmental catastrophes. 
The green transition is not only about risk 
minimisation, but also about getting the upside 
of participating in the opportunities 
Environmental, social and reputational 
risks need to be internalised in 
investment decision making.  
We need better data and disclosure 
from firms as well as a clarification of 
legal obligations and regulation so that 
investors can integrate ESG risks 
We are a coalition of 
international organisations and 
market leaders, who move at the 
vanguard that redefines finance  




The biggest issues are in the future and cannot 




We need to develop forward-looking 
risk assessments.  
We translate the science of the 
IPCC into the language of 
financial markets 
NGFS members The risks from climate change are systemic. We need to understand how these risks 
work and then device reactions or if 
the latter is not possible try to prevent 
these risks from materialising. 
We are agents, which are bound 
by the mandates that 
policymakers gave us. Since 
financial stability is a global 
issue, we look at what our peers 
are doing  
Climate 
finance 
NCE, E3G, CBI, 
odi, Böll foundation, 
WRI 
Greening the world economy will require 
trillions. At the same time institutional investors 
hold trillions that need a safe long- term return, 
but are faced with an investment environment, 
where negative interest rates are the norm  
We need to address the financial 
plumbing so that money can flow 
where it is most needed 
 
 
We connect the development 
community with mainstream 
financial institutions (in 






Figure 4.4 Co-publication Network 2015-2018. Nodes are scaled by degree. Symbols correspond to 
community membership as detected by the Girvan-Newman Algorithm. Abbreviations in the legend: 
Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL), Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), Third Generation 
Environmentalism (E3G), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), EU High-level Expert Group on 
Sustainable Finance (HLEG), Financial Stability Board Taskforce on Climate-related Disclosures (FSB 
TCFD), Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), New 
Climate Economy (NCE), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Overseas Development Institute 
(odi), Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSE), World Resources Institute (WRI), World Wide Fund 






Figure 4.5 Co-publication Network 2015-2018: Core. For abbreviations see figure. 4.4 
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 The fraction of nodes in the largest component in the network of texts between 
2015 and 2018 is 78.5%. As the amounts of nodes almost doubled in this period 
compared to the last one (see beginning of this section), the fact that the cohesion of 
the network still increased gives credits to efforts of the hubs to hold the community 
together. In this context, it should, however, be noted that some observers have 
suggested that this increased cohesion represented a peak rather than a continuing 
plateau. This is because instead of a consolidation with actors coming together e.g. 
within the FSB TCFD, new initiatives still proliferated after 2018. This development 
could indicate re-fragmentation.111  
 In terms of the frames, both figures show a crowded centre (empty triangles, 
empty rectangles and empty circles in figure 4.4, empty rectangles in figure 4.5) that 
is coordinated by the hub-creating actors like the UNEP Inquiry and the EU’s HLEG. 
In figure 4.4, the FSB TCFD is also featured in this community, but the connection is 
not strong enough for being considered when extracting the core. And whereas the 
FSB TCFD can be sorted to the risks and opportunities frame, the task becomes more 
difficult for the other central actors. While UNEP Inquiry partly advocates for a risks 
and opportunities framing, it has also connections to the critical frame. Similarly, the 
HLEG covers the risks and opportunities frame, but also the climate finance frame 
when it emphasises the mobilisation of private funds for the transformation of the 
European economy.  
 The fact that the centre integrates those two frames can be observed in both 
figures as the more ‘pure-play’ frames branch out from there. The risks and 
opportunities frame that is located at the bottom left in both figures is represented by 
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publications from amongst others 2° investing. As seen above, this actor is concerned 
with the development of forward-looking risk methodologies. Meanwhile, the climate 
finance frame is situated at the top of the figures. Amongst others, CPI and NCE belong 
to this frame.  
 The SRI frame, which is represented by eurosif, is still present in figure 4.4 
through its connection with the HLEG. Nevertheless, as in the previous periods it has 
been overpowered by other actors. As described above, the critical frame is connected 
to some central actors even though its main CSO representatives are not represented 
in the figures. Instead, the less antagonistic parts of the CSO community like the WWF 
and the WRI occupy more central positions within the risks and opportunities frame 
and the climate finance frame respectively.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described the evolution of the policy subsystem of sustainable 
finance between 1998 and 2018. By analysing the interactions of the actors in the 
policy subsystem over three periods, I detected four frames as well as a sustainable 
finance master frame that has emerged in the last period. Table 4.4. summarises these 
frames and lists some of the actors that are employing them. 
 One of the most apparent findings of this chapter is the marginalisation of the 
SRI frame. This finding is coherent with other assessments (Dumas and Louche 2016; 
Robins and McDaniels 2016) and statements from SRI actors themselves, who find it 
difficult to make themselves heard in the current discussion on sustainable finance.112 
The SRI frame was progressively replaced by the risks and opportunities frame and 
 





the climate finance frame. Concerning the risks and opportunities frame, actors like 
UNEP FI and Carbon Tracker contributed to its rising significance. Yet while actors 
from this frame often shared the same diagnosis and solution proposals, nuances in the 
levels of analysis and the operationalisation can be observed. As will be shown in the 
next two chapters, these subtle differences matter greatly for the governance of 
sustainable finance.  
Frame Selected Actors 
SRI Eurosif and its member organisations,  
Risks and opportunities 2° investing, UNEP FI, Carbon Tracker, 
FSB TCFD, Mercer, NGFS 
Critical Nef, Finance Watch, UNEP Inquiry, 
ShareAction, urgewald, RAN, Bank 
Track, FoE 
Climate finance Development banks, odi, CPI, NCE, 
IIGCC 
Sustainable finance master frame UNEP Inquiry, UNEP FI, HLEG, G20 
study group, FSB TCFD 
Table 4.4 Frames Present in Sustainable Finance Between 1998 and 2018  
 Whereas the risks and opportunities frame has (in its different variations) 
remained dominant throughout the entire period, the climate finance frame has 
emerged as a complementary assessment. The climate finance frame has received 
support from the development community and has emphasised the role of financial 
institutions and private money in the transition towards a sustainable economy. The 
critical frame, on the other hand, has remained mostly on the margins of the policy 
subsystem. This notwithstanding, against the background of the GFC and the 
conceptualisation of climate change as a systemic issue, personal and conceptual 
overlaps between this frame and more central actors have emerged. Lastly, especially 
in the last period, actors started to reflect on the policy subsystem of sustainable 
finance itself and sought to organise and expand it and thus contributed to the 





 While the SRI frame and the critical frame are promoted by relatively 
homogenous actor populations, the same is not true for the more prominent frames. 
The risks and opportunities frame is a case in point. Within this framing, a diverse 
coalition of actors that include ‘leaders’ from the asset management and insurance 
industry, IOs, CSOs and central banks come together. This plurality of actors means 
that the shortcut of understanding frames by looking at the characteristics of their 
proponents cannot be taken. The next chapter will, therefore, propose an alternative 
way to determine the background of the frames, which is to look at their relations to 
academic paradigms. Understanding how the frames are linked to different academic 


















5. Connecting Frames and Academic Paradigms 
 
The source of resistance is the assurance (…) that nature can be 
shoved into the box the paradigm provides  
Thomas Kuhn (1996[1962]: 151-152) 
 
Many of the ideas underlying the frames that were the subject to the analysis in the 
last chapter are not entirely new or idiosyncratic to sustainable finance. As highlighted 
in chapter 2, actors who engage in framing draw from already existing thought 
structures such as academic paradigms. In this chapter, I explore the connections of 
the frames with academic paradigms using quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis. The chapter first introduces four academic paradigms and subsequently links 
them with the actors and frames of the policy subsystem.  
 Understanding the relation between frames and academic paradigms matters, 
because it can help to draw conjectures about what the dominance of a frame means 
for the governance of the policy subsystem. If, for example, one frame could be traced 
back to a Marxist conception of the economy, whereas another one is found to be based 
on a neoclassical thought structure, these insights would allow for a clearer 
understanding of the categories along which they compete. Moreover, such a sorting 
enables us to determine which debate positions and socio-technical instruments the 
advocates of frames are likely to develop and which ones they will most likely reject. 
 This chapter sorts frames to academic paradigms in accordance with the 
operationalisation procedure that I outlined in chapter 2. Rather than just associating a 





situations, where a frame takes inputs from multiple academic paradigms. The 
remainder of this chapter develops and applies this sorting method in three sections. 
First, I revisit the concept of academic paradigms and its dimensions. I also specify 
the sources that I use to identify the academic paradigms. In the second section, I 
describe the academic paradigms of Modern Financial Theory, Ecological Economics, 
Environmental Economics and a hybrid Evolutionary Systems paradigm. The third 
section sorts the frames that were discussed in the previous chapter to these academic 
paradigms. First, I establish congruence on the sociological dimension by mobilising 
quantitative corpus analysis. Subsequently, a more in-depth qualitative assessment is 
carried out to map the ideational and terminological dimensions of paradigms to the 
frames. The fourth section concludes the chapter.  
 
5.1 Revisiting Concepts: Academic Paradigms and How to Spot Them 
In chapter 2, I introduced the concept of academic paradigms and suggested that it can 
be empirically operationalised by looking at its ideational, sociological and 
terminological dimensions (cf. table 2.3). Following Kuhn, I suggested that textbooks 
are a good source for detecting the ideational and terminological characteristics of an 
academic paradigm. The sociological dimension, on the other hand, can be 
operationalised by relying on quantitative measures such as citation metrics.  
 The next section describes four academic paradigms: 1) Modern Financial 
Theory, 2) Ecological Economics, 3) Environmental and Climate Economics and 4) a 
hybrid Evolutionary Systems paradigm. These paradigms were selected from a list of 
economic schools of thought that was compiled by querying articles and books on the 
history of economic thought and pluralism in economics (Dobusch and Kapeller 2012; 





Subsequently, the selection from the list was carried out in two steps. First, I selected 
those paradigms, whose main focus is either finance or sustainability. Second, I 
included for both the finance and the sustainability side one paradigm that can be 
sorted into the category of mainstream economics as well as one that has closer links 
with heterodox traditions. The latter criterion was incorporated to account for different 
treatments of the same issues.  
 The description of the academic paradigms follows roughly the script of table 
2.3 (cf. chapter 2). The information on paradigmatic journals and scholars that will be 
presented at the end of each subsection will later be used for the quantitative corpus 
analysis, whereas the ideational and terminological categories provide a framework 
for qualitatively linking the frames to the paradigms. 
 To identify the academic paradigms of modern financial theory, I relied on an 
intermediary textbook aimed at MBA students (Danthine and Donaldson 2015).113 In 
light of the homogeneity of financial education, this book can be assumed to be 
reasonably representative of the paradigm. As historical background information I 
used Bernstein (1993), which is recommended by de Goede (2001). In addition, I 
consulted Dunbar’s (2000) description of the role of financial theory in the rise and 
fall of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management.  
 For ecological economics, I used Common and Stagl (2005), which is one of 
the few comprehensive textbooks on the paradigm. The book also discusses ecological 
economics’ relation to environmental economics and neoclassical economics. In 
 
113 Danthine and Donaldson (2015) and earlier versions of the same textbook have been used, for 
example, in Master programmes at Princeton University and the Toulouse School of Management. 
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addition, I incorporated the ‘classical’ volume of Costanza (1991). Moreover, I 
revisited Jackson (2009) for a discussion of de-growth.  
 To assess environmental and climate economics, I relied on Common and 
Stagl’s (2005) chapter on the paradigm as well as on Hussen’s (1999) treatment. For a 
discussion of IAMs, I looked at several review articles. Finally, the evolutionary 
systems paradigm was identified by reviewing Scott and Page’s (2007) volume on 
complex adaptive system as well as Arthur’s (2013) review article on complexity 
economics. For its relation to evolutionary economics, I looked at Dosi (1982) and 
Mazzucato (2015). To incorporate a history of economic thought grounding of all the 
academic paradigms, I consulted Milonakis and Fine’s (2009) book. 
 
5.2 Seeing Like a (Financial, Ecological, Environmental, Complexity-
Evolutionary) Economist: Four Academic Paradigms in Sustainable Finance  
Modern Financial Theory  
Praising and critical accounts alike emphasise the impact that modern or ‘scientific’ 
finance has had on the working of capital markets over the past half century. 
Throughout this period, concepts and formalised thought structures from economics 
and probability theory increasingly became part of financial markets. In this process, 
traditional stock-picking based on ‘market wisdom’ and rules of thumb as well as 
‘pseudo-scientific’ methods like Chartism became marginalised. In their stead, well-
diversified portfolios, arbitrage trading and most recently Exchange Tracking Funds 
(ETFs) have gained prominence and market shares (Bernstein 1993; Braun 2016; de 
Goede 2001; 2005; Dunbar 2000; Faulhaber and Baumol 1988). A comprehensive 





description of the core ideational, sociological and terminological characteristics as 
outlined in table 2.3 suffices to identify it as an academic paradigm.  
 Starting with the definition, the above-mentioned textbook states that “valuing 
risky cash flows or equivalently pricing risky assets is at the heart of financial theory” 
(Danthine and Donaldson 2015: 31). This valuation occurs at various levels that range 
from the individual project or company to the aggregated portfolio. What is common 
to all valuation exercises is the preoccupation with time and risk as basic building 
blocks of financial assets. These two concepts are presented as the raison d’être for 
the financial system, which is concerned with redistributing purchasing power by 
selling and buying the valued assets over time and probabilistic outcomes (cf. Danthine 
and Donaldson 2015: 5-7).  
 In this context, a complete contingency market, i.e. the existence of financial 
instruments for all possible (i.e. infinite) ‘states of nature’ over time – so called Arrow-
Debreu securities – is a widely used thought experiment (cf. Danthine and Donaldson 
2015: 15-18). At the same time, the impossibility and empirical falsity of such an ideal 
state acts as something akin to the Lakatosian positive heuristic for academics. 
Accordingly, they strive to formulate theoretical constructions that are logically 
equivalent or empirically proximate to this state. For financial practitioners, the utopia 
of complete contingency markets can serve as a way of legitimising new financial 
instruments (Dunbar 2000: 42-43). 
 Moving from the definition and ambition of financial theory to the 
operationalisation of how to value risky assets, the role of concepts from neoclassical 
(micro-) economics and probability theory becomes apparent. First, investors are 
assumed to be maximising their expected utility, which is calculated as the valuation 





depends on the class of utility function displayed by investors (e.g. declining absolute 
risk aversion). The shape of this function determines the trade-off between risk and 
return that investors are comfortable with. When it comes to portfolio allocation, these 
different inclinations are not solved by buying different proportions of high and low-
risk assets. Instead, according to the separation and optimal portfolio theorems, 
different risk profiles of investors are catered to by the ratio of value that is allocated 
to the ‘risk-free’ asset, for which US government bonds often serve as a proxy, and to 
the optimal diversified equity portfolio (Danthine and Donaldson 2015: 116).  
 The optimal portfolio, which represents ‘the market’ and is often 
operationalised by an index such as the S&P 500, delivers superior performance – or 
using jargon ‘dominates’ – over stock-picking strategies, because of the random nature 
of price movements. This randomness is, in turn, explained by the EMH, which 
stipulates that market participants have on average complete information and, 
henceforth, are able to price assets by far and large correctly. This, in turn, results in 
the absence of non-random trends of prices. An expansion of the optimal portfolio 
theory is the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM). Accordingly, an asset’s risk is 
defined as its covariance from the market (or index), which is also referred to as ‘beta’, 
whereas its difference in terms of return is called ‘alpha’ (cf. Faulhaber and Baumol 
1988: 589).  
 The market portfolio exonerates the investors from the idiosyncratic risks of 
holding a particular company (which might go bankrupt), because of the benefits of 
diversification. Nonetheless, there remains universal or systematic risk. This kind of 
risk is generally measured via historical data. More precisely, it is equated with 
volatility, which is the standard deviation of the portfolio value in the period under 





risks that affect an entire economy. Factors that are often associated with an increase 
in the general volatility of the portfolio are interest rate changes, foreign exchange rate 
risks and changes in commodity prices.  
 While this exposition does certainly not do justice to modern finance and 
oversimplifies grossly, a couple of points are noteworthy. First among them is the 
equation of uncertainty with calculable risk that can be derived from past data. This 
means that any valuation and risk management method that builds on this conception 
of risk is unable to incorporate evolutionary or revolutionary developments that result 
in qualitative shifts or ‘unknown-unknows’. Criticisms that elaborate on this 
observation have been repeatedly made by scholars, who emphasise the importance of 
the distinction between fundamental uncertainty as used by Knight, Shackle and 
Keynes and the risk estimations of modern financial theory (e.g. Blyth and Taleb 2011; 
Lockwood 2015).  
 Second, it is noteworthy that higher level concepts and calculations like the 
CAPM are dependent on statistical aggregations like market indices (cf. de Goede 
2005 for a critical, genealogical discussion of indices). Moreover, allocation decisions 
are dependent on concepts like the ‘risk-free asset’, which is assumed to pay the 
‘market rate of interest’. The market rate of interest is an important calculative device 
that has a history that predates the advent of modern finance and is universally applied 
in the appraisals of projects and investments, where it is used to discount future 
cashflows (cf. Faulhaber and Baumol 1988: 583).  
 Turning to the sociological parts of the paradigm, some of the most prominent 
journals are the Journal of finance, the Journal of finance and quantitative analysis 
and the Journal of business (Fourcade et al. 2014: 14ff; Zirney and Reichenstein 1994). 





industry (Bernstein 1993: 215). Eminent scholars that have contributed to much of 
what was described above are Harry Markowitz, Kenneth Arrow, James Tobin, Fischer 
Black, Robert C. Merton, Eugene Fama and William F. Sharpe. Lastly, concerning the 
terminological dimension, expressions like risk/return profile, risk-adjusted returns, 
diversification, and portfolio are ubiquitous inside this paradigm. And even though 
they have often a precise meaning in theory and a convention for measurement, they 
also act in a more fuzzy or heuristic fashion when it comes to the conceptualisation of 
new phenomena and the exchanges amongst investment practitioners.  
 
Ecological Economics 
Ecological economics has been defined as the "transdisciplinary study of the human 
economy as part of nature's economy" (Common and Stagl 2005: XXVII). Unlike 
financial theory, it emphasises the sustainability part of sustainable finance. In its 
anthropocentric variant, this is defined as the “maintenance of the economic and 
environmental system so that it can satisfy human desires for a long time in the future” 
(Ibid: 8). Rather than individuals or financial assets, the main units of analysis are 
human and environmental systems (Carpintero 2013). In this context, the human 
economic system is understood as a subset of the environmental systems, into which 
it is ‘embedded’ (Common and Stagl 2005: 87). Moreover, economic activity is often 
conceptualised in terms of physical flows (e.g. resources, waste, energy) rather than 
according to human valuation conventions like prices (cf. Martinez-Alier et al. 2010: 
1743). 
 The preoccupation with the interaction of human and environmental systems is 
also apparent in the topics that the paradigm prioritises. Costanza (1991:7) proposed a 





desideratum. Accordingly, ecological economics should focus on: 1) Maintaining life 
support systems, 2) valuation of natural resources and natural capital, 3) ecological 
economic system accounting, 4) ecological economic modelling on different scales, 
and 5) innovative instruments for environmental management.  
 As with financial theory, time plays a crucial role. However, for ecological 
economists the relevant time horizons can span hundreds of years (Costanza 1991). A 
second important input is the question of scale. Depending on the research question 
scale can range from a confined local ecosystem to the entire planet earth. In addition, 
the interactions between different open systems, which exchange flows of e.g. energy 
or materials, are an important element of the academic paradigm. Finally, uncertainty 
and its separation into different categories, of which risk is only one, is addressed more 
explicitly (Carpintero 2013; Common and Stagl 2005: 380ff).  
 Moving from the more general outlook to specific concepts, the desirable levels 
of human economic impact on the environmental systems are expressed through the 
concept of carrying capacity (Common and Stagl 2005: 45). In the case of global 
systems, the term planetary boundaries has been increasingly used to denote an 
equivalent idea (cf. Steffen et al. 2015). While these concepts determine the maximum 
value of impact that human activities can have on ecological systems without 
jeopardising their stable functioning, the estimation of the actual impact is often 
operationalised through the so called IPAT equation. This identity defines the 
environmental impact (I) of human activity as the product of population (P) and a 
certain living standard or ‘affluence’ (A), which is mediated by a technological factor 
(T) that estimates the intensity of environmental impacts per unit of living standard 





 The operationalisation of impact measurement is carried out by mapping stocks 
and flows of material units like natural resources, pollutants, biomass, energy or heat 
between systems. Additionally, ecological economists have come up with critiques 
and additions to conventional economic accounting to reflect the interactions between 
economic and environmental systems. The concept of natural capital highlights the 
contribution of natural systems to the creation of economic output. Notably, unlike 
some representatives of environmental economics, scholars of the paradigm are 
pointing out that natural capital cannot be substituted by other forms of capital. 
Ecological economics also points towards the non-reproducibility of natural capital by 
humans. This understanding underlines the case for its preservation (Common and 
Stagl 2005: 91ff).  
 The focus on natural capital and related concepts such as ecosystem or amenity 
services that highlight the contribution of the environment to human wellbeing has 
made ecological economics a long-standing critique of conventional systems for value 
accounting, most prominent of which is the Gross Domestic Product or GDP (cf. 
Common and Stagl 2005: 144ff; Jackson 2009: 38ff). Importantly, not all proponents 
of ecological economics have embraced natural capital accounting. Critics argue that 
the concept constitutes a continuation of the market-based thinking that has been 
traditionally been employed in the neoclassical academic paradigm and the neoliberal 
policy paradigm. They point out that natural capital has served as a justification for 
‘green grabbing’, i.e. the appropriation and commodification of peasant and 
indigenous land by agents of financial capital (e.g. Corson et al. 2013).  
 Closely related to the measure of GDP and alternative indicators are the debates 
about green or de-growth that have both an academic and a political dimension. One 





increase in human economic activity will push environmental systems beyond their 
carrying capacities. Proponents of the de-growth (and steady state economy) thesis 
point towards the strong historical correlation between increases of economic activity 
measured by GDP and the environmental footprint of humanity. The green growth 
position, on the other hand, holds that it is theoretically possible and realistically 
feasible to increase the creation of economic wealth while at the same time reducing 
environmental impact. In jargon, this process is called ‘absolute decupling’ (cf. 
Jackson 2009, see Hickel and Kallis 2019 for a recent assessment on the possibility of 
green growth). 
 The main journal of the paradigm is Ecological economics. Ecological 
economists also publish in mainstream journals such as the Journal of environmental 
economics and management, and Environment and resource economics (Common and 
Stagl 2005: 17) as well as in heterodox outlets like Capitalism, nature, socialism 
(Heterodox Economics Directory, HED 2019). For the purpose of the citation analysis, 
the 9 journals from the ecological economics category in the HED were used to detect 
the paradigm. Henry Daly, J.C. Kumerappa, K.W. Kapp, Nicholas Georgscu-Roegen, 
Kenneth Boulding, Robert Ayres, Dennis Meadows, Ernst 'Fritz' Schumacher and 
Howard T. Odum are considered to be amongst the eminent scholars of the paradigm 
(Martinez-Alier et al. 2010: 1743).  
 Regarding language, there is a certain tendency to use natural science concepts 
such as energy flows, thermodynamics, or ecosystems. When it comes to metaphors, 
Boulding’s comparison of the earth to a spaceship that has to be responsibly managed 
rather than exploited with a cowboy’s frontier spirit is commonly referenced. Another 
prominent metaphor within the de-growth community is to associate a managed 





al. 2010: 1742). Finally, the space where human needs are achieved while planetary 
boundaries are not transgressed has recently been popularised through its geometrical 
representation as a doughnut (Raworth 2012; 2017).  
 
Environmental and Climate Economics 
A different approach to deal with the environmental sustainability part of sustainable 
finance is environmental economics. While concerned with similar problems as 
ecological economics, this paradigm is more of an extension of neoclassical thinking 
to environmental issues. In this paradigm, the actors and institutions known from 
neoclassical approaches are maintained and environmental issues are pegged onto 
them. Hence, individual agents like households and firms continue to trade on markets 
from which they derive utility and profits. The environmental dimension is added to 
this familiar framework insofar as the market interactions concern issues like the 
extraction of resources and the emittance of pollutants (cf. Hussen 1999:6ff).  
 One of the main analytical concepts of environmental economics is the 
externality. Negative externalities occur when the costs of a market transaction are not 
completely born by the seller and buyer. The classical case is the production of a good, 
which causes pollution, which, in turn, causes costs for a third party. Hence, the sold 
product is too cheap as it fails to integrate the costs imposed on third parties. Positive 
externalities describe the opposite case. Here, the price paid between the two 
transacting parties is too high, since third parties are benefiting from the transaction as 
well. The focus on economic actors instead of systems becomes apparent as the 
preoccupation rests with in- or decreases in the welfare of these actors. Welfare is 
measured in economic terms and does not make reference to categories like the 





of environmental economics with regards to climate change). Consequently, the 
problem of externalities is labelled as a market failure that is best fixed by a market 
intervention such as a tax or the allocation of property rights. 
 The approach of treating the environment with the concept of externalities is 
also carried over to climate economics, which can be seen as a sub-discipline of 
environmental economics. Climate change was famously described as the “greatest 
market failure the world has ever seen” in the Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006: VIII) 
and has since then been a major subject of study for environmental economists. To 
assess the costs of damages related to climate change and to understand the links 
between economic activity, emissions, climate change, and climate-related costs, 
economists have developed Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). These models 
integrate a climatological model that describes the relationship between GHG 
concentrations and climate change with an economic model. The integration between 
the two models is achieved as, on the one hand side, economic activities contribute to 
increasing GHG concentrations. On the other hand, there is a feedback effect as 
increased GHG concentrations fuel climate change. Finally, changes in the climate 
lead to loss of welfare as costs from physical damages are inflicted on economic actors.  
 Based on these inputs and a host of other parameters such as technology 
development, the model comes up with a price for the GHG emissions. One important 
aspect is whether an IAM makes a judgement about the optimal, i.e. welfare 
maximising level of emissions. The optimal level is defined as the point, where the 
benefits from an additional unit of emissions are equal to its costs, i.e. the physical 
damages arising from climate change. Underlying this line of reasoning is that human-
made capital can be substituted for natural capital and that the latter can be quantified 





carbon price is the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) that has been explored amongst others 
by Nordhaus (cf. Nordhaus 2014).  
 The SCC and optimal emission levels have been criticised for ignoring 
fundamental properties of the climate system such as non-linearities, tipping points 
and the importance of catastrophic events with a non-zero probability. Moreover, the 
use of market interest rates for discounting has drawn criticism on the ground of 
intergenerational equity. While students of ecological economics and critical 
economists have attacked the shortcomings of IAMs from their inception, in recent 
years also some of the early developers of IAMs like Nicholas Stern (Curran et al. 
2019: 30) and researchers from organisations like the IMF (Krogstrup and Oman 2019: 
41) have joined the sceptics.  
 The criticism on IAMs’ role in prescribing ignorant and potentially 
catastrophic policy recommendations is partly addressed by a different family of 
models, which do not make judgements about optimality and start from an emission 
target that is politically agreed or climatology-warranted. These models come up with 
a range of socio-technical pathways that are consistent with externally specified 
parameters for emission reductions (cf. Guivarch and Rogelj 2017 for a discussion on 
the variation of carbon prices that can still occur when emission targets are exogenous).  
 Next to the discussions about externalities and IAMs, some environmental 
economists have also applied the concept of the environmental Kuznet’s curve. This 
hypothesis states that as the per capita wealth of a country increases at first a rise of 
environmental impacts like pollution takes place. Once a threshold of wealth is passed, 
impacts decrease due to better technology and preference shifts towards an intact 
environment. Empirical assessments of this relationship have so far gathered some 





hand, the environmental Kuznet’s curve does not seem to hold for global issues like 
climate change (cf. Jackson 2009: 76, see also Dasgupta et al. 2002). 
 As to the sociological indicators, the Journal of environmental economics and 
management, and Environment and resource economics, that were designated as 
mainstream journals in the preceding section will be used to assess this paradigm. 
When it comes to eminent scholars, in the absence of a comprehensive list, I will focus 
on the main developers of IAMs. Apart from Nicholas Stern, notable scholars are 
William Nordhaus, who has developed the DICE model, as well as Chris Hope, the 
developer of the alternative PAGE model and Valentina Bosetti and Massimo Tavoni, 
who (amongst others) developed the WITCH model. Richard Tol, a prominent critic 
of Stern, as well as Michael Grubb, the chief economist of Carbon Trust, were also 
included to the list of names. Finally, on the terminological side, talk of (Pareto) 
efficiency, optimality, and, of course, externalities can be interpreted as an indication 
for the presence of environmental economics.  
 
Evolutionary Systems Paradigm 
Neither ecological nor environmental economics emphasises the role of finance when 
assessing the relationship between the economy and the environment. Yet also in the 
sphere of finance, there are some contending views to modern financial theory. While 
these alternatives draw on historically distinct academic paradigms such as 
Evolutionary Economics, Post Keynesian Economics, and Complexity Economics, 
there is a conceptual and sociological overlap between them. An additional 
communality is that these schools of thought oftentimes label themselves as heterodox 
thus positioning themselves in opposition to neoclassical or mainstream economics 





especially on the sorting of complexity economics). Consequently, and for the sake of 
brevity, I will treat them as one synthetic academic paradigm that I call Evolutionary 
Systems paradigm. 
 Despite their different intellectual heritages, the representatives of this 
paradigm share a preoccupation with the meso- and system levels. Individual agents’ 
contribution is acknowledged but the primary focus rests on the question of how 
interaction amongst units (which can be individuals, organisations or even systems) 
leads to the emergence of new properties and phenomena. Keynes’ macroeconomic 
and Minsky’s financial stability paradoxes are a case in point for Keynesianism’s 
emphasis on emergent phenomena (cf. Lavoie 2014: 18). Agent-based models like the 
famous El Farol problem or Schelling’s segregation model from complexity theory 
share the preoccupation with emergence at the system-level (cf. Miller and Page 2007: 
143-148). Analysis and simulations of such phenomena proceed in historical time thus 
highlighting path dependency and feedback effects (Arthur 2013: 16-18). The 
importance of positive, i.e. reinforcing, feedback effects, is also explored by 
evolutionary economists, who look at the lock-in of technological trajectories (Dosi 
1982; Mazzucato 2015).  
 The evolutionary systems paradigm is less concerned with efficiency and 
optimal allocation as a target metric and more with the resilience of a system. 
Redundancies are not necessarily seen as negative as they can reduce the chances of 
system failure. Furthermore, systems are constituted by interdependent units, which 
are sometimes represented spatially using a network topology. Additionally, systems 
themselves can through their inputs and outputs become the building blocks of a 
system of systems. When it comes to the manipulation of systems, it is up to the analyst 





resilience (cf. Meadows 1999). Systems are not assumed to necessarily respond to 
marginal variations in one input parameter nor are those responses linear. Hence, 
proponents of a systems perspective take generally a more sceptical stance on the 
ability of policies, institutions and humans to manage complex issues according to a 
mechanistic cause-effect logic. They often prefer to take an approach that is based on 
the precautionary principle and cast doubt on the ‘silver bullet’ properties of single 
measures like a carbon price (cf. Allan 2017: 153ff).  
 The focus on emergence, historical time and non-linearity means that 
fundamental uncertainty is treated distinctly from knowable risks and that tendencies 
towards equilibrium are rather the exception than the rule. Instead, attractor and 
detractor points are references against which systems are benchmarked and a 
movement from one system state to another is sometimes referred to as phase 
transition (Arthur 2013). While it is arguably a little bit of a stretch, I will include the 
political economy, sociological and Post Keynesian literature on financialisation (e.g. 
Epstein 2005; Stockhammer 2004; see also Christophers 2015 for a critical appraisal) 
into this paradigm. This is because this literature also tends to treat finance as a system 
that reproduces itself and expands according to certain dynamics. Furthermore, it has 
inputs and outputs on the other systems like the corporate system or the system of state 
budgets. 
 Since the evolutionary systems paradigm is an artificial paradigm, the 
sociological dimension is more varied. For complexity economics, the Santa Fe 
Institute and the surrounding journals and associations could be taken as proxies. Post 
Keynesian and evolutionary economics, meanwhile, have their own associations and 





heterodox” lists from the HED114 to indicate the sociological dimension of this 
paradigm. Notably, the HED lists have already been used in a previous study that 
measures publication patterns to assign economists to different paradigms (Grimm et 
al. 2016).  
 Given the hybridity of the paradigm, a list of eminent scholars is difficult to 
assemble. I have included Keynes and Schumpeter, who both display a systems-based 
and historical understanding of economics, as two possible founding fathers. 
Concerning the terminological dimension, emergence, evolution, complexity, adaptive 
systems, feedback effects, networks, lock-in, and innovation systems are indicative of 
this paradigm.  
 
5.3 Mapping Academic Paradigms to Frames  
This section starts with a corpus analysis that establishes the presence of paradigmatic 
scholars and journals. In addition to measuring the relative presence of each paradigm, 
the actors that score highest in the corpus analysis are described. This is because they 
engage most with academic paradigms and thus are likely to be the intermediaries, 
which translate between academia and the policy subsystem. Following this high-level 
assessment, I link concepts and arguments from the frames and communities to the 





114 Jakob Kapeller, “Heterdox Economics Newsletter”, http://heterodoxnews.com/hed/journals.html, 





Guilt by Association: Operationalising the Sociological Dimension Through Corpus 
Analysis   
A very crude indication of the sociological dimension is depicted in figure 5.1, which 
applies a simple string-matching search across 635 texts115 from the corpus that was 
used for constructing the co-publication networks (see chapter 4) and counts the 
occurrences (that is citations and in-text mentions) of the names of paradigmatic 
scholars that I listed in the previous section. An important caveat to interpreting the 
results of the analysis is that – even though judging from spot tests the names found in 
the corpus do really refer to the scholars in question – some matches might be false 
positives. There might be a ‘Stern’ in the corpus, who has little to do with climate 
economics and a ‘Markowitz’, who has never heard of portfolio theory. Furthermore, 
the different length of the lists of scholars that were obtained from the literature might 
lead to biases. Also, instead of displaying the absolute number of occurrences, multiple 
mentions of one or more scholars from a paradigm are counted as one. This 
transformation was undertaken to convey the proportion of the corpus that mentions 





115 31 texts were excluded mainly because of encoding errors and the inclusion of texts from 2018, 
which have not been added to the corpus, since the end of comprehensive sampling for 2018 might 
mean that these texts lead to bias, see Appendix D. 
116 However, the ranking remains the same in both cases, except for the case of the category of 
Environmental Economics excluding the mentions of Nicholas Stern, in which the presence of 
extreme values means that the paradigm is about level with Modern Finance in absolute terms, 






 Figure 5.1 Mentions of Paradigmatic Scholars in the Corpus 
 Figure 5.1 shows a dominance of the climate economists that have been 
discussed in the section on environmental economics. Most of this is explained by 
references to the Stern Review, since after excluding the word ‘Stern’ from the 
dictionary the score for this category drops from 137 (21.6% of the corpus) to just 17 
(2.7%). Environmental economics scholars are followed by academics from modern 
financial theory (8.7%) and ecological economics (6%). Keynes and Schumpeter are 





 The second sociological indicator looks at the citation of paradigmatic journals. 
In figure 5.2, the ecological, evolutionary and heterodox (a general category covering 
amongst others Post Keynesian journals) journal lists are based on the categorisations 
from the HED. Modern finance is based on a list of 13 journals from Zirney and 
Reichenstein (1994). The category Top 5, which is a list of the five leading ‘general 
interest’ journals in mainstream economics (Heckman and Moktan 2019), was 
included as a benchmark. Since the matching of texts uses the full-length name of the 
journal, except for a few instances listed below, false positives are relatively unlikely. 
Finally, a search of matches for other heterodox journal lists from the HED, i.e. 
Austrian, Radical, and Feminist, as well as the cross paradigm Interdisciplinary and 
History/Methodology lists was undertaken.  
 The scores in figure 5.2 were obtained through the same calculations that I used 
for the counts in figure 5.1.117 In total, there are 229 instances of a publication being 
matched to the journal lists. After manually removing false positives that occurred due 
to the more common language names of some journals (notably Economy and Society 
and Local Economy), 170 matches remain. As one publication can cite journals 
belonging to multiple paradigms, these 170 mentions originate from 102 texts (16.1% 
of the corpus).  
 A first result is that, unlike with the environmental economics category in the 
previous plot, the scores of the different bars are closer together. The leading category 
are modern finance journals, which are cited by 7.2% of the texts. The second most 
cited category are the Top 5 journals (6.3%). Ecological economics journals are cited 
by 27 texts or 4.3% of the corpus. 22 of these matches are accounted for by the journal 
 





Ecological economics.118 Interdisciplinary journals, which do not strictly cover 
economic paradigms but adjacent disciplines like accounting, geography and 
sociology, are cited in 17 instances (2.7%). The listing of these journals inside the 
HED can, however, be taken as an indication that these journals are also closer to 
paradigms that position themselves in opposition to the thinking represented in the 
categories of modern finance and the Top 5 journals.  
 With only 14 mentions (2.2%), environmental economics is relatively 
underrepresented. This can possibly be attributed to the fact that only two journals, 
none of which has an exclusive climate focus, were used to construct this category. It 
is also noteworthy that the journal Nature Climate Change, which one interviewee 
referred to as one of the leading outlets in the debates on sustainable finance, receives 
26 mentions (4.1%). However, the interdisciplinary nature of the journal makes a 
paradigmatic sorting difficult.119 The category of heterodox journals covers 11 
mentions (1.7%). Finally, evolutionary outlets as defined by the HED list are 
referenced in 9 instances (1.4%).  
 
118 False positives that reference the discipline or the association of ecological economics rather than 
the journal were removed manually.  






Figure 5.2. Mentions of Paradigmatic Journals in the Corpus: Of the 170 total mentions 164 
are displayed. The remaining categories are 3 citations of radical journals, 2 of historical 
and methodological journals and 1 of feminist journals.  
 Another noteworthy observation that is not represented in figure 5.2 is that the 
citations of paradigmatic journals are highly concentrated. Indeed, only 39 of the 145 
sampled actors cite an academic journal from the list. UNEP Inquiry is leading the 
tally and accounts for 17.6% of the 170 mentions. It is followed by UNEP FI (9.4%), 
the nef (7.1%), the Global Climate Forum (5.9%) and the Tyndall Centre (5.9%), the 





 Disaggregating the overall citation numbers according to the academic 
paradigms, it becomes apparent that with the exception of UNEP Inquiry, which holds 
a leading position across multiple paradigms, the different actors focus on bringing 
specific ideas to the policy subsystem. Table 5.2 lists the three organisations that 
contribute most to the citation of the paradigmatic journals displayed in figure 5.2 and 
the share of the total mentions attributed to these actors.  
Academic Paradigm by Journals Most Prominent Actors (% of 
citations of the category accounted 
for) 
Modern financial theory UNEP Inquiry (26%), UNEP FI (17%), 
2° investing and CIGI (11% each) 
Top 5 (‘Mainstream economics’) UNEP Inquiry (18%), Global Climate 
Forum (15%), Tyndall Centre and 
WBGU (8% each) 
Ecological economics UNEP Inquiry (15%), NCE and WBGU 
(11% each), nef and UNEP FI (7% each) 
Interdisciplinary Nef (24%), UNEP Inquiry (18%), 
UNEP FI, WBGU and others with one 
mention (6%) each 
Environmental economics Tyndall Centre (14%), NCE, EIB, EIU-
Aviva, UNEP FI, G20, nef and others 
with one mention (7%) each 
Heterodox (general) UNEP Inquiry (27%), nef (18%), CISL, 
UNEP FI , NCE and Positive Money 
with one mention (1/11) each  
Evolutionary economics Nef (22%), UNEP Inquiry, WBGU and 
CISL with one mention (1/9) each 







 The result that relatively few actors account for a significant share of the 
engagement with academic economics is consistent with the statement of the 
interviewee, who remarked that actors like UNEP FI, UNEP Inquiry and 2° investing 
occupy a space between financial practitioners, regulators and academia. Accordingly, 
they produce texts that do not fully live up to the standards of academia, but still engage 
with scientific debates.120  
 As can be observed in table 5.2, these three actors draw heavily from modern 
finance and mainstream economics. If we bring this observation together with the 
finding that UNEP FI and 2° investing (and UNEP Inquiry to a lesser extent) are 
proponents of the risks and opportunities frame, it could be hypothesised that these 
frames translate modern finance theory to the policy subsystem of sustainable finance. 
On the other hand, the nef’s critical framing takes input from the heterodox paradigms. 
Notably, UNEP Inquiry, as opposed to UNEP FI, has also engaged with heterodox 
journals. This association connects well with the Inquiry’s systemic understanding of 
finance and its deployment of the critical frame (see chapter 4).  
 Figure 5.2 shows that the academic paradigms that concern themselves with 
environmental sustainability part are less frequently cited than those related to 
economics and finance. Meanwhile, the actors that actually cite environmental and 
ecological economics research tend to overlap (NCE, UNEP FI, nef). While this could 
be an artefact of the small size of the journal list for environmental economics, it is 
nonetheless noteworthy that actors belonging to the climate finance frame like the 
NCE as well as those advancing the risks and opportunities frame (UNEP FI) do not 
show a clear preference of environmental economics over ecological economics. It 
seems that these organisations incorporate some of the measurements and concepts of 
 





ecological economics like ecosystem services (cf. chapter 4). On the other hand, the 
paradigm’s sceptical positions on growth and the treatment of uncertainty as risk are 
either ignored, or, in the case of the green growth position, rejected.  
 Whereas some of the organisations listed in table 5.2 have been attributed to 
the different frames in chapter 4, the table also lists actors that have not been revisited 
in detail so far. Amongst them are the Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 
a scientific body advising the German government, the GCF, the Tyndall Centre and 
the University of Cambridge’s Institute for Sustainable Leadership (CISL). All these 
actors occupy an intermediary space between academia, politics and industry that 
might be described with the term think tank. Yet the importance of some of these actors 
for sustainable finance differs strongly from e.g. the UNEP initiatives and 2° investing. 
When looking at the co-publication networks, it can be observed that the WBGU and 
the Tyndall Centre occupy more isolated positions. CISL and the GCF, on the other 
hand, are located inside the risks and opportunities frame. Nevertheless, they have so 
far not become the defining actors of this framing.    
 In summary, the concentration of citations suggests that certain actors provide 
a bridge between academic paradigms and knowledge production in the policy 
subsystem of sustainable finance. Looking at the relative values for the different 
academic paradigms, I observed that the dominance of environmental economics in 
the mentions of paradigmatic scholars can be largely attributed to the Stern Review. 
This does not necessarily mean that the documents citing Stern follow the perspective 
used in the report. Nonetheless, it suggests that the Stern Review acts as a reference 






 Second, in both measurements modern financial theory scored relatively high. 
This can be interpreted as an indication of the expansion of established concepts like 
financial risk or diversification to new issues. The risks and opportunities frame 
appears to be the main recipient of ideas from this academic paradigm. However, as 
will be explored below, there is a second possible interpretation. References to modern 
financial theory might also be used by proponents of the critical frame, which seek to 
challenge wisdom that has so far been unquestioned. This process is akin to the 
‘unpacking of black boxes’ (cf. Latour 2003), which brings the assumptions of a 
paradigm that are hidden in everyday conversation to the foreground by engaging with 
the academic literature that has established them.  
 The intermediary position of ecological and environmental economics in terms 
of journal references might be explained by the fact that the community working on 
sustainable finance needs input from the environmental side. One interviewee 
remarked in this context that in academia there is a disconnect and a lack of knowledge 
transfer between the macroeconomic and financial community and the work on 
sustainability issues from an ecological economics perspective.121 If this pattern holds 
also for the non-academic members of the sustainable finance community, one could 
interpret the referrals to the two academic paradigms not as an informed choice or an 
explicit allegiance, but rather as a pragmatic search for input.  
 Finally, the absence of heterodoxy is partly a reflection of the lack of adequate 
measurement when it comes to the evolutionary systems paradigm. What can, 
however, be said with more confidence is that other paradigms like Austrian 
 





Economics, Feminist Economics and Radical Political Economy, for which 
established measures were applied, do not play a major role in sustainable finance.  
 While the corpus analysis approach allows for the detection of an engagement 
with a certain academic paradigm, it remains ignorant about the way in which this 
knowledge is used in a frame. A further limitation is that the equal weighting of the 
texts provides information about the general distributions in the corpus but cannot 
account for the significance of central texts. To address these limitations, a more 
detailed qualitative examination of the connections between frames and academic 
paradigms is required.  
 
Guilt by Explanation: Operationalising the Ideational and Terminological 
Dimensions of Academic Paradigms  
Modern Financial Theory 
Modern financial theory left a first imprint on sustainable finance in its early SRI form 
through opposition rather than constructive engagement. By the early 2000s, the 
benefits of diversification had been integrated into investment strategies and even into 
the legal frameworks of fiduciary duties (Watchman et al. 2005: 7). This meant that 
any shift away from holding the market portfolio and towards selecting responsible 
assets was (and is) met with suspicion (UNEP FI and Mercer 2007: 7-8).122 On the 
other hand, as actors promoting sustainable finance moved from the SRI frame to ESG 
risks and opportunities and later to carbon and climate risks, they sought to graft their 
 
122 See also Interview: Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe, Interview CSO staff, UK, 





ideas onto financial theory. Thus, ESG issues were construed as risks at the asset, 
project and sector level but increasingly also as systemic risks at the portfolio level. 
 This expansion reflects an increasing turn of attention away from banks and 
specialised sectoral investors towards large diversified institutional investors. A case 
in point for the focus on systemic risk is CISL’s work on the ‘unhedgeable risk’ of 
climate change. Accordingly, investors have an interest in mitigating climate change 
since the systemic losses that are associated with a changing climate cannot be 
resolved through diversification (Coburn et al. 2015). 2° investing also references 
diversification and argues that stock indices, which are seen as proxies for ‘the 
market’, are significantly tilted towards fossil fuel industries and thus result in an 
overexposure to the risks of this sector (Thomä et al. 2014).    
 Yet the application of diversification does not stop here. Expanding the concept 
of the market portfolio to its logical conclusion means that a large and well-diversified 
investor will eventually own ‘the economy’ and thus will be interested in its overall 
long-term performance. This notion has become known under the name of the 
universal ownership (cf. chapter 4). Proponents of universal ownership make the point 
that large institutions have an interest in mitigating environmental destruction. 
Marrying insights from financial theory with the environmental economics concept of 
externalities, they maintain that large diversified owners will also own the bearers of 
the external costs that the firms inside their portfolio create (Mattiston et al. 2011; 
UNEP FI 2005).  
 A more formalised connection between portfolio theory and environmental 
risks is the climate Value at Risk (VaR) model (Dietz et al. 2016; EIU 2016, cf. chapter 
4). In this exercise, either physical damages or transition costs from different climate 





2016: 9). Apart from the properties carried over from the IAM such as the assumption 
of substitutability between natural and human-made capital and the presence of 
discounting to commensurate future and present value (cf. 2nd section), the use of VaR 
also introduces ideas from the academic paradigm of modern financial theory.  
 The inputs to the VaR equation are an initial portfolio value, a confidence 
interval based on a normal distribution, a list of risk factors and their measured or 
simulated volatilities and a predetermined time horizon (cf. Jorion 1997; Lockwood 
2015). This list of the elements of VaR make the association with the concepts of 
modern financial theory clear. Beyond the simple congruence of concepts, VaR 
calculations also feature benefits to diversification as the addition of different risky 
assets is mediated by their covariance (Jorion 1997: 151-152; Saita 2007). Yet the 
clearest indication of VaR’s belonging to modern financial theory, which is also the 
part of the metric that has drawn most criticism, is its treatment of uncertainty as 
probabilistic risk (Lockwood 2015: 10ff). This property has made VaR a protagonist 
of financial crises such as the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management and the GFC. This is because VaR’s inability to account for emergent 
behaviour (which might be induced by the performative effect of VaR itself) as well 
as positive feedback effects left financial institutions using the model with insufficient 
capital to absorb losses (Lockwood 2015: 20ff). The contention of one interviewee that 
the application of VaR to climate change is “too far of a stretch” notwithstanding, first 
vendors have started to commercialise climate VaR models for financial institutions.123  
 Whereas climate VaR is both an extreme case of incorporating modern 
financial theory and a highly visible one, on a more general level the expression of 
 
123 Interview former central bank official, Western Europe, for a commercial provider of climate VaR 






ESG issues in the language of risks received increased attention after Carbon Tracker 
and other actors started to deploy the concept of stranded assets (cf. chapter 4). This 
meant that climate-related risks moved away from traditional CSR categories such as 
reputational risks, which lack elaborate and widely accepted categories and methods. 
The commensuration of climate-related risks with other established categories like 
currency risk meant that they could be understood, measured and managed within the 
framework of financial theory. Interviewees from the industry as well as from civil 
society point out the importance of this development. Accordingly, once ESG issues 
had been couched in these terms, they moved away from the relatively powerless CSR 
departments and sparked the interest of boards and risk assessment units.124 In this 
case, it is not an elaborate and formal model that integrates sustainability issues with 
financial theory. Instead, the expansion of techniques of measurement and 
categorisation accounts for the connection.  
 Another link between modern financial theory and the risks and opportunities 
frame relates to corporate disclosures. From the 1980s until today, investor groups and 
CSOs have requested information on ESG issues from corporates. These efforts have 
often been justified by pointing towards the crucial role of information and 
transparency in investment decisions.125 However, the enthusiasm and the willingness 
to pay for such measurements has been varied as doubts on the financial relevance of 
such measures in the absence of regulation or the pricing of externalities persist.126  
 The counterargument, which states that ESG issues matter even in the absence 
of such policies, is also made within the framework of financial theory as quantitative 
 
124 Interview CSO staff UK, Interview asset management, Western Europe (2). See also Interview 
Lola Gouiffes,  
125 Interview European Commission official, Interview Co-Founder, Sustainability Consultancy, 
Germany.  






studies of fund performance are mobilised to determine the risk-adjusted returns of 
ESG themed investments against a market benchmark (e.g. Friede et al. 2015, Giese 
and Lee 2019; UNEP FI and Mercer 2007).127 These studies find either a positive 
(Giese and Lee 2019) or at least a non-negative relationship (Friede et al. 2015) 
between ESG and performance. Dumas and Louche note that the effect of mobilising 
modern financial theory to support the relevance of ESG has been that the discourse 
has shifted from the initial beliefs about the underperformance of ESG funds to a 
situation, where the mainstream view is that the ESG-performance link is 
“inconclusive” (Dumas and Louche 2016: 449).  
 Up to this point I have presented instances in which modern financial theory is 
mobilised to bring sustainability issues under its remit. This strategy is often used by 
proponents of the risks and opportunities frame, who seek to strengthen their case by 
pointing out that their arguments are congruent with the predicaments of a well-
respected theory. However, there is also a different direction of the argument, which 
acknowledges the predominance of financial theory, e.g. when it comes the definition 
of fiduciary duties, but treats it as an obstacle that has to be overcome. This use of 
modern financial theory is more in line with the critical frame.  
 Catherine Howarth, the CEO of ShareAction, has amongst others adopted this 
critical view by arguing that since climate change is material at the level of the 
financial system and matters for the beneficiaries’ future life circumstances, modern 
portfolio theory constitutes a “constrained mind set”, in which people are still 
“stuck”.128 Unpacking this argument, it follows that the core ideas of the academic 
 
127 Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe, Interview European Commission 
official.  





paradigm preclude the conceptualisation of what matters in sustainability terms, i.e. a 
system focus that integrates the future life circumstances of beneficiaries.  
 Far from being an isolated instance, the question of whether modern financial 
theory is a tool or an obstacle for the advancement of sustainable finance appears to 
be widely discussed in the expert community. Interviewees from the asset management 
industry recount that while some investors are introducing complementary target 
metrics to traditional financial risk/return measures, others remain sceptical about such 
initiatives since they believe in a trade-off between the two.129 A clash that illustrates 
the different positions occurred at a conference of the European Responsible Investor 
Network in March 2019. In this setting, a representative of a (self-styled) progressive 
Dutch asset manager argued with a CSO representative from one of the organisations 
that have been sorted into the critical frame over the possibility of sacrificing 
beneficiaries’ risk-adjusted returns for the improvement of their future non-monetary 
living conditions. In this exchange, the asset manager remained sceptical about the 
willingness of beneficiaries to forego financial gains.130 A similar argument was 
advanced by a CSO interviewee, who contended that while a cultural shift from the 
“rational investor” to “universal ethical investor” would be desirable, so far it had not 
been empirically observed.131 
 
Ecological Economics 
The main significance of ecological economics for sustainable finance is related to the 
measurement of the categories that the proponents of the of the risks and opportunities 
 
129 Interview asset management, Western Europe (1), Interview asset management, North America.  
130 Cf. Notes European Responsible Investment Network (ERIN) conference, Brussels: February 25th, 
2019 (Chatham House rules). 





frame seek to translate into financial language. The above-mentioned report on 
universal ownership uses an Input-Output model that integrates physical flows and 
ecosystem services of economic activities to estimate the external costs that investors 
might have to bear (Mattiston et al. 2011). Yet whereas the concepts of ecosystem 
services and natural capital are repeatedly referenced in discussions132, the explicit use 
of an ecological economics inspired approach is rare. The same holds for the proposals 
to replace GDP with an accounting system that incorporates environmental categories 
(but see NCE 2014: 92, 171ff).  
 CSOs that are connected by the critical frame display a certain affinity towards 
the more popular concepts of ecological economics. One interviewee from this 
community remarked that the members of the CSO coalition she belongs to make 
references to concepts like the planetary boundaries and doughnut economics. 
However, when engaging with financial sector representatives, this terminology is 
absent from the debate and is replaced with the language of risk and return.133 De-
growth, on the other hand, is met with personal sympathy by some experts from the 
civil society and research community.134 Unsurprisingly, proponents of the climate 
finance frame, who make the argument that private investments will bring about a 
green growth regime, reject it explicitly stating that “degrowth will never be politically 
sustainable” (NCE 2014: 51).  
 
132 Hans Bruyninckx, the director of the European Environment Agency, repeatedly advocated for a 
decrease of the unsustainable use of natural capital and argued that financial capital is overvalued vis-
à-vis natural and human capital. He made clear that the concept of sustainability could not be applied 
to anything that increases resource use. Cf. EU Public Hearing: Sustainable finance, Publication of the 
HLEG interim report, Brussels: July 18th, 2017., Notes EU High-level conference: Financing 
sustainable growth, Brussels: March 22nd, 2018.  
133 Interview CSO staff, UK. 






 Yet the response from the political and financial system to de-growth seems to 
be non-engagement rather than antagonism.135 In this context, one interviewee also put 
the blame on the academic community that researches de-growth, since scholars 
devote time to conceptual issues like the difference between de-growth or steady state 
economies, while they are oblivious to questions of political economy like the power 
of lobbies.136  
 The refusal to engage with de-growth notwithstanding, its mirror concept green 
growth is frequently referenced in the discourse. EC Vice President Dombrovkis137, 
OECD general secretary Angel Gurria138, Michael Bloomberg139, a representative 
from the Japanese financial services agency140 and the president of the European 
Banking Foundation141 all argued in favour of green growth. This high-level advocacy 
is linked the climate finance frame that has been championed by the development 
community and the OECD from around 2014 onward (NCE 2014; NCE 2016; OECD 
2017). One participant from the climate finance community remarked, however, that 
while green growth and the associated concepts like economic co-benefits from 
climate mitigation provide a valuable high-level, political narrative, they are not very 




135 Cf. Interview MEP Greens/EFA, Interview Nina Lazic. 
136 Interview MEP Greens/EFA. 
137 Notes EU Public Hearing: Sustainable finance, Publication of the HLEG interim report, Brussels: 
July 18th, 2017. 
138 Notes OECD 5th Forum on Green Finance and Investment, Paris: November 13th, 2018. 
139 Notes EU High-level conference: Financing sustainable growth, Brussels: March 22nd, 2018.  
140 Satoshi Ikeda (Chief officer for sustainable investment at Japanese financial services agency) at EU 
public hearing: A global approach to sustainable finance, Brussels: March 21st, 2019. 
141 Wim Mijs (EBF) at the launch event of the Principles for Responsible Banking by the EBF and 
UNEP FI. Cf. Notes European Banking Federation and UNEP FI: Launch of the Principles for 
Responsible Banking, Brussels, February 5th, 2019. 








The relevance of IAMs as input to financial assessment tools like climate VaR has 
already been discussed. IAMs are also the basic inputs to the Mercer studies that 
translate benefits and costs that are derived from an IAM to different asset classes and 
sectors such as emerging market equity or utilities (Ambachtsheer et al. 2015; Reid et 
al. 2019, see also chapter 4). On the other hand, these models also face strong criticism 
from proponents of the climate finance frame since they fail to acknowledge 
evolutionary dynamics and are considered to overestimate costs and underestimate 
climate-related losses (NCE 2014: 14).  
 More recently, the NGFS has questioned the usefulness of IAMs for the 
purposes of analysing systemic risk. In its first comprehensive report, the central bank 
network points out that existing models are partial and that the incorporation of tipping 
points as well as of second and third round effects is needed. Furthermore, the report 
states that existing IAMs are less attuned to the demands of financial regulators such 
as systemic risk assessments. This is because they were developed for different 
purposes like the estimation of the SCC at the global level (NGFS 2019a: 14, 17). A 
stronger version of this line of criticism is reflected in a recent working paper from the 
BIS. Following the critiques of both mainstream and heterodox economists, the BIS 
researchers outline problems such as the sensitivity of IAMs to assumptions about 
damage functions and discount rates, their use of unrealistic general equilibrium 






 Yet while IAMs might be questioned, the environmental economics concept of 
externalities is omnipresent across all frames and periods. Policy proposals on 
sustainable finance like the EU’s HLEG recommendations point out that the 
internalisation of external effects via prices is an imperative signal for financial 
reallocation (HLEG 2017: 15; HLEG 2018: 11). In a similar fashion, OECD general 
secretary Angel Gurría repeatedly argued for a "big, fat price on carbon”143 at a green 
finance conference. Interviewees almost uniformly and independent of their 
supportive or sceptical position about sustainable finance also pointed out that price 
signals in the ‘real economy’ were needed (see also chapter 6 on real economy vs. 
finance).144 They differ, however, in their assessment of how realistic the pricing of all 
external effects is. One representative from the climate finance community argued that 
this is “what we should strive for as good economists”, while an interviewee from a 
national environment agency pointed out that the failure to arrive at an adequate carbon 
price over the 20 years “puts things into perspective”.145  
 A final argument that has been carried over from neoclassical economics to 
sustainable finance is that the emphasis on the financial sector has been described as a 
backdoor or a 2nd best policy, which has to be leveraged as the direct pricing of 
externalities is not feasible due to political economy obstacles (Berensmann and 




143 Notes OECD 5th Forum on Green and Investment, Paris: November 13th-14th, 2018. 
144 Interview Nina Lazic, Interview Remco Fischer, Interview Jeremy McDaniels, Interview CSO 
staff, climate finance, North America, interview former central bank official, Western Europe, 
Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe, Interview I 17 (confidential). 
145 Interview CSO staff, North America, Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western 
Europe.   








In broad terms, the evolutionary systems paradigm has had two entry points into 
sustainable finance. First, it addresses the problems that neoclassical-inspired 
approaches have with incorporating long-term developments in the real economy. 
More concretely, evolutionary approaches seem more fitting to deal with a transition 
that is assumed and narrated as transforming economies and financial sectors beyond 
recognition. Developments like full decarbonisation are difficult to reconcile with 
perspectives that extrapolate or benchmark against the status quo and historical data.147 
This thinking is most closely associated with the climate finance frame that highlights 
the necessity of switching towards a new growth regime (NCE 2014; 2016; 2018).  
 Second, on the finance side, systems thinking has entered via the risks and 
opportunities frame. Prudential regulators inside the NGFS and, to a lesser extent, 
private coalitions like the FSB TCFD address climate and other ESG risks at least 
partly within the framework of the evolutionary systems paradigm. This is because the 
scope and timeframe of ESG risks can be better conceptualised through the 
evolutionary systems paradigm than through modern financial theory. Whereas in the 
latter case the risk is part of an independent unit like a company, an asset, a sector or 
a portfolio, in its systemic or macroprudential conception risks are an emergent 
property of interconnected financial systems (cf. Baker 2013; Kranke and Yarrow 
2018).  
 
147 For instance, Klaas Knot from the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) made a point about the inadequacy 
of historical data and risk as volatility at the EU Public Hearing: A global approach to sustainable 





 Also, the timeframe is prolonged significantly in the evolutionary systems 
interpretation. Whereas actors basing their risk management on financial theory 
seldom look beyond a five-year time horizon (and many not even beyond a one-year 
timeframe)  (Danthine and Donaldson 2015: 182; Naqvi et al. 2017), an evolutionary 
systems perspective extends the horizon to 20 to 30 years at the least. The recent 
announcement of the Bank of England to use a 30-year horizon in its 2021 exploratory 
climate stress test illustrates the increasing relevance of the evolutionary systems 
paradigm (BoE 2019).148 In addition, the NGFS and the PRA appear to reject the 
conceptualisation of risks that is associated with modern financial theory. This is 
evidenced by the fact that they both stress that climate-related risks are distinct even 
from other factors of structural change due to their far-reaching impacts, irreversibility, 
foreseeable nature and dependence on short-term actions (NGFS 2019a: 12; PRA 
2018).149 
 One tool through which such an evolutionary perspective is operationalised is 
scenario analysis. Working inside a complexity and network framework and 
positioning themselves explicitly against the alternative climate VaR150, Battiston et 
al. developed a climate stress test that estimates the first and second round effects of 
asset stranding in European financial markets (Battiston et al. 2017). Their paper has 
since then been referenced in the HLEG’s assessments and the subsequent European 
Commission’s action plan on sustainable finance (HLEG 2018; EC 2018a).151 In 
addition, the FSB TCFD and the NGFS have advocated the use of scenario analysis 
(FSB TCFD 2016, NGFS 2019a).  
 
148 Cf. Interview I 17 (confidential). 
149 See also Interview I 17 (confidential). 
150 Cf. Interview Franziska Schütze.  
151 Interview former central bank official, Western Europe, Interview Economist, environmental 





 The important departure of scenario analysis from methods that extrapolate 
from past data is that they take a range of explicit ‘views’ on future developments. 
This allows for a subsequent measurement of how well financial institutions are 
‘aligned’ to the scenario. Thus, the approaches that operationalise risks and 
opportunities through scenario analysis move towards the ideas of the evolutionary 
systems paradigm. This is because, first, unlike extrapolations of past and normally 
distributed data, scenario analysis offers a different way to deal with uncertainty that 
zooms in high impact events (cf. Langley 2013). Second, the assumptions and 
relationships that guide the scenario do not necessarily come from an ‘economic’ 
assessment in the narrow sense of the term. Instead, ‘non-economic’ forms of inquiry 
like climatology or even political goal and trajectory setting as in the case of the SDGs 
are mobilised in the translation of the scenarios to financial terms (cf. chapter 6).  
 Whereas the use of scenarios breaks with the risk analysis techniques of 
modern financial theory, for some observers this break is not sufficient. The above-
mentioned BIS working paper goes on to suggest that while useful, forward-looking 
modelling will not be able to fully resolve the uncertainty of climate change and 
societies’ responses to it. Invoking the Knightian notion of radical uncertainty, the 
paper calls on regulators and central banks to go “beyond modelling” (Bolton et al. 
2020: 46). The authors thus recommend an even stronger “epistemological break” with 
modern financial theory, where regulators should embrace rather than model away 
radical uncertainty and coordinate with other institutions to manage the transition 
(Ibid: 46-48). The links of this analysis and its recommendations with the evolutionary 
systems paradigm are very clear. Nonetheless, the recency of the paper and its status 
as a working paper mean that the extent to which the regulatory community will fully 





 Aside from the regulatory community, the evolutionary systems paradigm has 
also guided the work of the UNEP Inquiry (Zadek and Robins 2014) as well as of civil 
society organisations like the Finance Innovation Lab (cf. Berry et al. 2018, see chapter 
6). Using the language of stocks and flows between systems, UNEP Inquiry stresses 
the ability of finance to deliver on external requirements like the SDG investment 
needs. Moreover, the functionality of the financial sector is determined by how 
effective, efficient and resilient it is in performing this task (UNEP Inquiry 2015; 
2016). This re-definition of efficiency at the level of the system’s outputs, which 
differs markedly from the more self-referential asset price focus of the EMH, 
integrated critical assessments of the financial sector’s functionality such as Philippon 
(2014) and Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2015) (cf. Turbeville 2016). As such, it is not very 
far away from the debates on financialisaton, which were also referenced by the British 
economist John Kay and Finance Watch secretary general Benoit Lallemend in the 
context of the EU’s HLEG.152  
 The systems perspective is also reflected by the fact that UNEP Inquiry and 
other actors like the EU’s HLEG stress that there is no single policy that can switch 
finance towards sustainability. Or in the words of the HLEG: “Given the complexity 
of the financial system and its policy and regulatory framework, there is no single lever 
to achieve these ambitions and ‘switch’ the financial system to sustainability153.” 
(HLEG 2018: 5).  
 
 
152 Cf. Notes EU Public Hearing: Sustainable finance, Publication of the HLEG interim report, 
Brussels: July 18th, 2017. 
153 See also talk of Saïd El Khadradoui (EPSC). Cf. notes European RI conference: Setting the agenda 
for a just and sustainable Europe, Brussels: February 24th, 2019. And remarks from Frank Elderson 
(DNB), Nathen Fabien (UN PRI) at EU Public Hearing: A global approach to sustainable growth, 







In this chapter, I established the presence of four academic paradigms in the policy 
subsystem of sustainable finance. The empirical examination found that there are 
relatively few actors that provide a direct and observable link between academic 
paradigms and the frames that were identified in chapter 4. Concerning the paradigms 
themselves, modern financial theory is most frequently referenced. While some actors 
inside the risks and opportunities frame use concepts and models from this paradigm 
to translate between sustainability issues and finance, proponents of the critical frame 
attack it for being incompatible with sustainability. Furthermore, proponents of the 
evolutionary systems paradigm point out the inadequacy of modern financial theory to 
understand systems, uncertainty and endogeneity in order to promote their thinking. 
Whereas the paradigm of modern financial theory is associated with the earlier variants 
of the risks and opportunities frame that highlight risks at the portfolio level, the 
evolutionary systems paradigm is closer related to the conceptualisation of risks as 
being systemic.  
 Finally, while environmental and climate economics and in particular the Stern 
Review are widely acknowledged and used as input for higher order models such as 
climate VaR, some actors have cast doubt on the usefulness of IAMs. Input from 
ecological economics is also used by some actors but the concepts of the paradigm are 
not widely reflected. This relative absence of engagement with the sustainability-
related paradigms notwithstanding, ecological economics and environmental 
economics still have the potential to influence sustainable finance. This is because 
categories and assessments from these paradigms are integrated into the discussions 





paradigms. The incorporation of climate trajectories into scenario analysis as well as 
into applications like climate VaR are notable examples. As such, the inputs from the 
environmental side are especially relevant for the black-boxing of socio-technical 
instruments, which I will examine in the next chapter.  
 Having sorted the paradigms to the corpus and the different frames, the next 
chapter will take one step forward from this and highlight how academic paradigms 
and frames are politically significant. This will be done by examining how frames 

















6. Turning Frames into Policy Through Debates and Socio-
Technical Instruments 
 
Accounting standards are not neutral; they project a vision of the world.  
Olivier Guersent, Director General DG FISMA, European Commission.154 
How do you invest in lowering inequality? 
 Gerard van Olphen, APG Asset Management.155 
Bringing people together that supposedly fight for the same cause does not play out 
so well when it comes to practice, (…) As soon as you go to fundamentals, people are 
not so enthusiastic anymore (…) So I get tired of celebrating the fact that we are 
putting people together on platforms.  
Bas Eickhout, Member of the European Parliament, Greens/EFA.156 
 
 
Does it really matter whether sustainable finance is understood as an ethical 
imperative, a new growth regime or a set of risk factors? Chapter 4 has tracked the 
development and the positioning of the frames that constituted sustainable finance over 
three periods between the late 1990s and 2018. In this chapter, I outlined that the initial 
dominance of the SRI frame was replaced by the risks and opportunities frame and to 
a lesser extent by the climate finance frame. In addition, the critical frame that 
emphasises the dysfunctionality of the financial system has accompanied the policy 
subsystem at its margin.  
 
154 Notes EU Public Hearing: A global approach to sustainable finance, Brussels: March 21st, 2019. 
155 Ibid.  





 Chapter 5 explored how these frames build on or challenge existing academic 
paradigms. Matching frames to academic paradigms showed that there is no simple 
congruence between the two concepts. While some frames display a disposition to one 
academic paradigm relative to the others, this is far from complete equivalence. The 
risks and opportunities frame is a case in point. There is a strong argument to be made 
that it draws from modern financial theory. However, in its systemic variant, the frame 
also connects well with the evolutionary systems paradigm. Finally, proponents of this 
frame use both neoclassical-inspired environmental economics and the more 
heterodox insights from ecological economics when it comes to the operationalisation.  
 In the following, I will examine how both frames and their connections to 
different academic paradigms matter for the governance of sustainable finance. I will 
look at two analytically different channels that translate between ideas and policy 
outcomes. First, there is a dynamic, where frames are used to persuade elite and 
broader audiences. Frames act as a starting point for debate positions, which provide 
a narrative that outlines the goals of sustainable finance and offers an abstract 
explanation of its functioning. Second, there is a performative dynamic where frames 
are used to design socio-technical instruments that make the economy governable (cf. 
chapter 2). 
 In the first section, I will briefly revisit the connection between frames and 
policy paradigms as outlined in chapter 2 and restate the hypothesis on the co-variation 
between policy subsystem structure and transmission channels. The second section 
looks into the persuasive transmission channel by examining four prominent debates. 
In the third section, I focus on the performative transmission channel and revisit five 





debate/frame-instrument links and assesses how they integrate with the transmission 
mechanism outlined in chapter 2. The fifth section concludes the chapter. 
 
6.1 Revisiting Concepts: Policy Paradigms and Transmission Channels 
In chapter 2, I introduced the hypothesis that the immaturity of the policy subsystem 
of sustainable finance makes persuasive processes less powerful than performative 
dynamics. In mature policy subsystems, a shift of the policy paradigm is characterised 
by actors fighting about whether abrupt changes in well-known categories mean that 
the system is in a fundamental crisis.  In immature systems, by contrast, the political 
element can be found with the design of socio-technical instruments.  
 Chapter 4 lent some support to this hypothesis. Whereas there were some 
fundamental debates (e.g. on divestment, fiduciary duty, mainstreaming and green 
growth), the overall landscape of sustainable finance has so far remained relatively 
harmonious. This is also illustrated by the network topologies depicted in chapter 4. 
Throughout the three periods, the networks show that the communities cluster around 
the centre and display significant overlap. These topologies are different from the 
network structure of an antagonistic policy debate, where actors segregate themselves 
into opposing coalitions (e.g. Leifeld 2013; Rinscheid 2015).  
 To explain the variation in the importance of persuasive and performative 
transmission channels, I pointed to differences in the structure of the policy subsystem. 
One indicator is the size and stability of the actor population. For the time being, the 
debates about sustainable finance have by far and large not involved the general public. 
Instead, the expert community itself and other close elites like policymakers, 
specialised media (e.g. Financial Times, Responsible Investor, Bloomberg) and 





there appears to be a lack of antagonism that comes in spite of the ideational 
irreconcilability of some controversies (see section 2). On the other hand, the expert 
community appears to be much more invested in arguing over socio-technical 
instruments. The description of sustainable finance’s evolution in chapter 4 suggested 
that technical matters like the standardisation of ESG measurements were a more 
pressing concern than the resolution of fundamental disputes.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will further explore these preliminary 
observations on the two transmission channels. I will outline some of the most 
prominent debates and socio-technical instrument types and establish their 
significance for the governance of sustainable finance. In addition, I map the 
connections of debates and socio-technical instruments to the frames.  
 
6.2 The Debates of Sustainable Finance 
At first sight, sustainable finance appears to be a policy area that is characterised by 
the absence of debates. In chapter 4, I referred to an observation of an interviewee who 
noticed that everybody was “excited” about the topic.157 Similarly, an institutional 
investor gave evidence to the uncontested nature of green bonds by exclaiming: “We 
all love them!”158 And even though SRI was and is dismissed by some investors as a 
money burning fringe business, the dynamic between proponents and critics of SRI is 
more characterised by mutual disengagement than by outright conflict. Finally, as was 
observed in chapter 4, the mobilisation of the still relatively undefined and hence 
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inclusive nature of the term sustainable finance as a master frame has contributed to 
the mitigation of conflicts in the recent past.159 
 Yet even in this overall situation of harmony there are some debates. The 
subjects of these debates are often discussed in abstract and dichotomous terms. They 
relate to the goals of sustainable finance, its contribution to the economy and the 
environment and the causal mechanisms that are assumed to deliver change. Finally, 
since these issues reflect disagreement about debate positions and not technicalities, 
they can be observed at the panel discussion of conferences (as panel members are 
selected to encourage discussion) and in specialised media outlets. The four debates 
that will be revisited below have been selected on the basis of qualitative content 
analysis, interviews and participant observation data. The criteria that led to their 
inclusion are that they are repeatedly referenced in the data and are discussed in 
controversial terms.  The debates are the ESG – Performance Trade-off, Financial 
Materiality vs. ESG impact, Engagement vs. Divestment, and Transformative Finance 
vs. Real Economy Focus. 
  
The ESG – Performance Trade-off  
Many of the developments within the risks and opportunities frame address the 
question of how ESG issues are related to financial performance. As described in 
chapter 4, the bad performance of SRI funds in the early 2000s meant that mainstream 
investors treated sustainable finance with suspicion. Seeing this trade-off, the 
opponents of SRI mobilised the concepts of fiduciary duty and financial materiality. 
Moreover, they argued (and continue to argue cf. Lindeijer et al. 2019) along the lines 
 





of Milton Friedman’s dictum on corporate responsibility by stating that they are only 
accountable to their beneficiaries and not to society as a whole.160  
 Ever since, promoters of sustainable finance arguing within the risks and 
opportunities frame have mobilised large n research (see Friede et al. 2015 for a meta-
study) and case studies to refute this claim. As described in chapter 5, these studies 
also adopted tools and concepts from modern financial theory.161 One way to establish 
the superior or at least not inferior performance of ESG investing is the back-testing 
on historical datasets (e.g. Grantham 2018). A different line of argumentation 
mobilises forward-looking scenarios that predict increased financial returns for ESG 
investors (e.g. Ambachtsheer et al. 2015; EIU 2016; Reid et al. 2019; see also next 
section). As noted in chapter 5, the predictions of forward-looking scenarios rely on 
an expansion of the time horizon. Hence, they move away from the short-term periods 
that modern financial theory and financial practice emphasise. Instead, scenarios look 
at time intervals in the order of decades if not centuries.  
 For the greater part of the analysed time period, the efforts of demonstrating 
that ESG issues are not an anathema to financial returns have been met with silence 
and disengagement rather than with outright rejection. This only changed once 
sustainable finance had received enough attention to be seen as an issue that 
unconvinced investors could no longer ignore. One interviewee from the asset 
management industry remarked that investors could be placed along a continuum 
between the believers of the “true [ESG] religion” and those that “do not even pay lip 
service”. The greater part of the distribution between those extremes is, however, just 
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“picking up the story without truly believing that ESG can drive return.”162 Sometimes 
this suspicion towards ESG is also articulated openly as in the case of a lobbyist for 
retail investors, who expressed concerns that ESG labels might be used by 
underperforming funds as a cover-up for poor management.163 
 
Financial Materiality vs. ESG Impact  
In the dispute over financial materiality vs. ESG impact the advocates from either side 
start from the premise that ESG matters. Yet they disagree about what ESG is and what 
it should be for. The proponents of the financial materiality thesis follow the risks and 
opportunities frame and argue that ESG issues should be added to the list of the more 
established risk factors like currency risk. Thus, if physical destruction of assets occurs 
because of climate change or if changes in policy, technology and litigation mean that 
investors will lose money, investments in assets that are exposed to such ESG risks 
should be re-evaluated.  
 The adherents to the financial materiality position comprise large financial 
institutions, IOs, CSOs and regulators. These actors maintain that ESG issues should 
only be considered if a transmission between them and financial metrics can be 
established. In the first period, UNEP FI highlighted the materiality of ESG issues to 
support the argument that they needed to be part of the fiduciary duty of institutional 
investors (see chapter 4). More recently, the FSB TCFD explicitly asked for the 
disclosure of financially material information concerning climate-related risks (FSB 
TCFD 2017: IV). Furthermore, the stress on financially material risks and 
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opportunities can be seen in the interview and participant observation data, where 
representatives from asset managers164, index providers165 and banks166 all emphasised 
the need for better and more relevant data. As I will show in the next section, the focus 
on financial materiality influences the design of socio-technical instruments. This is 
illustrated by the fact that earlier measurements that had been established to 
accommodate the SRI frame increasingly faced criticism as the emphasis on financial 
materiality became dominant.  
 Those arguing in favour of financial materiality see themselves as only 
responding to changes in price signals as environmental risks are priced due to new 
information on natural disasters or changes in policy and regulation. Anticipating such 
changes, they argue that ESG issues should be monitored and integrated already today. 
Nonetheless, they remain adamant in their position that ESG issues only matter to the 
extent that they are reflected in financial risks and returns. Financial materiality is 
defined as the impact of all present and projected risks and opportunities that can be 
measured in money terms. Consequently, proponents of financial materiality are 
unwilling to forego financial return in favour of increasing the impact of sustainability 
goals that are not expressed in financial metrics.  
 It is noteworthy that the financial materiality interpretation posits that all 
relevant information is already known today and can thus be priced accurately. This 
reflects the understanding of the academic paradigm of modern financial theory, where 
– if it functions well – the financial system is assumed to be in an equilibrium state 
that constantly adjusts to new (exogenous) information. This understanding implicitly 
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rejects the evolutionary systems paradigm, which emphasises that today’s financial 
decisions influence the future.  
 The camp of those who think that ESG impacts matter beyond their relation to 
financial materiality is more heterogeneous. First, CSOs that are bound together by the 
critical frame conceive ESG impacts as the negative consequences of existing 
investments. They use the focus on ESG impacts to point out the shortcomings of 
financial materiality. Accordingly, only integrating those parts of sustainability that 
have a price tag is inadequate for addressing the negative impact of finance and the 
economy on environmental and social systems. Such a narrow conception of 
sustainability is problematic, because, despite being unpriced, natural and social 
systems have a value to humans and the economy. Their argument thus aligns with the 
ecological economics paradigm as it highlights the embeddedness of finance and the 
economy in broader environmental and social systems. Ultimately, the emphasis to 
measure physical (and social) instead of financial categories aims for the removal of 
the dichotomy between financial risks and environmental impacts.  
 The promotors of the climate finance frame, on the other hand, zoom in on the 
positive impacts of new financial instruments. While they equally point out the 
necessity of measuring non-financial ESG impacts, their priority rests less with 
establishing the negative ESG impacts of current practices. As noted in chapter 4, the 
climate finance frame argues that public policy and public money should enable new 
private investments into climate-friendly economic activities. Determining the ESG 
impact of investments is a way to determine which investments deliver the greatest 
environmental returns. In other words, focusing on ESG impacts can help with the 
implementation of the climate finance frame as it enables the strategic selection of 





Lab. The Lab is an incubator for public-private financing instruments that is run by the 
CPI and has to date supported 35 projects with US$ 1.5 billion.167   
 Importantly, only the critical frame translates ESG impacts into a debate 
position that opposes the financial materiality thesis. As suggested above, the critical 
frame focuses on ESG impacts to point out that an exclusive concern with financial 
materiality leads to an insufficient coverage of environmental and social issues.  
 I have illustrated a clash between the two debate positions of financial 
materiality vs. ESG impact in chapter 5 when recounting the exchange between the 
Dutch asset manager and the CSO representative. Confronted with the argument that 
financial institutions should only care about financially material issues, proponents of 
the ESG impact position counter that beneficiaries, i.e. consumers of financial 
products, are not solely motivated by maximum financial return but have a more 
holistic set of preferences. This means that non-financially material issues are part of 
the mandate of the stewards of beneficiaries’ funds (e.g. Berry et al. 2018: 30-33; 
HLEG 2018: 20).  
 A second challenge from the adherents of the critical interpretation of ESG 
impacts is that the emphasis on financial materiality fails on grounds fairness. The fact 
that only risks that are expressed in money terms are considered means that e.g. 
climate-related damages to property in wealthy geographies are more of a risk than 
equivalent damages in less affluent communities. Therefore, this approach is 
unsuitable to incorporate equity concerns and exacerbates rather than reduces 
inequalities.168 
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 Whereas some participants in the financial materiality vs. ESG impact debate 
tend to fortify their positions by arguing that only financial risks or ESG impacts 
matter, there are also actors that try to blur the boundaries. Some investors, for 
instance, try to establish a ‘second bottom line’, which aims for the maximisation of 
non-financial impact (see also Inderst and Stewart 2018: 4 for a typology of 
investors).169 Interviewees from the financial sector as well as from the regulatory 
community also emphasised the role of “values” as opposed to financial value and the 
fact that there are areas [of economic activity], that simply “should not” be used for 
profit making.170 This debate position about values echoes the ethical considerations 
of the SRI frame, which tries to bridge the distinction between financial and ethical 
considerations. However, the lack of formalisation of the frame and the idiosyncrasies 
of ethical views mean that the thinking about holistic values acts more as a background 
constraint than as an active force for developing either arguments or socio-technical 
instruments.  
 A more formalistic attempt to reconcile between financial materiality and ESG 
impacts are the non-financial reporting guidelines that the European Commission has 
recently tabled. They integrate the two positions by developing the concept of ‘double 
materiality’. Accordingly, the terms of materiality and risk are applied both to the 
impacts of climate-related risks (transition and physical, see next section) on 
companies and to the impacts of companies’ activities on the climate. The 
communication notes that these two perspectives already overlap and that this overlap 
will increase in the future. Furthermore, longer time horizons will mean that financial 
materiality will expand its scope towards holistic assessments (EC 2019).  
 
169 Interview asset management, Western Europe (1). 






 In summary, the debate over financial materiality vs. ESG impact is about 
whether to look at financial or natural and social categories. While the ESG impact 
advocates can be differentiated between those coming from the climate finance frame 
and those from the critical frame, only the latter group has created a position that 
debates the financial materiality thesis. This position reflects the ecological economics 
paradigm and points to the embeddedness of the economy in broader systems as well 
as to the short-sightedness of established financial categories. The financial materiality 
position is, on the other hand, informed by modern financial theory and emphasises 
the need as well as the capability of the financial system to integrate and price 
previously overlooked ESG information. 
 
Engagement vs. Divestment 
The question of engagement vs. divestment is about whether financial institutions 
should talk to companies that are involved in unsustainable economic activities or 
whether they should punish them by withdrawing financing. The former strategy 
portrays financial institutions as facilitators in the transition of companies, whereas the 
latter sees them as disciplining actors. The choice between either method might well 
be answered at the level of the individual investment. However, rather than being 
decided on a case-by-case basis, engagement vs. divestment is debated publicly and 
reflects disagreements about articles of faith and theories of change.  
 The argument that engagement offers a better route to change is often made by 
incumbent financial institutions to fend off calls for divestment. A representative from 





what the theory of change of divestment was.171 Hiro Mizuno from the Japanese GPIF 
made a similar case by stating that divestment would mean the transfer of 
responsibility [for environmentally problematic companies] to irresponsible 
investors.172 The theory of change of engagement thus emphasises the role that activist 
investors can play in gently forcing unsustainable companies towards the transition. 
As such, it is connected to the risks and opportunities frame, which is interpreted as 
requiring active risk management on behalf of financial institutions.  
 Proponents of divestment counter this position by pointing towards 
incompatibility between investments in certain sectors (most notably coal) and 
political or scientific targets such as the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. The 
divestment advocates are often members of the CSO community like Bank Track, who 
engage in relational framing that posits them as the antagonists of untrustworthy 
financial institutions (cf. chapter 4). To make the case for divestment, these actors 
translate emission projections and energy scenarios (see next section) to the balance 
sheets of financial institutions. Hence, if the IPCC calculates that emissions will have 
to be reduced by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030, any new financing for fossil fuel 
projects is nonsensical (Kirsch et al. 2019: 4). Or, in the words of one of the 
campaigners it is “an insult to logic, to science and to humanity (…)”.173  
 The theory of change of divestment is that certain sectors and companies are 
beyond saving and will have to be wound down. The calculations of the climate 
scenarios mean that there is no point in engaging with businesses that are doomed. 
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Here, the concept of stranded assets that is part of the risks and opportunities frame is 
mobilised to advocate for a position that highlights risk minimisation through exit, 
instead of risk management through engagement. Thought to the end this means that 
the logic of divestment is to convince every potential investor that assets, which are 
based on unsustainable economic activities, are ultimately stranded and thus worthless. 
 The transmission channel of divesting consists of selling the asset to another 
investor when it comes to equity or, alternatively, the refusal to buy bonds or issue 
credit in the case of debt. This means that on the level of the financial system the short-
term financial impact of divestment is marginal; something that is pointed out by the 
engagement position. The adherents of divestment counter this argument by changing 
the timeframe. By means of divestment investors ‘signal’ to their peers that they no 
longer believe in the viability of certain industries. Over time, other financial 
institutions learn to shun assets that leading investors deem to be unsustainable.174 The 
logical endpoint of ‘divestment by all’ is that companies must wind down 
unsustainable business lines and either pay out the remaining capital to investors or 
reinvest it in other sectors.175  
 Summing up the above, engagement comes from a risk-inspired debate 
position, which contends that activist investors will be willing and able to manage the 
risks of their investees. The alternative is divestment, which also mobilises the risks 
and opportunities frame to emphasise the incompatibility of certain investments with 
scientific projections. The connection of divestment proponents to the critical frame 
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also means that they remain sceptical about the effectiveness of engagement and the 
functionality of the financial system more generally.  
 
Transformative Finance vs. Real Economy Focus 
The last debate is about whether the focus on finance as an agent of change is justified. 
The dispute is between those, who contend that tweaking the rules of finance is an 
incredibly potent lever to influence the allocation of funds and those, who see the 
financial sector as a transmission belt that merely reacts to developments in the real 
economy. For the latter group, sustainable finance is a potential instance of mission 
creep. This is because they fear that by trying to harness the financial sector to achieve 
an outcome that has little to do with its function, unintended consequences will arise. 
 One issue over which the proponents of the two debate positions disagree is 
whether capital requirements should be adjusted to favour green assets. While some 
banks and Juncker Commission vice-president Dombrovskis have repeatedly argued 
for a ‘green-supporting factor’, this has been rejected forcefully by financial 
regulators.176 At one forum, Anne de Lorver from the Banque de France reacted to the 
proposition of such a factor by pointing out that sectoral monetary policies have never 
worked and that macroprudential policy is about the robustness of the financial sector 
and not about offering incentives.177  
 Following the repeated expression of similar views, the European Commission 
initially backtracked on Dombrovskis’ proposals. In its action plan, the Commission 
follows a logic that is more attuned to the demands of regulators by arguing that 
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changes in capital requirements can only be undertaken if they are “justified from a 
risk perspective” (EC 2018a: 9). This means that a green- supporting factor must 
reflect ‘real world’ differentials in the risk of green or brown assets.178 This strategic 
retreat notwithstanding, with the van der Leyen Commission taking up its mandate, 
Dombrovskis has kept on pushing for a green-supporting factor.179 
 The demand that any supporting or penalising factor must be risk-based to not 
introduce bias or bubbles in the economy is rooted in the belief that finance is and 
should not be an agent of change. If it functions well, the financial system reflects the 
risks of unsustainable businesses and the opportunities of sustainable ones. In this 
view, market failures that lead to the inaccurate pricing of risks are located in the real 
economy. Hence, regulatory changes to remedy them should be undertaken in the real 
economy and not through the indirect route of financial regulation. This understanding 
of finance is in line with modern financial theory, environmental economics and the 
neoclassical economics paradigm more broadly. This is because it emphasises the 
pricing of externalities in the real economy as well as the importance of transparent, 
unbiased information in the financial markets. If both conditions are achieved, this will 
make sure that equilibrium market prices materialise.  
 Representatives of the financial industry and adherents to the risks and 
opportunities frame more broadly follow this line of reasoning when they argue that 
political initiatives on sustainable finance are barking up the wrong tree. In their view, 
the financial system would be more than ready to finance sustainable activities as soon 
 
178 The grounding of capital requirements in risks was also advanced by some of the interviewees, 
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as long-term, coherent and ‘credible’ policies such as carbon pricing make them 
profitable.180 A similar assessment, though with different implications, was made by 
an interviewee from the community that is closer connected to the critical frame. 
Accordingly, developments in finance are of minor importance as long as the absence 
of externality pricing means that unsustainable production and consumption patterns 
remain profitable. As finance can only invest in the economic activities that exist in 
the real economy, the potential of reforms in finance is negligible.181 
 The opposing position holds that finance is not only a reflection of the real 
economy. Quite to the contrary, the financial system is characterised by self-referential 
dynamics that can foster or inhibit investments in sustainable activities. Therefore, 
reforms in the real economy like the pricing of externalities would most likely be 
insufficient to alter the allocation of capital flows. This is because the financial system 
does precisely not operate as a neutral transmission channel. Campiglio argues in this 
context that because of market failures inside the financial system, carbon pricing 
might not be enough to switch capital allocation towards green investments. These 
failures occur since the allocation of funds carried out by financial institutions is to a 
certain extent autonomous from the real economy. Instead, these flows respond to 
dynamics that are endogenous to finance such as the Minskyian credit cycle. Hence, 
behaviour that is rational from the view of financial institutions, e.g. deleveraging after 
a credit boom and bust, can be detrimental to societal goals like the financing of green 
investments (Campiglio 2016: 224).  
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 This position is put forward by the actors that belong to or partly integrate the 
critical frame as well as by some actors situated within the risks and opportunities 
frame (e.g. Berry et al. 2016; UNEP Inquiry 2015; Zadek and Robins 2014). UNEP 
Inquiry highlights the failures of the financial system by pointing towards systemic 
biases in risk assessments, short-termism, inflated derivative markets of dubious real 
economic value and the inability of the financial system to create ‘missing markets’ 
for sustainable products (Zadek and Robins 2014: 19ff; Zadek and Robins 2018: 15). 
The argument that short-termism is a systemic problem of the financial system is also 
taken up by other actors such as 2° investing (Naqvi et al. 2017). “Undue” and systemic 
short-term pressures in the capital markets have also become a topic for the HLEG 
(2018: 5) and the European Commission. In the action plan that followed the HLEG’s 
recommendations, the Commission instructed the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) to conduct research on short-termism (EC 2018a: 11).  
 The climate finance frame also highlights the transformative potential of 
finance. Its take on the question is, however, less concerned with detecting deep 
structural reasons for the current misallocation of funds towards unsustainable 
businesses. Instead, it emphasises the transformative potential that will be unlocked 
once the financial plumbing connects an abundance of funds with until now cash-
stripped transformative projects.  
 The debate on whether finance has a transformative role or not seems not be 
structured entirely by opposing frames. While the climate finance frame occupies the 
transformative finance position, the risks and opportunities frame and the critical frame 
are more divided. Instead, it appears that academic paradigms are a better dividing line 
in this debate. Modern financial theory and environmental economics see finance as 





market failures in the real economy. The evolutionary systems paradigm, on the other 
hand, bestows considerable agency on the financial system.  
 Among the institutional locations where this relatively academic debate is most 
relevant are central banks and regulators. This is not surprising since these actors have 
undergone a process of scientisation over the past decades and as such can be expected 
to reflect academic disputes (cf. Marcussen 2008; Thiemann et al. 2018). As I 
emphasised above, central bankers and regulators adhere to the real economy focus 
when it comes to capital requirements. This reflects a neoclassical inspired 
conceptualisation of financial risks and market failures. Furthermore, as independently 
argued by two representatives of this community in different occasions, central 
bankers were at first generally sceptical about the integration of climate-related risks 
into their work. This is because they find it difficult to reconcile such innovations with 
their mandate, which is price stability. Sticking to their mandate became a central 
concern for central bankers after the GFC. As they had accumulated more power 
through unconventional monetary policies, central bankers were careful to point out 
the consistency of such policies with their mandates to fend off accusations that hold 
that they were influencing the economy in an unaccountable manner.182  
 The restraint that the real economy focus imposes on central banks stands in 
contrast with the NGFS’ activist stance. Frank Elderson, governing board member of 
the DNB and executive director of the NGFS, leans more towards this “whatever it 
takes” approach. This is evidenced by his positive view on the leverage of central 
banks and his tackling of the question of mandates by paraphrasing John F. Kennedy 
(“Do not ask what legislation can do for you [as a Central Bank], but what you can do 
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without additional legislation”183). Such a position is much closer aligned with the 
transformative finance view. It also integrates well with the variation of the risks and 
opportunities frame, which is advocated by the NGFS. The systemic nature of climate 
risks is taken as a justification for swift, bold and decisive actions by otherwise neutral 
supervisors. A commonality between the transformative finance view and the systemic 
variant of the risks and opportunities frame is that they both borrow from the 
evolutionary systems paradigm.  
 A reconciliation between the transformative and the non-interventionist 
interpretations of central banks’ role is offered by proposals that argue that central 
banks should use their capacities in supervision and monetary policy to advance 
environmental aims “without prejudice” to the primary objective of price stability (e.g. 
Cœuré 2018; Schoenmaker 2018; Villeroy de Galhau 2019). 
 In summary, the transformative finance vs. real economy focus debate cuts 
across the risks and opportunities, climate finance and critical frame and can be better 
understood in terms of academic paradigms. The transformative position follows an 
evolutionary systems perspective, whereas the argument that financial reallocations 
will follow suit as soon as real economy market failures are addressed is rooted in the 
efficient market theories from modern finance and the pricing solutions of 
environmental economics. When it comes to policy recommendations, the 
transformative position seeks to mobilise all possible levers to move the system into a 
new state. The real economy focus cautions against such all-embracing measures and, 
instead, vouches for the careful treatment of market failures.  
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6.3 What Gets Measured, Gets Managed: Metrics, Taxonomies, Definitions and 
Scenarios 
If it is true that what gets measured gets managed, then it matters who decides what 
gets measured and how the measurement is done. From a performativity point of view, 
measurements can be understood as attempts to establish the ideational infrastructure 
(Braun 2014) of sustainable finance. The tools that actors mobilise to build this 
infrastructure are to some extent aimed at solving the debates from the previous 
section. For instance, definitions and measurements of ESG issues provide the data 
that feeds into the large n studies that investigate the ESG-performance trade-off.184 In 
addition, the selection of categories to measure ESG issues has implications for the 
financial materiality vs. ESG impact debate.  
 Yet the shape of socio-technical instruments cannot be simply explained as a 
linear extension of debate positions. Socio-technical instruments are not primarily 
intended as weapons for persuasion and legitimacy. As stressed in chapter 2, they bring 
together ideational and material components to make new objects intelligible and 
hence governable. To undertake ESG investing, it is necessary to create methodologies 
that transform the economic activities of corporations into data that is processable by 
people and machines that make financial decisions. The socio-technical instruments 
that transform a hitherto extra-financial reality into financial categories are, however, 
not unproblematic reflections of that reality. Instead, they incorporate certain 
ideational and material factors, while leaving out others. By doing so, they take 
inspirations from the different frames and academic paradigms.  
 
184 Cf. Interview Economist, environmental agency, Western Europe, Interview European 





 In the following section, I will examine five types of socio-technical 
instruments. The selection of these instruments was informed by the same criteria as 
the selection of the debates, i.e. repeated and controversial referrals in the data.  
Starting with the chronologically oldest one, I first discuss ESG metrics and indicators. 
Subsequently, I look at the risk factors that have been developed to link sustainability 
to financial decision making. In the third subsection, (green) taxonomies are 
considered. This is followed by a discussion of the role of scenario analysis. Finally, 
I examine metrics that measure the performance of the financial system as a whole.  
 
Measuring Good and Bad: ESG Metrics and Indicators  
ESG metrics and indicators date back to the 1980s and 1990s when SRI saw its first 
expansion. The demand for these indicators came mostly from religious investors, who  
looked for methods that could help them determine what counts as an ethical 
investment. The creation of the UK based ethical research service EIRIS by the 
Methodist Church and the Quakers is an early attempt to fill this gap (Sparkes 2002). 
In France, the creation of ARESE, which later merged with EIRIS to become Vigeo 
Eiris followed a similar script albeit its definition of social and environmental issues 
did not have explicit religious undertones (Déjean et al. 2004). Other sustainability 
rating agencies that emerged at the time are Sustainalytics, imug, ecofys, utopis and 
oekom.  
 These agencies sell ESG scores that are based on proprietary models to 
investors. The models combine publicly available information with ESG relevance, 
data from other specialised vendors (e.g. on GHG emissions)185 and original research. 
 
185 GHG emissions data are in turn estimated by the non-profit CDP and special vendors like South 





The unit of analysis are share and bond issuing companies and sovereigns. The outputs 
of these methodologies are often index values or ordinal categories (e.g. green, yellow, 
red). Furthermore, some agencies specialise in in-depth qualitative analysis, which, 
however, appears to be undervalued by investors.186  
 When it comes to the demand for ESG ratings, faith-based investors remain 
important clients for sustainability rating agencies. In addition, two types of investors 
have joined more recently. An interviewee from an ESG ratings provider argued that 
the first type of investor strongly believes that ESG issues can drive returns, whereas 
the second type just needs “any number” for compliance.187 This categorisation fits 
well with the earlier interview statement about debate between the true (ESG) believers 
and those that just jump on the bandwagon (cf. last section).  
 The data demands of the true believers, who are frame sustainable finance in 
terms of risks and opportunities, differ from those of the adherents of the SRI frame. 
The SRI frame had been operationalised by making in- and exclusions based on the 
idiosyncratic ethical views of investors. Traditional ESG ratings with their thresholds 
and aggregate assessments are designed to cater to these investment strategies. They 
do, however, not fit easily with other approaches to sustainable finance. This is 
evidenced by investors’ complaints about the irrelevance of ESG metrics.  
 A 2016 report from ShareAction and the WWF found that half of the surveyed 
Swiss pension funds mentioned the lack of information as an obstacle to responsible 
investment. Given the wide range of available ESG information, the authors attributed 
investors’ complaints to the lack of reliable, complete and homogenous data (Hierzig 
 
186 On the description of ESG metrics see Interview, Researcher, Sustainability Agency.  





2016: 17, 36).188 More recently, Morgan Stanley and Bloomberg came to a similar 
conclusion when surveying 300 US asset managers. Accordingly, 70% of the 
respondents maintained that there were no standard industry metrics for sustainable 
investing (Morgan Stanley and Bloomberg 2019: 12).  
 The criticisms on the irrelevance of ESG ratings mirror the debate about 
financial materiality. As noted earlier, the FSB TCFD recommendations point out that 
companies should disclose material information on climate-related risks in their annual 
financial filings. Part of the motivation of this recommendation is to move the material 
ESG issue of climate change away from the supplementary “window dressing” 189 
sustainability reports to the more important annual financial filings.  
 Materiality assessments, which are driven by a risk and opportunity calculus, 
stand in conflict with earlier ESG assessments as they require different categories. A 
joint report by 2° investing, the World Resources Institute (WRI) and UNEP FI points 
out that there is a notable difference between the impact metrics of climate friendliness 
and measures of ‘carbon risk’. While the former emphasises the share of positive 
contributions of a portfolio (i.e. ESG impacts), the latter only looks at financial losses 
(i.e. financial materiality). A discrepancy between the two can occur when high carbon 
intensities do not contribute to enhanced risks. This can be the case when regulatory 
costs can be easily passed on to consumers. In another set of cases the high costs of 
fossil fuel production rather than their ‘dirtiness’ drives risk (Fulton and Weber 2015: 
15ff). On a more fundamental level, there is also a discrepancy between ESG scores 
and ESG risks, if regulatory developments rather than physical damages are the source 
 
188 A similar point was made by Dirk Schoenmaker (Rotterdam Business School), who highlighted the 
weak correlations between the metrics of different ESG providers for the same companies as well as 
their incompleteness, since they are only based on companies that report thus leaving out the worst 
performers and smaller entities. Cf. Notes Bruegel workshop: How to Speed Up Sustainable Finance?, 
Brussels: November 28th, 2018. 





of risk. This is because as long as policy changes like the pricing of externalities or the 
prohibition of certain economic activities are not forthcoming, the correlation between 
ESG scores and material losses remains inexistent (cf. Fulton and Weber 2015: 12).190  
 Apart from the selection of categories, the risks and opportunities frame alters 
the process of measurement itself. In- and exclusion strategies were served well by 
indices that set thresholds to determine what counts as responsible investment. By 
contrast, risk-based decision-making requires more granular and complete data. To 
measure the exposure of a bank’s balance sheet or an investor’s portfolio to a set of 
ESG risk factors, analysts need at best information on all risks for all assets. A large 
portfolio owner, who follows modern portfolio theory’s prescriptions about the 
benefits of diversification, requires greater amounts of data than a niche SR investor, 
who is concerned with the alignment to ethics. The latter investor is perfectly happy 
with a smaller investment universe, which would be a non-starter for the former. On 
the other hand, the risk-based investor can live very well with an asset that carries high 
ESG risks as long as there is a hedge. This, in turn, stands in stark contrast to the 
principled approach of SRI. As a consequence, the ESG rating approach of relying on 
publicly available data plus the rating agencies’ own research is no longer sufficient 
once the risk and opportunities frame becomes dominant.  
 The fact that risks and opportunities framing made the hitherto uncontentious 
SRI-way of measuring ESG issues problematic is illustrated by the debate about 
‘bottom-up’ versus ‘top-down’ metrics. Bottom-up refers to the traditional SRI method 
of attributing good or bad ESG indicators of projects and economic activities to 
companies and then to the securities that they issue. The bottom-up approach is also 
used by the watchdog CSOs that report on negative environmental impacts like the 
 





coal exposure of financial institutions (e.g. Kirsch et al. 2019; see also Dupré et al. 
2013). Notably, initiatives like the GRI, the FSB TCFD (cf. chapter 4), the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and the CDP can also be sorted to the 
bottom-up approach. This is because they equally rely on the disclosure of companies 
to assess ESG issues. The important difference between these initiatives and the ESG 
rating agencies is that the former aim for standardisation, whereas the latter offer tailor-
made, proprietary methodologies.  
 Despite these attempts for standardisation, the bottom-up approach still has 
problems with providing quick and inexpensive measurements of the exposure of all 
assets to all risks. The necessity to include all assets also leads to problems if 
corporates’ disclosure is deficient. Top-down approaches can remedy this. These 
measurements are often based on Input-Output models that assume a fixed relation 
between environmental inputs (i.e. resources) and outputs (i.e. pollutants and 
emissions) for a given sector or value chain (Dupré et al. 2013: 17; see also 
Goldhammer et al. 2017: 1165 for a literature review and Busch et al. 2018; IMF 2019: 
90ff on the correlations between different methodologies). Other model-based 
solutions are regressions that extrapolate from reported data to fill disclosure gaps 
(Dupré et al. 2013: 17ff).  
 Next to a full coverage, a risk-based understanding of sustainable finance needs 
a common yardstick to make potential investments commensurable. Thus, ‘objective’ 
indicators that can replace the idiosyncratic methodologies used by the sustainability 
rating agencies are required. Alongside with the changes in political and societal 
context, this requirement has contributed to the increasing centrality of climate and 
energy issues in sustainable finance that was observed in chapter 4. A report by the 





emissions are the most used and standardised ESG indicator (Raynaud 2015: 15). Yet 
while this is the case, researchers remain sceptical about GHG foot-printing as 
inconsistencies between datasets and methodologies persist despite conventions like 
the GHG protocol (Busch et al. 2018; Dragomir 2012).191 
 In light of the complications with measuring even something seemingly 
conventional as CO2 emissions, one might question whether the standardisation that is 
routinely demanded by risk motivated financial institutions can actually be driven by 
a convergence towards scientific accuracy. This might be especially questionable if 
investors just want ‘any number’ and are unwilling to pay for expensive measurement 
systems.192 And bearing in mind the question at the beginning of the chapter of how to 
invest in lowering inequality, the problem of standardising metrics gets even more 
problematic when it comes to non-climate ESG issues.  
 Furthermore, there might actually be an active resistance to informative and 
standardised metrics in some parts of the financial system. Indeed, the ‘any number’ 
category of investors prefer idiosyncratic ESG definitions. This preference does not 
reflect ethical considerations, which would imply that investors choose the metrics that 
align best with their values. Instead, financial institutions that are only interested in 
box-ticking engage in ‘ESG data shopping’. This means that they choose the provider, 
whose methodology emphasises the positive impact of their portfolio and downplays 
the negative categories.193 
 
191 On scepticism towards indicators see: Interview Franziska Schütze; See also Dirk Schoenmaker: 
Notes Bruegel workshop: How to speed up sustainable finance?, Brussels: November 28th, 2018. 
192 On investors’ reluctance to pay for data cf. comments by Rochus Mommatz (responsAbility 
Investments AG). Notes OECD 5th Forum on Green Finance and Investment, Paris: November 13th, 
2018. 
193 For a reflection on ESG shopping cf.  “Poor scores: Climate change has made ESG a force in 
investing” Economist, December 7th, 2019. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-






 Even if the standardisation of financially material ESG data was to occur, one 
still can doubt of how ‘scientific’ such a process would be. Echoing previous episodes 
in the development of financial measures (cf. de Goede 2005), the process of 
consolidation that is currently going on in the field of ESG metrics is much more 
profane than one would imagine. The consolidation that is happening appears to be not 
about the convergence of metrics through scientific discussion but about market 
consolidation, i.e. mergers and acquisitions. In April 2019, the rating agency Moody’s 
bought the French ESG provider Vigeo Eiris. This is only the most recent episode of 
a buy-out frenzy of ESG firms, where International Shareholder Service acquired the 
German ESG firm oekom as well as the emissions data provider South Pole Group. 
Meanwhile, S&P bought Trucost and Morningstar holds a 40% stake in Sustainalytics 
since 2017, which it will increase to 100% by 2022. Lastly, more quantitatively 
oriented ESG start-ups have undergone the same process of consolidation. Carbon 
Delta, which is home to the commercial application of climate VaR, was bought by 
the index provider MSCI. Meanwhile, the Co-firm, a provider of scenarios for climate 
risks and opportunities scenarios, was acquired by the global auditor Price Waterhouse 
Coopers.  
 Notably, this process of consolidation has affected the first generation of SRI-
inspired ESG data providers (Vigeo Eiris, Sustainalytics, oekom), the second 
generation that complemented this data with top-down modelling (Trucost, South Pole 
Group) and an emerging third generation that provides quantitative and 
computationally sophisticated (e.g. involving AI or geospatial data) modelling 





standardised way seem to be happy, ESG providers are worried about the loss of 
diversity.194 
 In summary, an evolution of ESG metrics and indicators has occurred as a shift 
from the SRI to the risks and opportunities frame meant that the demand for in-depth 
company assessments was replaced by demand for granular data on all existing assets. 
This has favoured the role of easy to comprehend, quantitative metrics like GHG 
emissions over more complex and political issues like workers’ rights or gender 
equality. At the same time, more idiosyncratic metrics seem to be able to survive as 
they still cater to existing SRI funds as well as to investors that engage in ESG data 
shopping to boost their sustainable credentials. Finally, investors’ appetite for 
convergence might not result in a move towards the most scientifically sound metrics, 
but in the survival of the metric provider that fares best in the process of market 
consolidation. 
 
From ‘Fluffy’ to ‘Rock-Solid’: Risk Factors 
The idea that environmental issues carry some sort of risk is not particularly new. 
Insurers contemplated climate-related risks already in the 1990s (Paterson 2001). 
Furthermore, after the corporate debacle of Enron and the boycotts following scandals 
from oil majors Exxon and Shell in the same decade, CSR experts emphasised the 
relevance of reputational risks.195 Yet these risks failed to get sustained attention from 
 
194 Jennifer Thompson, “ESG rating agencies fulfil the need for knowhow”, Financial Times, May 
12th, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/2cd37df8-a973-3f94-b498-09ee1a6ba53b, Accessed June 13th, 
2019. 
195 Interview European Commission Official: According to the interviewee, “social” reputational risks 
from mass layoffs (e.g. due to plant closure) were also prominently discussed as a reputational risk; 
something that has completely disappeared in the evolution of the debate. However, increased scrutiny 
of how firms treat their employees during and after the ongoing COVID 19 pandemic seems to 
suggest that attention to these factors might make a comeback. Cf. Gillian Tett et al. “Coronavirus 





corporates and financial institutions. While climate-related risks were explored at the 
time, they did not make it into the day-to-day financial decision making of insurers 
(Paterson 2001: 27). Reputational risks, meanwhile, were relegated to relatively 
powerless CSR departments. 
 The recent resurgence of a reputational risk narrative, which emphasises the 
changing demands from Millennial investors and employees (cf. chapter 4), 
notwithstanding, reputational risks have so far failed to generate lasting impact. As 
opposed to the ‘real’, financial risks, ESG issues appeared to be ‘fluffy’. But what 
makes risk factors either real or fluffy? The performativity answer to this question is 
that it is not the true nature of the risks but the (non-) existence of an ideational 
infrastructure that makes all the difference.  
 Risk factors become only real, if there are stable concepts that delineate them 
from other specific and residual risks and if there are conventions on how to assess 
them (cf. Allan 2017; de Goede 2005). One might, for example, ask how real credit 
risk would be, if its delineation from market risk was withdrawn, if conventional 
analysis techniques like looking at credit history and collateral values were put into 
question and if the material infrastructure of credit rating agencies ceased to exist. Far 
from being an exclusive concern of performativity researchers, such questions of 
definition and delineation matter greatly for investors. A report by the GPIF and the 
World Bank on sustainability in bond markets summarises these concerns and points 
out that “There is still little understanding and consistency about how ESG “factors” 
relate to the established factors in asset pricing models, such as value/growth, size, 
liquidity” (Inderst and Stewart 2018: 20).  
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 The risks and opportunities frame is quite intuitively most relevant for the 
stabilisation of risk factors. In chapter 4, I argued that while the overall diagnostic and 
prognostic framing concerning risks and opportunities remained the same, the issues 
that are supposed to constitute risks and opportunities as well as the corresponding 
definitions changed markedly. The significance of these changes is thus less 
observable at the level of the debates, which are characterised by positions informed 
by different frames, but matters all the more for the design of socio-technical 
instruments.  
 One of the most significant variations within the risk and opportunities frame 
is that after the failure of reputational risks to lead to much change, the stranded assets 
concept gave rise to a new research programme. The emphasis on social and political 
changes in the transition towards a sustainable, low-carbon economy meant that the 
stranded assets argument was soon sorted into the category of ‘transition risks’. These 
are also known as non-physical risks (e.g. Fulton and Weber 2015: 6) and as such 
different from the physical risks that estimate the impact of climate change on financial 
assets. The constituent factors of transition and physical risks were already present 
before they received these names. Possible litigation costs, technological change and 
shifts in consumer preferences were to become transition risks, whereas losses from 
floods, droughts and other natural disasters would be categorised as physical risks (e.g. 
Caldecott and McDaniels 2014: 10; Dupré et al. 2013: 12 for a description of these 
subcategories prior to the categorisation).   
 The stabilisation of risk factors into the two overarching categories occurred 
from 2015 onwards. Interviewees have pointed out the importance of the PRA’s 
differentiation between physical risks, transition risks and liability risks that Mark 





actors were educated to think along the same lines (cf. chapter 4).196 While it is unlikely 
that the PRA was all-powerful in popularising these concepts, it is true that transition 
and physical risks became widely used afterwards.  
 To operationalise the two overreaching concepts, a couple of subcategories 
have been proposed. For transition risks, these include policy and legal factors (i.e. 
liability risk), technological factors, market and economic factors and reputational 
factors. Physical risks, on the other hand, are often decomposed into an acute (e.g. 
extreme weather events) and a chronic (e.g. persistent change of average temperature 
or sea level rise) dimension (cf. Clapp et al. 2017; FSB TCFD 2017: 5ff; Fulton and 
Weber 2015: 8). Most recently, the NGFS has gone beyond simple categorisations and 
proposed transmission mechanisms that connect physical and transition risks with the 
real economy and the financial system (NGFS 2019a: 13-17).  
 The indicators for measuring the subcategories of physical and transition risks 
usually come from the ESG data providers discussed in the previous subsection. Data 
on GHG emissions is amongst the most prominent inputs for assessing transition risks. 
The FSB TCFD recommends the use of emissions normalised by AUM – the so called 
carbon intensity – as a transition risk indicator. While widely used (see also TEG 
2019a), those arguing from a financial materiality perspective have criticised carbon 
intensity for its inconsistency and the failure to correlate with financial losses (Weber 
et al. 2017b).  
 Physical risks, on the other hand, are quantified by matching global or regional 
climatological models to financial assets (e.g. Ambachtseheer et al. 2015; Clapp et al. 
2017 EIU 2016; Reid et al. 2019). One example of this technique would be the 
 
196 I 17 (confidential), Interview Former central bank official, Western Europe. Liability risks were 





assessment of projected losses on real estate that is exposed to a changing climate. 
Insurance companies have traditionally carried out such assessments in-house. The 
arrival of the last generation of quantitatively sophisticated ESG data providers (see 
last subsection) might mean that this expertise is no longer the exclusive domain of 
insurers and their regulators.  
 The remaining dimensions of transition risk like litigation, technological 
change and preferences shifts are least developed when it comes to standardised 
quantitative indicators. Their understanding remains to date based on case studies, 
projections of trends and narrative arguments (cf. Baker et al. 2017; PRA 2018).  
 Finally, the NGFS and some of its member organisations have argued that 
climate-related risks are distinct from other systemic risks. This is because of their far-
reaching impacts, irreversibility, foreseeable nature and dependence on short-term 
actions (NGFS 2019a: 12, see chapter 5). This understanding also has implications for 
the choice of measurements. The first NGFS report notes that the development of 
adequate data, models and “intellectual capacity” is still work in progress (NGFS 
2019a: 29ff). This notwithstanding, NGFS members have developed micro-financial 
assessments of climate-related risks to size the exposure of financial institutions 
(NGFS 2019a: 24-25). 
 In addition, the NGFS has started to explore more ‘unorthodox’ economic 
models like Stock-Flow-Consistent models, Input-Output models and network 
contagion models to map potential transmission channels (NGFS 2019b). Notably, 
these techniques are more closely associated with the evolutionary systems paradigm 
explored in chapter 5. Yet another risk assessment tool from the NGFS is a 2x2 





in meeting the below 2° target. The four categories of this typology will be used to 
come up with scenarios that estimate macro-financial risks (NGFS 2019a: 21).  
 One factor that is common to transition and physical risks is that they have to 
be financially material. While there is some overlay with indicators that focus on the 
contribution of financial instruments to environmental and social impacts (see also 
section 2 on double materiality), the designation of risk is reserved for (projected) 
financial losses. The relation of risk factors to the financial materiality position should 
come as no surprise since both are associated with the risks and opportunities frame. 
The capability of the different risk factors to connect with the procedures and 
definitions that financial institutions and regulators identify as material is also likely 
to have contributed to the ‘success’ of transition and physical risks compared to the 
relative ‘failure’ of reputational risks.  
 In summary, the development of risk factors has not seen a great deal of 
antagonism between the different frames. Instead, different approaches have remained 
within a broad acceptance of the risks and opportunities frame. Inside of this frame, 
transition and physical risk factors were stabilised through more consensual definitions 
and the support of regulators like the PRA. Nonetheless, a cleavage concerning the 
understanding of risk factors can be detected when assessing them in terms of the 
academic paradigms. On the one hand, the establishment of transition and physical 
risks as another factor alongside traditional categories like currency risk fits well with 
modern financial theory. The same goes for socio-technical instruments like climate 
VaR models, which use techniques and concepts like discounting and diversification 
to calculate risks and opportunities. On the other hand, the introduction of forward-
looking scenarios and the systemic understanding of risks point towards a perspective 





Shades of Green and Brown: Taxonomies 
Taxonomies are lists that answer the question of what is green or brown. By doing so, 
they black-box fundamental choices about the goals and the assumed causal 
mechanisms of sustainable finance. The indicators that are used to gauge contributions 
to green objectives privilege some aims at the possible expense of others. The inclusion 
of certain issues, even if based on reasons of political expediency or the availability of 
data and not on scientific merit, stabilises the assumption that they matter most for 
sustainability. Taxonomies’ emphasis on contributions to sustainability already 
indicates that this kind of socio-technical instrument is geared to the measurement of 
non-financial ESG impacts (see previous section).  
 The EU’s taxonomy of green economic activities (EC 2018b) is the most 
comprehensive of its kind so far. Furthermore, it is expected to be the base for the 
Commission’s future actions. This has meant that it is sometimes presented as the 
“grammar” of sustainable finance.197 To assist with the operationalisation, the 
Commission has established a Technical Expert Group (TEG) of 35 experts from 
academia, industry and civil society (TEG 2019a: 17).  
 As it marks the first comprehensive attempt to define greenness, the 
Commission emphasises the taxonomy’s centrality. At the same time, financial 
institutions and regulators take great interest in its development (cf. NGFS 2019a: 34; 
Villeroy de Galhau 2019: 10).198 This might sound surprising since these latter actors 
care more about financially material risks than about ESG impact. It, however, 
illustrates that the separation between the two concepts and more markedly the 
 
197Olivier Guersent (DG FISMA) OECD 2018; Mario Nava (DG FISMA). Notes OECD 6th Forum on 
Green Finance and Investment, Paris: October 29th, 2019. 
198 Interview I 17 (confidential); Edmund Lakin (HSBC). Notes Bruegel workshop: How to speed up 
sustainable finance? Brussels: November 28th, 2018.; Olivier Guersent. Notes OECD 6th Forum on 





indicators that measure them is less crisp than the discussants in the debates would 
like. This notwithstanding, some members of the expert community have been 
sceptical about the central position that the EU awards to the taxonomy, because it 
integrates poorly with risks and opportunities considerations (see also below this 
subsection).199 
 The prioritisation that taxonomies award to ESG impact metrics can be better 
understood by looking at the actors that have pioneered their use. The Commission’s 
initiative is not the first attempt to classify green economic activities. When the first 
actors ventured into the terrain of definitions the stakes were, however, somewhat 
lower. The existing taxonomies are the CBI’s Climate Bonds Standard, first developed 
in 2010, the Green Bonds Principles from the International Capital Markets 
Association (ICMA) (2014), the Multilateral Development Banks’ and International 
Development Finance Club’s Common Principles for Climate Change Mitigation 
Finance Tracking (2015) and the Green Finance Committee of China Society for 
Finance and Banking’s Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue (2015). These 
initiatives set out eligibility criteria and assessment procedures that confer green labels 
on bonds. 
 While the taxonomies differ, the EIB and the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) 
have developed a self-described “Rosetta Stone” document that translates between the 
different frameworks. Table 6.1 describes the generic build-up of the existing 
taxonomies (cf. EIB and PBoC 2017). Depending on the scheme, financial instruments 
that provide funding for sectors that contribute to one or more of the policy objectives 
can be considered green.  
 























































… … … … … 
Sector 
A.2 
… … … … … … 
Table 6.1 Universal Taxonomy Reproduced from EIB and PBoC 2017: Annex II 
 As can be seen in table 6.1, all taxonomies take the sector and not the individual 
company as their unit of analysis. In their review, the EIB and the PBoC find that some 
taxonomies have a broader environmental scope, while others are exclusively targeted 
to climate mitigation and adaptation (EIB and PBoC 2017: 5). A corollary to this is 
that none of the existing frameworks incorporates the social dimension of ESG. While 
this lacuna was addressed by the ICMA’s Social Bond Principles (2017), human and 
workers’ rights organisations have lamented the exclusion of the social dimension.200  
 The TEG’s taxonomy builds on earlier attempts that are aimed at estimating 
the impact of sustainable financial instruments like green bonds. Before the TEG was 
convened, DG CLIMA had already commissioned a study for the HLEG that reviewed 
existing taxonomies and definitions of greenness. The commissioned study echoes the 
universal taxonomy of table 6.1 as it suggests a sector-based approach (Kahlenborn et 
al. 2017: 44ff). The significant involvement of the EIB and the CBI in the formulation 
 





of the taxonomy (cf. TEG 2019a: 8-9, 20) also meant that the final shape of the 414 
pages long taxonomy document reflects earlier initiatives. 
 After specifying relevant economic activities, taxonomies classify their 
greenness in a binary or continuous manner. This is achieved by establishing minimum 
quantitative thresholds (e.g. tons of CO2 equivalent emitted per ton of cement 
produced), specifying the adoption of  low-carbon practices (e.g. manure management 
for livestock farming) or singling out the production of certain products (e.g. insulating 
windows) (cf. TEG 2019a: Annex F for the examples). In the case of the TEG, the data 
for the respective assessments should at best come from company disclosures that are 
in line with the taxonomy. However, the TEG notes – in accordance with what was 
argued in the subsection on ESG metrics – that even GHG disclosure is deficient and 
that currently 80% of the data has to be obtained via estimation methods (TEG 2019a: 
72).   
 An innovation of the TEG is that in order to comply with the taxonomy, the 
economic activity in question must demonstrate that it does not jeopardise five other 
environmental objectives as well as social safeguards (TEG 2019a: 64-65). This do-
no-significant-harm (DNSH) clause is carried over from the DG CLIMA study 
(Kahlenborn et al. 2017: 44) and the regulatory proposal. The DNSH has notably led 
to the categorical exclusion of nuclear energy and waste incineration as these activities 
jeopardise the reduction of pollution and the promotion of the circular economy 
respectively (TEG 2019a: 235, 293). In addition, the TEG excludes economic activities 
that offer short-term reductions in emissions, but lock-in long-term high-carbon 
trajectories as in the case of making fossil fuel extraction infrastructure more energy 





 One major point of contestation for the taxonomies is the tension between 
‘scientific’ merit and ‘political’ influence. A case in point is the Chinese green bond 
framework, which allows for green bonds proceeds to be mobilised for the “clean 
utilisation of coal”. Clean coal refers to the capture of methane emissions from coal 
mining and the reduction of pollutants through the ‘washing’ of coal prior to 
combustion (EIB and PBoC 2017: Annex III). Since the burning of coal without 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is considered to be inconsistent with the below 2° 
target (section 2, see also next subsection), non-Chinese observers have described 
these ‘technical criteria’ as an obvious political choice.201  
 Yet also Europe is not immune to such tensions between industry interests and 
scientific targets. One interviewee recounts an episode in the European Parliament, 
where the choice to exclude fossil fuel companies but not aviation from the proposed 
sustainable investing benchmarks was achieved through a kind of horse trade.202 
Moreover, the exclusion of nuclear energy and unabated gas electrical utilities from 
the TEG’s initial proposal attracted opposition from several member states (notably 
France for nuclear and the Germany and Poland for gas). The proposal from the TEG 
also received a record number of industry feedback. Both industry associations and 
individual firms submitted criticisms of the taxonomy.203  
 Notably, industry engagement with the taxonomy was not confined to Europe 
with a particularly scorching critique coming from the Japanese Business Association. 
One of the association’s members criticised the ambitious thresholds of the taxonomy 
by likening it to the “Darth Vader of green finance” because in his opinion just as the 
 
201 Philippe Zaouati (Mirova, HLEG member). Notes EU Public Hearing: Sustainable finance, 
Publication of the HLEG interim report, Brussels: July 18th, 2017. 
202 Interview MEP Greens/EFA. 
203 Cf. Notes EU Public Hearing: A global approach to sustainable finance, Brussels: March 21st, 
2019; Notes EU stakeholder dialogue: progress and outcomes of the technical expert group’s work on 





Star Wars villain represents the dark side of the force, the list was also “dark green”.204  
Following these attacks from member states and industry, the final compromise 
reached by negotiators in the trilogue in December 2019 smoothened the taxonomy’s 
wording slightly.205 And while early commentators have interpreted those changes as 
minor language issues that will e.g. not lead to the inclusion of gas and nuclear as 
eligible projects206, one might interpret these moves as pre-emptive maneuverers that 
will potentially harden the application of the taxonomy to issues that go beyond the 
narrow focus of providing a standard for green bonds.   
 The focus on green bonds, the involvement of actors like the development 
banks and the CBI and the importance of ESG impact criteria already indicate that the 
climate finance frame is most closely related to taxonomies. This relatively 
unambiguous association changed, however, with the EU taxonomy. This taxonomy 
is envisioned as a building block that enables green bond labelling, which is in line 
with the legacy from the climate finance frame. However, the taxonomy might also 
serve as basis for the potential assignment of risk weights to existing assets and the 
update of capital requirements by regulators. This latter intended use is, in turn, much 
closer to the risks and opportunities frame. The conflicting position between these two 
frames has meant that the TEG’s output has become the source of criticism that goes 
beyond the material interests of affected industries.  
 One line of criticism has taken aim at the fact that the legacy of earlier 
taxonomies as well as the narrow mandate of the TEG meant that it is focused on 
defining a niche and not on changing the bulk of the financial system. 2° investing 
 
204 Satoshi Ikeda (Japanese Financial Services Agency). Notes OECD 6th Forum on Green Finance 
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argued that that the application of impact-based metrics ends up promoting niche 
financial products that are exposed to environmentally friendly economic activities. 
When applied to the capital markets, such policies fail on their own terms since the 
promotion of the corresponding financial products does not necessarily translate in 
environmental impact. This is because there is no direct transmission mechanism 
between companies’ funding and their investment decisions (cf. Dupré and Felmer 
Roa 2019). This criticism emphasises the pitfalls of equating exposure to green 
activities with the increase of said activities.  
 A related criticism is that the project focused methods of the climate finance 
frame that measure the positive impact of new assets cannot be applied to equity and 
corporate bond markets. This is because in the former case money flows from investors 
to issuers, which, indeed, translates to capital expenditure for positive impacts. On the 
capital markets, by contrast, money flows mostly between financial institutions. 
Hence, equating the purchase of existing green financial assets with positive impact is 
misleading (Dupré and Felmer Roa 2019: 10). Proponents of this line of argument 
suggest separating the instruments of sustainable finance according to the context. 
While a green taxonomy makes sense for measuring the positive impact of new assets, 
it cannot be applied to reallocate funds on the capital markets. Here, risk-based 
measures are better suited.207 
 This understanding of a separation of instruments is not shared by all of those 
who criticise the inability of a green taxonomy to address misallocation of funds in the 
capital markets. While CSOs such as Finance Watch share the assessment that the 
construction of an additional green economy (climate finance of new assets) on top of 
 






a fossil fuel based economy is meaningless, their preferred solution is a brown 
taxonomy that measures the negative impact of existing assets (Finance Watch 
2018208). This is in line with the critical frame’s emphasis on negative ESG impacts 
that was described in the previous section.  
 Yet for the time being, a brown taxonomy at the EU level remains an elusive 
endeavour. One reason for its absence is the existence of veto players and vested 
interests, which would have made the formulation of a brown taxonomy a time 
intensive and politically challenging matter.209 The flipside to this is that while veto-
players want to block the brown taxonomy, players from the climate finance 
community have a material interest in making the green taxonomy happen.210 Apart 
from these interests there is also path dependency. The TEG had to start with 
something that already existed. Yet what existed were green taxonomies, whose initial 
purpose was to provide criteria for green bonds. As these taxonomies are upgraded as 
inputs to instruments like benchmarks, capital requirements or even monetary policy, 
their role becomes more ambiguous as they enter territories that display by far and 
large a risks and opportunities framing.   
 This subsection highlighted that taxonomies are socio-technical instruments 
that were developed inside the climate finance frame, where actors use them to define 
and promote the green bond niche. The indicators and definitions that underlie these 
taxonomies are not necessarily the outcome of scientific scrutiny and public 
deliberation. This is because priorities of policymakers and industry are sometimes 
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reflected in the ‘technicalities’. As taxonomies move into other parts of sustainable 
finance, path dependencies such as the focus on sectors are retained. However, the 
contact with other frames, notably the risks and opportunities frame, has meant that 
the TEG’s taxonomy displays inconsistencies, which, in turn, have led to repeated 
criticisms.  
 
Locking-in the Future: Scenarios  
In chapter 5, I have attributed the rise of scenario analysis to the evolutionary systems 
paradigm and to one of the later variations of the risks and opportunities frame. 
Scenarios are higher order instruments that interact with ESG metrics, risk factors and 
taxonomies. Scenarios like the climate VaR, CISL’s unhedgeable risk (2015), 
Battiston et al.’s (2017) carbon stress test, the Mercer reports and the DNB’s 
Waterproof? (2017) study take physical and transition risks and translate them into 
numerical estimates of losses, gains and exposures. ‘Alignment scenarios’, on the other 
hand, come up with a number that measures how close investors are to the financing 
of ‘science-based targets’211 like the Paris Agreement (Höhne et al. 2015; Thomä et al. 
2017; Weber et al. 2017a).  
 The first category of scenarios integrates subcategories of risks and estimation 
methods to link natural kinds to financial measures. Some scenarios (e.g. climate VaR, 
Mercer) also reproduce standard procedures from modern financial theory. This 
happens inter alia through the use of discount rates and a well-diversified reference 
portfolio. Scenarios on physical risk also incorporate and thus stabilise the relations 
between climate pathways and damages e.g. via an IAM (cf. chapter 5).  
 





 Alignment scenarios take a different route, which is associated with the 
emphasis on systemic risks (and opportunities). The concept of alignment has been 
championed by the UNFCCC since the Paris CoP with one participant referring to the 
CoP 24 in Kattowice as an “Alignment CoP”.212  In this reading, alignment refers to 
translating the below 2° goal to the level of an individual financial institution. The 
basic idea behind alignment is to compare the investments and divestments that are 
needed for a transition with the actual practices of financial institutions.  
 The translation of the discourse of alignment to the technical level of scenarios 
is carried out by developing explicit assumptions about how the transition will happen. 
One scenario model is the Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment (PACTA), 
which has been developed by an EU funded consortium comprising amongst others 2° 
investing, the PRI (UNEP FI), CDP, WWF Germany and the CBI. This work has also 
fed into the ISO Standard 14097 (under development), which aims to assess climate 
alignment of financial portfolios (cf. Thomä et al. 2017: 13). The “Climate Transition” 
and “Paris-Aligned” benchmarks for equities and bonds that are developed by a 
subgroup of the TEG follow a similar logic (EC 2018c; TEG 2019b).  
 While coming from actors inside the risks and opportunities frame, portfolio 
alignment scenarios are different from forward-looking risk scenarios in two ways. 
First, their modelling is agnostic about future financial gains and losses of assets. The 
scenario also measures the exposure of a financial portfolio to emissions. Yet the 
emphasis is not on risk but on whether overall capital investments are consistent with 
a below 2° pathway. This approach thus builds on non-financial metrics of positive 
impact but expands them insofar as it addresses the problematic situation, where 
 





investments constitute an improvement over no action but are insufficient to meet e.g. 
the Paris goals (Höhne et al. 2015).  
 There are many alternatives to operationalise alignment (cf. TEG 2019b: 48ff). 
One way is to compare the physical investments that are needed according to a 
transition roadmap with the investment plans of the companies held by the financial 
institution. The resulting metric measures the consistency between investments in e.g. 
renewable energy, cement production or transport and the pathway. An important 
difference to risk scenarios is that the output is expressed in degrees Celsius and not 
in a financial metric. Risk is thus black-boxed by the implicit assumption that e.g. the 
alignment with a 6° scenario is risky (cf. Thomä et al. 2017: 10). The assumption that 
6° of warming translates to high risks sounds logical, given the grim projections of the 
IPCC. Expressing alignment in degrees rather than in money terms is also a way to 
circumvent the question of financial materiality and bring the risks and opportunities 
frame’s preoccupation with existing assets together with the focus on both positive and 
negative ESG (read climate in this case) impacts. As such, the alignment approach 
prevents the possibility that the lack of externality pricing, regional inequalities in the 
valuation of impacted assets and financial theory assumptions about growth, 
discounting and diversification might lead to a result where environmental risks are 
not financially material.  
 Apart from black-boxing an affirmative answer to the question whether 
anything that is not Paris-aligned is risky, alignment scenarios also black-box the 
transition pathways. This means that scenarios require data about the allocation of 
future emissions to different sectors as well as about technological developments. Most 
frequently, this kind of data comes from transition models, which combine 





technological trends. The most widely used of these transition models is the annually 
updated World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA 2017; 
cf. Thomä et al. 2017: 9).  
 The assumptions about technological development and energy consumption 
patterns of the IEA have been challenged by Greenpeace for being unrealistic and not 
in line with the below 2° target. This is amongst others, because the 2° consistent IEA 
scenario refers to the IPCC’s 50% probability pathway of 2° warming (instead of the 
66% one) and makes generous assumptions about the deployment of untested CCS and 
carbon removal technologies (Muttit 2017: 17). The BIS working paper that was 
introduced in the last chapter also notes that assumptions about CCS can lead to 
variations in the estimation of stranded assets in scenarios (Bolton et al. 2020: 25).  
 From a de-growth perspective it is noteworthy that the IEA energy model 
assumes an annual average GDP growth of 3.4% even though demand reductions in 
certain sectors like steel and aviation are included (IEA 2017: 13). The efforts that 
have gone into contesting the IEA scenarios might be interpreted as a testimony of 
how important alignment scenarios will become in the future. This is also illustrated 
by a call of “60 business leaders, scientists and investors” for a new transition scenario 
that is consistent with the 1.5° target, which the IPCC advocated for in its latest 
report.213 In reaction to these demands, the IEA has come up with a 1.5° scenario for 
the 2019 World Energy Outlook. As Sean Kidney from the CBI mentioned at one 
forum, the full publication of the scenario was, however, blocked by the United 
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States.214 Meanwhile, the TEG has also recommended the use of the IPCC’s 1.5° 
scenario for its indices, citing the precautionary principle as justification (TEG 2019b: 
44). 
 Sophisticated scenario analysis is not yet widely used. It is, however, an 
instrument that has been gaining traction over the last period. The FSB TCFD 
recommends scenario analysis for corporates and financial institutions. NGFS 
members have also shown interest in scenarios for micro- and macro-financial 
analysis. The central banks or regulators of the UK, France, Denmark and the 
Netherlands have either already applied or are in the process of applying climate 
scenario analysis to their assessment of financial stability (cf. chapter 4, see also 
Danmarks Nationalbank 2019). French and British financial institutions are expected 
to come up with scenario-based stress tests as part of their reporting to regulators (see 
chapter 4). In addition, the EU’s transition and Paris-aligned benchmarks will build on 
alignment scenarios. Finally, scenarios interact with other instruments like ESG 
metrics and taxonomies. If these instruments need to be made ‘dynamic’, i.e. being 
able to project forward-looking developments of sectors and technologies, they require 
explicit assumptions about the future.  
 This subsection has revisited the characteristics of scenarios. Many scenarios 
are sophisticated projections of the risks and opportunities framing that black-box 
concepts from financial theory as well as potentially problematic ESG indicators. 
Alignment scenarios, on the other hand, foreground ESG impacts, which are taken as 
a longer-term proxy for systemic risks and offer a potential way to relegate risk 
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considerations that are based on the predicaments of modern financial theory to a 
secondary place. Instead of risk factors and financial calculations, these scenarios 
black-box assumptions about technological and societal developments.  
 
Asking the System Question: Performance Measures for the Financial System 
The last set of metrics moves in the opposite direction of the quest for ever more 
granular data. Instead of financial assets, the proponents of financial system 
performance measures take nothing less than finance itself as their unit of analysis. 
These metrics start from the assumption that the financial system is embedded in a 
wider system of systems. This embeddedness means that judgements about the state 
of finance cannot be made in a self-referential way (see chapter 5). Instead, the 
financial system’s health is assessed by looking at its impact on environmental and 
social systems. This functional view of finance echoes the narrative of finance being 
‘the servant rather than the master’ that has gained some traction in the aftermath of 
the GFC (cf. Baker 2015: 352).  
 The proposed metrics are amongst others finance’s efficacy and efficiency to 
provide the money needed for environmental and social purposes (UNEP Inquiry 
2016). In addition, measures such as resilience to crises, diversity of financial 
institutions (e.g. cooperative banks, sectoral banks, universal commercial banks, …), 
the ratio of financing provided to the real economy and the minimisation of funds 
towards the fossil fuel industry have been suggested (Berry et al. 2018: 48-49, Finance 
Watch: Dashboard 2019215; Turbeville 2016; UNEP Inquiry 2016).  
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 The reasoning behind these metrics reflects the critical frame and the 
evolutionary systems paradigm. Moreover, performance metrics implicitly take a 
stance on the transformative finance vs. real economy focus debate. By 
conceptualising finance as a proper system rather than as an appendix they convey that 
changes inside of finance can be transformational.  
 Apart from UNEP Inquiry, the main proponents of this view are CSOs like the 
nef, Finance Watch, Positive Money, and the Finance Innovation Lab. The system 
focus might make performance metrics also interesting for central bankers and 
regulators. This is so far, however, only partially the case. One interviewee, who 
interacts with this community, remarked that the question of whether finance as a 
system is detrimental to sustainability would be interesting. However, she was not 
aware of any current efforts to answer said question.216  
 For the moment, it seems that NGFS members are only willing to concern 
themselves with the dimensions of sustainability that can be translated into systemic 
risks. They, however, shun measurements that benchmark finance against political 
goals. Regulators and central banks’ intermediate positioning on their contribution to 
societal goals is challenged from both sides. In a recent debate that was conducted on 
the pages of the Guardian and the FT’s Alphaville, Positive Money representatives and 
former BoE staffer Tony Yates expressed opposing arguments on the scope and 
political nature of the BoE’s mandate.217 
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 When it comes to policy proposals, the HLEG’s and EC’s demand for the ESAs 
to research systemic problems with short-termism might be a place into which socio-
technical instruments that measure the performance of the financial system can be 
integrated. Yet, whereas the HLEG has publicly questioned the usefulness of self-
referential measures of financial health like the liquidity and tradability of assets, 
neither the HLEG nor the Commission have so far suggested alternative, system-wide 
metrics.218  
 In summary, system performance measures are instruments that enable critics 
of finance to gauge the functionality of the financial system. This functionality is 
assessed by looking at the positive and negative impacts that finance has on social and 
environmental systems. System output measures have been developed by CSOs and 
IOs to inform policy makers and regulators. So far, they have, however, not been 
incorporated by this target audience into regulatory processes.  
 
6.4 Bringing it All Together: Frames, Academic Paradigms and Transmission 
Channels  
In the previous two sections, I revisited the persuasive and performative transmission 
channels through which frames and academic paradigms influence the governance of 
sustainable finance. I explored how actors that are bound together by a common frame 
create debate positions and socio-technical instruments. In accordance with the 
transmission mechanism developed in chapter 2, I expected that frames provide the 
background for the positioning of actors and, hence, the cleavages in the four debates 
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that repeatedly flare up in sustainable finance. In addition, I outlined the hypothesis 
that in immature policy subsystems the performative channel would be stronger and 
more politicised. 
 In the forgoing sections, I have shown that the first conjecture concerning the 
attribution of debate positions to frames does not find strong support from the data. 
Table 6.2 summarises the four debates that I revisited by assigning a (+) and a (-) sign 
to the debate positions and then matching the frames to the positions in columns 2 and 
3. The table shows that the only debate that is clearly structured around competing 
frames is the one on financial materiality vs. ESG impacts. On the (+) side, actors from 
the climate finance frame want to discuss the positive impacts of new financial 
instruments and the adherents of the critical frame emphasise the negative impacts of 
already existing investments. The risks and opportunities frame, by contrast, occupies 
the (-) side and rejects the relevance of ESG issues that cannot be expressed in financial 
terms.  
 The remaining three debates all feature the risks and opportunities frame on 
either side. This indicates that those debates are to a certain extent internal to this frame 
and that the proponents of other frames engage with these debates by joining a side. 
Given the central position of the risks and opportunities frame over the whole period 
(cf. chapter 4), the centrality of such intra-frame debates seems plausible. In other 
words, the framing that sustainable finance is about risks and opportunities seems 
relatively unchallenged and the main question is how risks and opportunities are best 
understood.  
 The presence of the risks and opportunities frame on both sides of the three 
internal debates does not mean that each position is supported by an equal number of 





of new positions. In table 6.2, I re-arranged the (+) and (-) signs so that the second 
column roughly reflects the status quo view of finance, whereas the third column is 
associated with a perspective that challenges the financial system. Column 2 is also 
closer to modern financial theory, while column 3 is proximate to the evolutionary 
systems paradigm.  
 It is no great surprise that the critical frame can be found in the column that 
represents the challenger position. When it comes to the double positioning of the risks 
and opportunities frame, it is noteworthy that the positions aligned with the challenger 
view are all of more recent nature. In the ESG – performance debate the traditional 
position was that the inclusion of ESG issues limits the room for selecting on the ‘real’ 
risks and opportunities categories. The more recent position that is advocated by the 
‘true believer’ financial actors, by contrast, suggests that ESG is one of those real 
categories. In the engagement vs. divestment debate most mainstream financial 
institutions take the side of engagement. On the other hand, the civil society actors that 
advocate for divestment have also employed a risk framing that emphasises that 
financial institutions are failing at risk minimisation.  
 The transformative finance vs. real economy focus debate is characterised by 
the opposing views on how the financial system relates to risks and opportunities. The 
real economy focus position highlights the financial system’s role in pricing risks and 
opportunities in an equilibrium economy. The transformative finance position, on the 
other hand, argues that the behaviour of the financial system today contributes to 
materialisation of risks and opportunities tomorrow. This cleavage corresponds to the 
differences between the academic paradigms of modern financial theory and 
evolutionary systems. As such, it does not fit with the transmission mechanism that 





can be explained by looking at the institutional site, where this debate is most 
prominent. As outlined above, the interlocutors of the transformative finance vs. real 
economy focus debate are central bankers and regulators as well as business and civil 
society actors that address the former two groups. Therefore, the absence of the 
intermediary step of framing might be explained by the scientisation of this 
community.  
 
Debate Frames (+) Frames (-) 
ESG – performance trade-off:  






Risk and opportunities 
(+): Financial materiality   
(-):  ESG impact  
Risks and 
opportunities 
Climate finance (positive 
impacts), Critical 
(negative impacts)  





Critical, Risks and 
opportunities 
(minimisation)  
(+): Real economy focus 
(-): Transformative finance 
Risks and 
opportunities 
Risks and opportunities 
(systemic), Climate 
finance, Critical 
Table 6.2 Frames’ Relation to Debate Positions 
 A second result of this chapter is that the hypothesis, which maintains that the 
performative transmission channel matters more in immature policy subsystems, is 
validated to some extent. Looking back at sections 2 and 3, one can assert that socio-
technical instruments like taxonomies received more attention than abstract debates 
about e.g. financial materiality vs. ESG impact. Importantly, debates and socio-





to occur through the black-boxing of an idea in a socio-technical instrument and not 
by debate-winners delegating the implementation of their views.  
 Table 6.3 details the socio-technical instruments. Apart from the instrument 
(column 1) and the frames (column 2), their ‘end-uses’, i.e. their implementation in 
the financial system (column 3), are listed. The table reveals that the risks and 
opportunities frame had an impact on the development of all the instruments that were 
discussed in section 3 with the exception of system performance metrics, which have 
been developed by actors from the critical frame. The delineation and determination 
of risk factors has been one of the central preoccupations of this frame.  
 The SRI frame is still reflected in some ESG metrics that are used by SR 
investors as well as by larger financial institutions. Depending on their approach to 
sustainable finance, the latter use these metrics either for risk assessments or for ESG 
data shopping. Taxonomies highlight the impacts of financial instruments and are 
associated with the climate finance frame. Importantly, the centrality of the EU’s green 
taxonomy has meant that the proponents of the risks and opportunities frame have also 
become interested in taxonomies. This, in turn, has led to conflicts about the design 
and function of these socio-technical instruments. Lastly, the need for long-term 
projections on risk as well as systemic risk considerations have motivated the 
development and sophistication of different types of scenarios. Regulators and central 
bankers push for the uptake of these techniques since they are particularly interested 
in learning about future threats to financial stability. On the other hand, their interest 
in the more political metrics that focus on performance of the financial system has so 
far been muted.  
 The end-use of the instruments co-varies with the frames to a certain extent. 





management, the critical system output measures seek to inform regulation. ESG 
metrics as well as taxonomies can be used for the labelling of assets and funds and 
hence for decisions on where to invest and divest. Depending on the operationalisation, 
this can be of interest for SR investors and development banks as well as for financial 
institutions that start from a risk-based understanding. Risk factors matter for the day-
to-day management of financial institutions as well as for regulatory interventions. 
Scenarios inform regulators about future developments. However, they can also be 
used by financial institutions that base strategic decisions on them or by watchdog 
CSOs that want to assess the compliance of banks with e.g. the below 2° target.  
Socio-technical 
Instrument  
Frames End-use of Socio-technical 
Instrument 
ESG metrics  SRI,  
Risks and opportunities 
Labels, specialised assets and 
funds 
Risk factors  Risks and opportunities Portfolio management and 
investment decision making, 
capital requirements  
Taxonomies  Climate Finance Labels, benchmarks, capital 
requirements, specialised 
assets and funds 
Scenarios  Risks and opportunities Inform long-term strategies of 
investment, regulatory or 
voluntary compliance with 
alignment objectives 
System performance  Critical Inform regulatory changes, 
help supervisors and broader 
public to assess state of 
finance 







In this chapter I examined the debate positions and socio-technical instruments in the 
policy subsystem of sustainable finance. Subsequently, I checked whether differences 
in debate positions and the design of socio-technical instruments are structured by 
academic paradigms and frames. I found that in the case of debate positions a 
separation along frames could only partially be observed since most debates are 
dominated by the risks and opportunities frame. This means that different 
interpretations or temporal variations of this frame feature on either side of the debate. 
Notably, one debate position (transformative finance vs. real economy focus) was 
more structured according to differences in academic paradigms. This might be an 
indication that in institutional locations that are closer to academia (e.g. central banks) 
the translation from academic paradigms to frames is skipped.  
 As to the socio-technical instruments, the increasing dominance of the risks 
and opportunities frame resulted in a challenge of ESG metrics that had been 
consolidated during the period when the SRI frame represented sustainable finance. 
These re-purposed metrics also served as indicators for the stabilisation of risk factors. 
The application of the risks and opportunities frame to taxonomies, which had been 
pioneered by actors from the climate finance frame, has led to some tensions. 
Meanwhile, the development of system performance measures integrates well with the 
critical frame and the evolutionary systems paradigm.  
 In the final section of this chapter, I explored the hypothesis that performative 
transmission channels are a more powerful route for ideas in immature policy 
subsystems. I outlined that this would be the case, because in a policy subsystem with 
relatively few actors, discussions would be settled at the technical level rather than in 





I found some support for this hypothesis. This notwithstanding, only comparative 
research can determine whether variations in maturity and size of policy subsystems 

























7. Conclusion: Ideas Matter but so Does the Context of Their 
Transmission 
 
It’s not easy being green 
Kermit the frog.219 
 
The above quote from the muppets character is sometimes invoked by members of the 
sustainable finance community to convey that the conflicting definitions, metrics and 
practices make the topic a muddled and complex affair. A similar statement could be 
made about this thesis. If we were to ask whether the results of the thesis lend support 
to the often quoted Keynes phrase that asserts that the world is ruled by little else than 
the ideas of economists, the answer would most likely be no. On the other hand, if we 
were to slightly reformulate the main research question of this thesis and asked 
whether economic ideas influenced the evolution of sustainable finance, the answer 
would be affirmative.  
 This seemingly paradoxical situation arises because the transmission from 
academic paradigms to policy paradigms that has been explored in the above chapters 
is not as straightforward as a linear understanding of ideational influence would 
suggest. When ideas travel from academic contexts to the knowledge production 
within a policy subsystem and then to the implementation by institutions or socio-
technical instruments, they are modified, disputed and reassembled in the process. This 
does not mean that the incorporation of one rather than another idea is arbitrary and 
without consequences. Ideas that are derived from an academic paradigm retain their 
 





meaning and their adoption has political ramifications. Nevertheless, their 
modifications – e.g. into frames in this thesis – as well as their interactions with the 
context – e.g. legacies of material infrastructures in the case of socio-technical 
instruments – must be acknowledged.  
 This complex understanding of ideational influence has theoretical 
implications for constructivist IPE and the study of policy paradigms. On the other 
hand, the approach taken in this thesis has also some limitations. These relate both to 
the in-depth understanding of ideational influence as well as to establishing the 
significance of ideational factors for environmental politics. The limitations, in turn, 
give rise to potential future research questions. The same applies to some of the 
empirical material that could not be explored further in this thesis. Lastly, as 
sustainable finance is still a ‘hot topic’, there are also some practical implications that 
can be derived from the material in this thesis.   
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications and Limitations  
Two of the main preoccupations of this thesis were, first, to provide an explicit 
transmission mechanism for policy paradigms and, second, to apply this mechanism 
to a case of evolution. The first was addressed by mapping how ideas from academic 
paradigms are related to framing exercises by the actors within the policy subsystem. 
Subsequently, I explored how frames and, to a lesser extent, academic paradigms, 
provide the input for the persuasive and performative processes.  
 The theoretical implications of this approach and the findings of this thesis are 
that ideational explanations benefit from an explicit understanding of 1) the meaning 
of ideas in an academic context, 2) the translation of these ideas to policy subsystems 





were addressed by the concepts of academic paradigms, frames and debates/socio-
technical instruments respectively. While I do not suggest that ideational scholars 
should adopt the same concepts and transmission mechanism, I argue that answering 
the questions of which ideas matter how and where will bring greater clarity. 
Addressing these issues upfront might also guard researchers from taking shortcuts 
such as taking the presence of an idea in a policy document as proof of its relevance. 
Another benefit of being explicit about these issues is that it helps researchers to avoid 
the problem of using concepts like paradigms in an unspecified way.  
 An example of why answering these questions matters can be found when 
looking at the risks and opportunities frame. On the one hand, this frame is connected 
to modern financial theory. This academic paradigm has historically evolved from 
neoclassical economics, which, in turn, has been associated with the neoliberal policy 
paradigm. However, a closer look cautions against such a premature attribution. As 
outlined in chapters 4 and 6, there are significant differences in the implementation of 
this framing. Risks and opportunities discourse can be mobilised to argue for better 
risk management of material financial risks on the level of the financial institution. It 
can, however, also be utilised by central banks and regulators, which worry about the 
systemic implications of unhedgeable risks like climate change and, consequently, will 
become more interventionist. In this case, it is not only ideas from modern finance 
theory that matter but increasingly also those from the evolutionary systems paradigm. 
Furthermore, depending on the twist one gives to the frame, it can support either 
engagement (risk management) or divestment (risk minimisation).  
 While there are some variations in the debate positions and socio-technical 
instruments that are associated with the risks and opportunities frame, the malleability 





the SRI frame as well as the idiosyncratic ESG measures to whose rise it contributed 
are an anathema to the most sanguine promoters of the risks and opportunities frame 
(the true believers). Likewise, taxonomies that highlight the contributions of financial 
instruments to non-financial categories are not particularly well received by those 
inside the risks and opportunities frame.   
 The point I want to convey here is that ideas from academic paradigms are not 
translated mechanically. Their significance depends on the actors that take them up 
and on the relation of these actors to other ideas. In the case of socio-technical 
instruments, ideas also need to integrate with material factors like the availability of 
data and resources. This might further constrain or change them. On the other hand, 
the agency of actors in the policy subsystem is also not total. Neither are the material 
constraints of socio-technical instrument construction. There are still limits to what an 
idea from a particular academic paradigm can be used for.  At the very least, it will be 
cumbersome, costly and time-intensive to connect ideas that are thought to be in 
contradiction in the academic context. This means that there is still value in studying 
the differences between academic paradigms and analysing how these play out in a 
policy subsystem.  
 Keeping in mind that this complex understanding of how ideas matter comes 
from observing a case of evolution rather than of crisis brings me to the second issue 
major issue of the thesis. One question that arises in this context is how generalisable 
those observations are. In other words, are they only valid for sustainable finance, for 
finance in general or for evolutionary cases in general? As this thesis studies only one 
case, any statements about generalisability are speculative. This notwithstanding, there 
might be some promise in exploring the hypothesis that ideational transmission 





understanding might be able to resolve some of the inconsistencies that research on 
policy paradigms that emphasises the sequencing of paradigm change has run into (cf. 
Blyth 2013a; Baker 2015; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  
 The dynamics of paradigm change, evolution and crisis that were explored in 
this thesis might also provide some clues for understanding the ongoing COVID 19 
pandemic. While the multiple contingencies of the situation make such links 
completely hypothetical, applying some of the theoretical apparatus that was discussed 
in this thesis might, nonetheless, lead to some insights. For instance, the almost 
unprecedented rupture of economic activity across geographies has led to some early 
assessments, which treat the pandemic as a turning point that leads to a shift of the 
economic paradigm. The thesis’ elaboration of how paradigm shifts occur might 
inspire research questions that clarify the dynamics that are currently happening. For 
instance, in light of the fast-moving nature of the crisis, looking at persuasive processes 
might be a good starting point. On the other hand, the (re-)design of socio-technical 
instruments that are mobilised as response  to the crisis might lead to insights about 
longer term developments. Moreover, linking the arguments and plans for (policy) 
paradigm change back to academic paradigms can help to determine the fundamental 
differences between agendas.   
 Beyond addressing questions of crises and paradigm change, the thesis also has 
implications for students of environmental politics. Understanding the variegated 
nature of the policy subsystem of sustainable finance provides a starting point for 
analyses that query the impacts of ideas on environmental and socio-economic 
systems. However, the approach taken here can only make limited statements on this 
issue. Kern et al.  (2014: 524) note that while the concepts of paradigm and paradigm 





policy goals and policy (in my case socio-technical) instruments, they are less well-
equipped to understand how those changes manifest themselves.  
 In this thesis, I have addressed this limitation to a certain extent by outlining 
how socio-technical instruments and debate positions might influence the shape and 
direction of the financial system. Importantly, there is still an additional layer in 
finding out how such a potential transformation relates to changes in the environment. 
As evidenced by the transformative finance vs. real economy focus debate, this 
question is also a concern for the members of the expert community themselves.  
 A final limitation is the question of boundary specification that was addressed 
in chapter 3. This thesis defined the policy subsystem of sustainable finance by using 
delineation techniques from network analysis. However, in a fast-evolving system, 
actors might be overlooked, despite efforts to be inclusive. In addition, access 
problems as well as geographical biases might have led to misrepresentations. Finally, 
if one asks a research question that is distinct from the one addressed in this thesis, one 
might define sustainable finance in a divergent way.  
 
7.2 Future Research 
Both the theoretical contributions and the limitations suggest avenues for future 
research. The question of whether the ideational transmission mechanism that was 
observed in this thesis is idiosyncratic to sustainable finance or whether it can be 
applied to other cases is a first possible question. In light of the relative paucity of 
evolutionary cases of ideational transmission, a first step might be to check if similar 
dynamics can be seen in other evolutionary cases in finance. An example of such a 
case could be the insertion of new technologies into finance or so called FinTech. Like 





of a visible paradigm shift, in which incumbents and challengers display disagreements 
about fundamentals. Instead, financial institutions, regulators and policymakers seem 
to be all in broad agreement that FinTech is something worth exploring. An ideational 
approach might be able to uncover underlying tensions and differences and check to 
what extent these are related to academic paradigms or frames.  
 A second research design that could emerge from the findings of this thesis is 
of a comparative nature. Accordingly, evolutionary cases could be compared to crisis 
cases. A second dimension could be introduced by separating between finance and 
non-finance cases. This would result in a 2x2 matrix which explores how the 
evolutionary/crisis and the finance/non-finance dichotomies are related to different 
channels of ideational transmission. A variation of such a research design could use 
the concept of policy subsystem and relate its characteristics to the transmission of 
ideas. In this thesis, I suggested that immature policy subsystems with small actor 
populations are more prone to performative dynamics. On the other hand, as suggested 
by the literature on paradigm shifts in macroeconomic policy, mature policy 
subsystems with stable and large actor populations can be expected to be more 
susceptible to persuasive dynamics.  
 To study a case that is similar to the one explored in this thesis in all aspects 
but the maturity of the policy subsystem, one might actually not have to look farther 
than sustainable finance itself. If the increasing institutionalisation that was observed 
in the last period is not interrupted, the future of sustainable finance might be 
characterised by dynamics that are different from the ones observed. It is even possible 
to imagine that after an initial institutionalisation, sustainable finance could be 
subjected to a paradigm shift that follows the processes that are described by Hall and 





challenge from outside once they have been convinced that the dominant risks and 
opportunities framing cannot accomodate their interests and ideas.  
 Next to the questions that relate to constructivist IPE, many of the issues that 
were explored above offer a starting point to further our understanding of how the 
(re)organisation of finance influences the relations between capitalism and the 
environment. Future research that applies different strategies and methods could check 
in detail how the victory of one debate position or the adoption of one type of socio-
technical instrument influences both the financial system and the environment. In this 
context, some potential questions could be: What are the outcomes of either divestment 
or engagement? How – if at all – do financial products that are aligned with a taxonomy 
(e.g. green bonds) or a transition scenario (e.g. green ETFs) affect the environment? 
Does the definition and measurement of climate-related risks enable or preclude 
regulatory interventions? 
 These and other questions are not new and are, indeed, addressed by the actors 
that were studied in this thesis. Financial institutions, IOs, central banks, CSOs and 
academic economists are pondering these issues. Nonetheless, there is value in 
assessing such questions from a perspective that uncovers the political characteristics 
of such seemingly technical matters. Against the background of this thesis, I would 
argue that a research strategy that combines insights from environmental politics, IPE 
and STS has great potential here. More concretely, the emerging research on financial 
infrastructures offers a promising avenue for this kind of analysis (cf. Braun 2014; 
Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019).  
 Another possible direction for future research could be to assess national 
variations in sustainable finance. In the thesis, I observed that governments and 





Europe, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have taken the lead, whereas 
other countries seem to remain in a ‘wait and see’ position. Comparative research 
could help to understand those divergences by looking, for example, at the structure of 
the respective national financial sectors or at political and regulatory systems more 
generally. This would provide a possible touching point between the study of 
sustainable finance and the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
 
7.3 Practical Implications 
I started this thesis by pointing out that the salience of sustainable finance has grown 
considerably in recent years. At the time of writing, it appears that it would be still too 
early to assert that a consolidation and institutionalisation of the issue has taken place. 
While actors like FSB TCFD and the EU aim to establish standards, there are also 
alternatives competing in the same space. Moreover, despite the efforts of the NGFS 
to coordinate the regulatory responses to sustainable finance, divergences are present 
in the regulatory community and might accentuate themselves further in the future.  
 This lack of consolidation notwithstanding, it increasingly appears that 
sustainable finance is here to stay. This comes in spite of the scepticism of hard-nosed 
financiers and sceptical environmentalists alike, both of whom deem it to be nothing 
but a temporal fad. Furthermore, initial observations in the COVID 19 pandemic seem 
to suggest that the promoters of sustainable finance have had so far more success in 
arguing that the crisis shows the true value of sustainable businesses as opposed to 
those that want to use the current situation to abandon the sustainable finance agenda 
and go back to business as usual.220 The scale and the multiple contingencies of the 
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ongoing pandemic mean, however, that conjectures, which are based on such initial 
observations, remain highly speculative.  
 Such contingencies notwithstanding, it remains nevertheless important to 
understand the implications of the real possibility of a continuation and expansion of 
sustainable finance for the environment. The fact that sustainable finance has 
established itself in the financial system and may continue its institutionalisation does 
not necessarily mean that it will make any meaningful contributions to environmental 
sustainability. It, however, means that questions of why whatever version of 
sustainable finance fails to do so can no longer be brushed aside a priori by declaring 
that it means nothing but a change in name.  
 Because an argument can be made that there is some real change in finance 
through sustainable finance, it is worth exploring how these changes may or may not 
affect environmental outcomes. Some of the results of this thesis can help with that 
task. First, the observation that multi-actor coalitions comprising private, public and 
civil society representatives come together to advance their conception of the topic 
reiterates a point that was earlier made by authors like Newell and Paterson (Newell 
and Paterson 2010; Newell 2019). To assess whether finance-related responses to the 
climate and environmental crises are mere greenwashing or should be taken seriously, 
relying on categories like private-public-civil society is no longer sufficient. Some 
private financial institutions (think the true believers in the risks and opportunities 
frame) have arguably thrown their weight behind a strategy that abandons the links 
with the fossil fuels-based economy. So have some of the regulators. Other private 
financial institutions, meanwhile, have only changed their wording or at best try to 
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capture an additional niche of sustainable investment without abandoning their 
traditional business. Again, the same could be said for some of the regulators.  
 The argument that arises from this assessment is that one must probably pay 
more attention to the implementation than to the types of actors that are involved. This 
brings me to my second point. This thesis suggested that the design and adoption of 
socio-technical instruments matters greatly for sustainable finance. Depending on the 
specification of taxonomies, transition scenarios and risk factors either trillions of 
dollars, euros, yen etc. or next to nothing might be re-allocated. The central position 
of these instruments means that the designers and users of these instruments as well as 
policymakers should be aware of the ideas and interests that might be black-boxed in 
them. As the connection between socio-technical instruments and frames has 
illustrated, the latter might carry some path dependency in them that should be 
reflected. This is not to argue that socio-technical instruments should not be developed 
or that there should be a constant politicisation about them. For something like 
sustainable finance to function, a degree of standardisation and technocracy appears to 
be necessary. Nonetheless, questions pertaining to the transparency of the design of 
such instruments as well as to who has control over them once they are operational 
and by which processes they can be changed and updated are worth asking. Here, 
academic research has a role to play. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this thesis I sketched a transmission mechanism between the ideas of academic 
paradigms and the governance of sustainable finance. I found that traditional 
conceptualisations of finance in terms of risks and opportunities have been the 





Nevertheless, this dominance is not unchallenged as ideas that are closer related to 
academic paradigms like ecological economics and evolutionary systems perspectives 
have influenced the thinking and framing of actors. In an evolutionary case of 
ideational transmission like sustainable finance, the implications of either of these 
ideas is ultimately mediated by the modalities of the transmission. The incorporation 
of ideas into socio-technical instruments has turned out to be a potent transmission 
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Appendix A: Interviews 
1) Interviewees allowed for attribution to their names 
Jeremy McDaniels, Senior Researcher, UNEP Inquiry, Geneva: July 3rd, 2018 
Remco Fischer, Project Officer, UNEP FI , Geneva: July 20th, 2018 
Jakob Thomä Research Director, 2 degrees investing initiative, Phone interview: 
September 29th, 2018. (Interview in German language).  
Franiska Schütze, Economist, Global Climate Forum, Phone interview: October 
10th, 2018. (Interview in German language) 
Nina Lazic, Advocacy and Research Officer, Finance Watch, Brussles: October 
24th, 2018 
Lola Guiffes, Research Fellow, I4CE, Brussels: October 29th, 2018 
Emanuele Campiglio, Researcher, WU Vienna, Phone interview: October 31st, 2018 
Cillian Lohan, Rapporteur, EESC , CEO, Green Economy Foundation, Brussels: 
November 28th, 2018 
Annika Cayrol Research Coordinator, Financité, Brussels: November 30th, 2018 
 
2) Interviewees requested anonymity 
Board Member, SRI Association, Europe, Phone interview: September 26th, 2017, 
physical meeting: Berlin: September 21st, 2018. 
Former central bank official, Western Europe, Phone interview: December 5th, 
2018 
Co-founder, Sustainability Consultancy, Germany, Phone interview: October 3rd, 
2018 
NGO staff, UK, Phone interview: December 17th, 2018 
Member of the European Parliament, Brussels: December 18th, 2018 
I 17 (confidential), Phone interview:  January 8th, 2019.221 
Economist, Environmental Agency, Western Europe, Phone Interview: January 
24th, 2019. 
NGO staff, climate finance, North America, Phone interview: February 17th, 2019 
Asset management, Western Europe (1), Phone interview: January 31st, 2019 
Asset management, Western Europe (2), Phone interview: February 2nd, 2019. 
Asset management, North America, Phone interview: January 24th, 2019 
European Commission official, Brussels, March 19th, 2019. 
Researcher, Sustainability Agency, Phone interview , January 14th, 2018. 
Staff, Social Banking, Phone interview, July 25th, 2018. 
Staff, Regulatory Authority, Europe, Phone interview, March 6th, 2019. 
 





Appendix B: Network analysis: Concepts and measures 
 
1) Network notation in matrices and edge lists 
One-mode networks are recorded in adjacency matrices of size n*n (n rows and n 
columns). If a link is present between two nodes, the cell that intersects the row of 
node I with the column of node J has a value of 1 in unweighted networks and a value 
corresponding to the tie strength in weighted networks. If there is no link, the cell takes 
a value of 0. Finally, unweighted networks are symmetric as the value of the row of 
node I intersecting the column of node J is the same as the one in the cell, where the 
column of node J intersects with the row of node I. Directed networks, on the other 
hand record different values in the upper and lower part of the diagonal (which 
represents self-links of nodes).  
In figure 1, I provide an example of a directed, unweighted network of 10 
nodes. Table 1 presents the corresponding adjacency matrix of 10 rows and 10 
columns. As can be observed both in the graph and the matrix, node one has 6 
incoming links (the column of node 1) but zero outgoing links (the row of node 1). 
Finally, table 2 presents an alternative notation for networks: a so called edge list. An 
edge list consists of two columns, where the first column records the nodes from which 
the links are outgoing, and the second column records the nodes that receive the links. 
Since edge lists are much less demanding for data entry than matrices, but can easily 
be converted to matrices, I used this format for constructing the co-publication 
networks.  











   [,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] [,7] [,8] [,9] [,10] 
 [1,]    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [2,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [3,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [4,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [5,]    0    0    1    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [6,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [7,]    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0     0 
 [8,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 [9,]    0    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0     0 
[10,]    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0     0 
 
        [,1]  [,2] 
 [1,]    2    1 
 [2,]    3    1 
 [3,]    4    1 
 [4,]    5    3 
 [5,]    6    1 
 [6,]    7    6 
 [7,]    8    1 
 [8,]    9    7 
 [9,]   10    1 
Table 2. Edgelist of the hypothetical network 
 
Two mode networks, on the other hand, are recorded in affiliation matrices (or 
alternatively edge lists). Here the rows signify one type of node, whereas the columns 
represent the other type of node. The network in figure 2 and its corresponding matrix 
(table 3) is taken from the classical “Southern Women Study” from 1941. Here the 
nodes in the rows are women of a community in the South of the US, while the nodes 
in the rows are society events attended by the women. Looking at the left side of the 
graph and the first row of the matrix one can observe that Evelyn attended event 1 on 
June 27, which is visualised by a link in figure 2 and by an entry equal to 1 in the 
corresponding cell in the matrix.  






Figure 2. Network from Southern Women Dataset. Representation from Newman 2010 
 
 








2) Converting two-mode to one-mode networks through matrix 
multiplication  
To transform a two-mode affiliation matrix to a one-mode adjacency matrix, the 
affiliation matrix has to be multiplied with its transpose. The transpose AT is defined 
as the matrix where the columns and the rows of the matrix A are switched. Thus, if A 
is a matrix of n columns and m rows, AT is a matrix of m rows and n columns. Table 
4 is a partial representation of the transpose matrix of the “Southern Women Network” 
from figure 2 and table 3. As can be seen the rows and columns are switched with the 
events now being the rows, while the women are in the columns.  
 
## X__1 Evelyn Laura Theresa Brenda Charlotte Frances Eleanor Pearl Ruth 
## E1        1     1       0      1         0       0       0     0    0 
## E2        1     1       1      0         0       0       0     0    0 
## E3        1     1       1      1         1       1       0     0    0 
## E4        1     0       1      1         1       0       0     0    0 
## E5        1     1       1      1         1       1       1     0    1 
## E6        1     1       1      1         0       1       1     1    0 
## E7        0     1       1      1         1       0       1     0    1 
## E8        1     1       1      1         0       1       1     1    1 
## E9        1     0       1      0         0       0       0     1    1 
## E10       0     0       0      0         0       0       0     0    0 
## E11       0     0       0      0         0       0       0     0    0 
## E12       0     0       0      0         0       0       0     0    0 
## E13       0     0       0      0         0       0       0     0    0 
## E14        0      0             0           0                 0             0             0         0        0 
To convert an affiliation matrix into an adjacency matrix it has to be multiplied 
with its transpose. In the above example this would mean that that 18*14 matrix of the 
Southern Women matrix is multiplied with its 14*18 transpose. This then results in an 
18*18 matrix, in which the women are connected via joint attendance or, alternatively, 
in a 14*14 matrix, which links events via joint attendees.  
The product of a matrix multiplication is obtained by taking the sum of the 
“term-by-term” multiplied entries of the rows of a matrix A with the columns of a 
matrix B. If we multiply table 3 with table 4, the first row of the new 18*18 adjacency 
matrix would look like this:  
##           Evelyn Laura Theresa Brenda Charlotte Frances Eleanor Pearl Ruth 
## Evelyn     8        6          7          6            3          4            3        3      3 
 
Table 4. Transposed Affiliation Matrix from Southern Women Dataset (only columns 1-9 out of 18). 
(own calculations) 
Table 5. First row of the product of the affiliation matrix of the Southern Women Dataset and its 





The first cell that connects Evelyn with Evelyn is not very informative about 
her connections, but only informs us that she attended 8 events.222 The other cells, 
however, record the number of events that Evelyn co-attended with the person listed 
in the column. As can be verified by looking at the joint entries of “1” in table 2 Evelyn 
and Laura attended 6 events together (E1, E2, E3, E5, E6 and E8). The full matrix that 
results from the multiplication is thus a weighted, symmetric matrix, where the values 
of the cells represent the number of joint affiliations.  
A graphical representation of the adjacency matrix is pictured in figure 3. Here 
the number of joint attendances is indicated by the shading of the links with darker 
shaded lines representing higher number of joint attendances.  
 
Figure 3. Network from Southern Women Dataset, where attendees are linked through events 
(own representation) 
 
222 Note that with weighted affiliation matrices the square roots of the matrix and its transpose are 
multiplied. As the square root of 1 is, however, also 1, this manipulation is not necessary with 






3) Betweenness centrality: Cut-offs  
For the calculation of betweenness centrality of individual contributors that I 
subsequently used to identify interviewees, I set the maximum length of paths that 
were considered as shortest paths to 3. This is because people are in practice unaware 
of longer connections or the lengths of these connections make them unable or 
unwilling to exploit them for activities like the exchange of information (cf. Grannis 
2010: 996). 
 
4) Modularity  
Modularity is defined as the number of edges falling within groups minus the expected 
number in an equivalent network with edges placed at random. Modularity can either 
be positive or negative. Positive scores indicate the presence of a strong community 
structure of a graph, whereas negative values point to the absence of such a structure. 
(Newman 2006: 8578). 
In formal terms modularity is expressed by the equation:  
Q = Aij – kikj/2m   
Where Q is modularity, Aij represents the number of edges between nodes i and 
j recorded in the adjacency matrix A.  kikj/2m represents the expected number of edges 
between node i and j, which is defined as the product of the two nodes degrees divided 
by the total number of possible edges in the graph. The implementation of a 
community detection algorithm will then record the partitions of the nodes into 
different communities and select the highest modularity by checking the eigenvector 
that is associated with each partition (Newman 2006: 8579).  
 
5) Girvan-Newman Algorithm 
The algorithm detects communities by subsequently removing the EDGE with the 
greatest betweenness score, thus disconnecting the network step by step. The 
algorithm converges when the Modularity score of the network as a whole is highest. 
Modularity measures in broad terms how far the network community structure is 












Appendix C: Data collection and representation of network analysis, edge weights 
and additional analysis  
 
1) Data for co-publication networks 
Below I list in alphabetical order the 242 organisations that I collected through the 
mapping of “elite networks” and the distribution of the 891 documents that I 
eventually obtained from 152 of them (i.e. the non-zero entries below).  
The identification of actors and documents was carried out according to this 
protocol from June 12th, 2017:  
 
1. Identification of network actors: 
1.1 mentioned in literature on sustainable finance, IPE and environment 
1.2 mentioned at conferences on the topic or in talk with scholars at conferences  
2.3 snowballing of the above 
 
2. Information on sustainable finance 
2.1 check website 'about us' for general description 
2.2 check if sustainable finance, climate finance, sustainability, climate change, 
CMU, alternative economic thinking is a topic or theme on the website 
If so go to 2.2.1 
2.2.1 check on website description as well as flagship publications or strategy 
documents, which are assumed to reflect the dominant frame  
2.2.2. download relevant publications available online 
if not go to 2.2.3 
2.2.3. search publication database for these keywords 
2.2.4 download relevant publications 
 
*publications assessing the state of affairs were downloaded when sth. novel was in 
there or when a focus on the  EU was there for instance, whereas annual country or 
sector assessments were not considered  
** 'relevance' of publication was determined based on the title, the table of content 















2 Degrees Investing Initiative 34 
350.org 0 
92 Gruppen 2 
ABM-AMRO 0 
adelphi 9 
ADI, Asset Level Data Initiative 0 
AEI, American Enterprise Institute 0 
AFD, Agence Francaise de development 1 
AFME, Association for Financial Markets in Europe 0 
AIGCC, Asia Investor Group on Climate Change  2 
Allianz 3 
Allianz Global Investors 0 
ANT Financial Services 0 
API, American Petroleum Institute 1 
Asian Development Bank 0 
ASN, Algemene Spaarbank voor Nederland 2 
Aviva 15 
AXA 0 
Bank of America 0 
BankTrack 21 
Barclays 0 
Bertelsmann Foundation 1 
Beyond Ratings 0 
BIC, Bank Information Center 3 
BIS, Bank for International Setltlements 0 
BNEF's Wilderhill New Energy Global Innovation 0 
BoE, Bank of England 2 
Böll, Heinrich Böll Foundation 3 
Both ENDS Foundation (Both ENDS) 8 
Bruegel 1 
BVEK, German Emissions Trading Association  10 
Caisse d’Epargne 0 
Capital Institute 4 
Carbon Disclosure Project 12 
Carbon Market Watch 1 
Carbon Markets and Investment Association 0 
Carbon Principles 0 
Carbon Tracker 20 
Carbon Trade Watch 3 
Carbon Trust 3 





CECOEDECON, The Centre for Community Economics and Development 
Consultants Society  1 
CERES, Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 4 
CFU, Climate Funds Update (odi+ Böll foundation North America) 15 
CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research 2 
CIGI, Center for International Governance Innovation 13 
CISL, Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership   17 
Citigroup 1 
Citizens Dashboard on Finance 0 
CJA, Climate Justice Action 0 
Climate Alliance 1 
Climate Bonds Initiative 20 
Climate Change Reporting Framework 0 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board 10 
Climate Justic Now! 0 
Climate KIC 1 
Climate Smart Lending Platform 0 
Climate Transparency 1 
Climate Works Foundation 4 
Connexions Consulting 0 
CoR, Club of Rome 2 
Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) 2 
Corporate Accountability International 1 
Corporate Knights 2 
Council on Economic Policies 1 
CPI, Climate Policy Initiative 24 
Credit Agricole 1 
De Nederlandse Bank 1 
Degrowth Movement 6 
DNV GL 0 
DOLFINS, Distributed Global Financial Systems for Society (Uni Zurich) 0 
Dresdner Kleinwort 0 
Durban Group for Climate Justice 0 
E2 0 
E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism 15 
EACB, European Association of Cooperative Banks 2 
EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1 
Ecofys 0 
Ecologic Institute 4 
EcoSecurities 0 
ecovadis 1 
EDF, Environmental Defense Fund 1 
Edison Electric Institute 0 
EIB, European Investment Bank 2 
Emissions Marketing Association 1 
Ende Gelände 0 





Equator Principles 2 
ESD, Energy for Sustainable Development 0 
ESRB, European Systemic Risk Board 1 
European Commission High Level Expert group on sustainable finance 2 
European Responsible Investment Network 1 
eurosif 9 
EY, Ernest and Young 3 
F3 Life 0 
FARN, Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 0 
FGW, Research Institute for Societal Development 2 
Finance in Motion 3 
Finance Innovation Lab 2 
Finance Watch 7 
FNG, Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen 11 
FONERWA, Rwanda's Green Fund  1 
Friends of the Earth 8 
FSB-TCFD, Financial Stability Board Task Force on Climate Related Financial 
Disclosures 5 
FTSE4Good 0 
G20 Green Finance Study Group 6 
GABV, Global Alliance for Banking on Values  0 
GEI, Green Economics Institute 0 
Germanwatch 3 
GHG Protocol 0 
GHUB, Beijing Greenovation Hub for Public Welfare Development 3 
GIC, Global Investor Collaboration on Climate Change 1 
Global Climate Action 2 
Global Climate Coalition 0 
Global Climate Forum 14 
Global Commons Institute 2 
Global Compact 0 
Global Ethics Institute 0 
Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance 3 
Global Trade Watch 0 
Gold Standard 2 
Green Alliance 2 
Green Bonds Principles 1 
Green Climate Fund 0 
Green Economy Coalition 1 
Green finance taskforce (UK) 1 
Greenpeace 4 
GRI, Global Reporting Initiative 1 
HBS, Hans Böckler Foundation 3 
Henderson Global Investors 0 
Heritage Foundation 0 
HSBC, Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Holdings PLC 2 





IABD, Interamerican Development Bank 2 
IASB, International Accounting and Standards Board 1 
ICCR, Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility 4 
IceCap 0 
IDEA Carbon 0 
IEA, International Energy Agency 4 
IETA, International Emissions Trading Association 19 
IFC, International Finance Corporation 5 
IGCC, Investor Group on Climate Change 5 
IIF, Institute for International Finance 0 
IIGCC, Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change 26 
IMF,International Monetary Fund 2 
INET, Institute for New Economic Thinking 5 
Inrate 0 
Institut für nachhaltige Kapitalanlagen 6 
International Development Finance Club 0 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 4 
International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Co (IPEEC) 4 
Investor Environmental Health Network 0 
IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2 
IRENA, International Renewable Energy Agency  1 
Islamic Development Bank 1 
JP Morgan Chase 1 
Kepler Chevreux 2 
KfW, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 1 
Lisbon Council 0 
London Mining Network 0 
MCII, Munich Climate Insurance Initiative 12 
McKinsey & Company 3 
Mercer 1 
Mirova 22 
Morgan Stanley 0 
MSCI World ESG Index 0 
Munich RE 1 
Natural Capital Finance Alliance 1 
NatureVest 3 
NCE, New Climate Economy 3 
Nedbank 1 
nef, New Economics Foundation 15 
Network for Sustainable Financial Markets 0 
Netzwerk Plurale Ökonomik 0 
New Economy Coalition 0 
New Rules for Global Finance 1 
NRDC, National Resources Defense Council  2 
ÖBU, Swiss Association for Environmentally Conscious Management  1 
odi, overseas development institute 2 






OSS, Observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel  0 
Oxfam International 4 
Partners for New Economy 0 
PDC, Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition  0 
Pew Research Center 0 
Pictet 0 
PIK, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 0 
Point Carbon 0 
Portfolio Carbon Initiative 0 
Positive Money 3 
PRI, Principles for Responsible Investment 3 
Profundo 0 
PwC, Price Waterhouse Coopers 1 
Rabobank 0 
RAN, Rainforest Action Network 5 
RBS, Royal Bank of Scotland 0 
RE, Rethinking Economics 0 
REC, Responsible Endowments Coalition 5 
REEEP, Renewable energy and energy efficiency partnership 4 
REN21, Renewable Energy Network 0 
Root Capital 6 
Sandbag 3 
SCF, UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 4 
SGS 0 
shareaction.org 14 
Sierra Club 0 
SOMO, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 3 
South Pole Group 9 
SSE, UNEP-Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative 6 
Sustainable Insurance Forum 0 
Sustainable Investment Forum 1 
Sustainalytics 1 
The 50/50 Climate Project 0 
The Climate Group 0 
The CoFirm 6 
The Lightsmith Group 0 
Trinomics 4 
Tüv Nord 0 
Tüv Süd 0 
Tyndall Center for Climate Change 6 
UNEP Inquiry into a sustainable financial System 60 
UNEP other 3 
UNEP-FI United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 87 
UN-PAGE 0 
Urgewald 1 






Utrecht University Sustainable Finance Lab 0 
Vashuda Foundation 2 
VfU, Verein für Umweltmanagement und Nachhaltigkeit in Finanzinstituten 1 
WBGU, German Advisory Council on Global Change  6 
WCC, World Council of Churches 0 
Western Fuels Association 0 
WIR, World Resources Institute 6 
World  Coal Association 0 
World Bank Protype Carbon Fund 1 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 5 
WSF, World Social Forum 0 
WU Vienna Institute for Ecological Economics 0 
Wuppertal Institute 1 
WWF, World Wildlife Fund for Nature 8 
 Total 
 891 
Additional organisations, whose 
documents were collected but are not 
part of the networks  
(SBN) Sustainable Banking Network 
Transition pathways initiative 
Carbon pricing leadership coalition 
Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance 
Global sustainable finance research 
network 
FAIRR (investor network) 


























2) Distribution of authors per text 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of authors for the texts in the co-publication network 
 
3) Periodisation of networks: Elimination of nodes and edges for visual 
representations 
Period 1998-2008: Nodes with edge weight < 2 deleted, i.e. texts that have less than 
2 shared contributors are not linked and texts without links in the new network are 
not displayed 
Original network: 61 texts  
Reduced network 44 texts 
Period 2009-2014: Nodes with edge weight < 2 deleted. Subsequently in the newly 
obtained network nodes with degree < 2 are deleted 
Original network: 247 texts 
Reduced network: 106 texts 
Period 2015-2018: Nodes with edge weight < 2 deleted. Subsequently in the newly 





extracted by deleting edges with weights < 3 and equally deleting nodes with degree 
< 7 in the newly obtained network 
Original network: 359 texts 
Reduced network: 107 texts  
Core network: 47 texts 
 
 
4) Betweenness centrality for individuals throughout the three periods 
 
Figure 5. Top 3 individuals per period in weighted betweenness centrality with cutoff 3 
Jane Wilkinson (Luxembourg Exchange), Nick Robins (UNEP Inquiry, formerly 
HSBC), Paul Clements Hunt (UNEP FI), Penny Shepherd (UKSIF), Stephanie Pfeifer 






5) Weighting Correlations 
Two different methods were applied to determine the weights of edges. In the first 
method, the conversion of two to one-mode networks results in a conversion of the 
sum of joint affiliation into the edge weight. To give an example, two texts that have 
three authors in common are linked by an edge, whose weight is equal to 3. 
Alternatively, in the second method, for documents written by up to 10 
contributors, individuals get a link of strength 1 to each other. If the document has 
more than 10 contributors, the weights of the connections between contributors get an 
increasing ‘punishment’. The number of 10 as well as the punishment function were 
obtained from Larsen and Ellersgaard (2017). The justification for taking 10 as a 
threshold is that the number lies within the lower bound of what sociologists consider 
to be maximum size of ‘sympathy groups’, within which meaningful interaction can 
take place (cf. Larsen and Ellersgaard 2017: 59). In table 6, I record the correlations 
between the betweenness centrality scores that were obtained through either method 
in the text-text networks in the three periods. This score was chosen as a test, since it 
influences the sorting through the Girvan Newman Algorithm and the interpretations 





Table 6. Betweenness centrality correlations for weighted and unweighted graphs 
 
6) Citation network 
A directed network detailing the intra-citation of the sampled documents was created 
using string search algorithms. This network consists of 409 documents and 864 
citations amongst them. Figure 6 visualises the network, whereas figure 7 details the 












Figure 7. Distribution of in-degree 
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Appendix D: Corpus analysis 
1) Differences between texts for network analysis (667) and for corpus 
analysis (635) 
In total the corpus analysis is based on 32 less texts than the network analysis. 28 of 
these missing texts could not be subjected to the corpus analysis due to ‘encoding 
issues’. This means that the conversion from pdf files to txt files, the latter of which 
are the required format for natural language processing in the quanteda package in 
the environment R, resulted in unreadable files. These conversion errors are most 
likely attributable to the use of special fonts or formatting in the pdf files. Among the 
documents that could not be converted are texts from CPI, 2° investing, and CISL.  
Furthermore, four texts from an Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) 
conference in Berlin in 2012 were removed manually from the corpus. Upon closer 
inspection these texts are scientific articles rather than policy documents or reports 
and as such do not meet the criteria for being included in the corpus. Hence, they 
should also be removed from the network analysis corpus, where they do, however, 
not play a critical role since they either isolates or at the fringes of the giant 




























































Appendix E: Transcripts of events (chronological order) 
 
EU Public Hearing: Mid-term review of the Capital Markets Union, Brussels: April 
11th, 2017. 
EU Public Hearing: Sustainable finance, Publication of the HLEG interim report, 
Brussels: July 18th, 2017. 
Finance as a response to environmental crises? Critical analysis of the 
‘economicization’ of carbon emissions and biodiversity, University of Hamburg, 
Hamburg: November 29th to December 1st 2017. 
One Planet Summit: Climate finance day, Paris: December 12th, 2017 (participation 
via live stream). 
2nd FINEXUS conference, Zurich: January 17th-18th, 2018. 
EU High-level conference: Financing sustainable growth, Brussels: March 22nd, 
2018. 
QED Forum on sustainable finance, Brussels: June 5th, 2018. 
Ökofinanz 21 (German association of sustainable investment consultants) annual 
meeting, Berlin: September 21st, 2018. 
EESC hearing: Facilitating access to climate finance for non-state actors, Brussels, 
October 29th, 2018. 
OECD 5th Forum on Green Finance and Investment, Paris: November 13th-14th, 
2018. 
Bruegel workshop: How to speed up sustainable finance?, Brussels: November 28th, 
2018. 
Change Finance Forum, Brussels: December 6th-7th, 2018. 
European Banking Federation and UNEP FI: Launch of the Principles for 
Responsible Banking, Brussels, February 5th, 2019. 
European RI conference: Setting the agenda for a just and sustainable Europe, 
Brussels: February 24th, 2019. 
European Responsible Investment Network (ERIN) conference, Brussels: February 
25th , 2019 (Chatham House rules). 
EU Public Hearing: A global approach to sustainable finance, Brussels: March 21st, 
2019. 
EESC hearing: The sustainable economy we need, Brussels: June 11th, 2019. 
EU, Technical Expert Group Stakeholder Dialogue, Brussels: June 24th, 2019 
(participation via stream).  
Global Research Alliance on Sustainable Finance and Investment (GRAFSI), 2nd 
conference, Oxford: September 4th-5th, 2019. 
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Figure 11. Periodisation of sustainable finance in the UK from Robins and McDaniels 2016 







Appendix H: R Script 
  
I implemented the analysis and visualisation of the networks in the statistical 
programme environment R using several packages like igraph that consist of a set of 
functions. Below I record the code for constructing, analysing and visualising the co-
publication networks. The data files that are imported into R are uploaded on the GEM 
STONES shared dataset and can be made available on request.  











# load data for the yearly graphs (1year, later no suffix), total graphs (cum) and 
the periods (per) 
contnet_1_year <- lapply(excel_sheets("contnet3_281119.xlsx"), 
                         read_excel, path = "contnet3_281119.xlsx") 
con_cum <- lapply(excel_sheets("contnet3_cumulative_281119.xlsx"), 
                  read_excel, path = "contnet3_cumulative_281119.xlsx") 
cont_per <- lapply(excel_sheets("contnet_3_3periods_281119.xlsx"), 
                   read_excel, path = "contnet_3_3periods_281119.xlsx") 
 
# transform the affiliation matrices to adjacency matrices and to graphs  
incidence <- lapply(contnet_1_year, xtabs, formula = ~Author_Name + 
Document_Name, sparse = T) 
incidence_cum <- lapply(con_cum, xtabs, formula = ~Author_Name + 
Document_Name, sparse = T) 
incidence_p <- lapply(cont_per, xtabs, formula = ~Author_Name + 
Document_Name, sparse = T) 
graph.two <- lapply(incidence, graph.incidence) 





graph.two_p <- lapply(incidence_p, graph.incidence) 
adj <- function(x) {sqrt(x) %*% sqrt(t(x))} 
adj.affil <- function(x) {sqrt(t(x)) %*% sqrt(x)} 
adj.ind <- lapply(incidence, adj) 
adj.affil <- lapply(incidence, adj.affil) 
adj.ind_cum <- lapply(incidence_cum, adj) 
adj.affil_cum <- lapply(incidence_cum, adj.affil) 
adj.ind_p <- lapply(incidence_p, adj) 
adj.affil_p <- lapply(incidence_p, adj.affil) 
graph.ind <- sapply(adj.ind, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag = FALSE, 
weighted = TRUE) 
graph.affil <- lapply(adj.affil, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag = FALSE, 
weighted = TRUE) 
graph.ind_cum <- lapply(adj.ind_cum, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag = 
FALSE, weighted = TRUE) 
graph.affil_cum <- lapply(adj.affil_cum, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag 
= FALSE, weighted = TRUE) 
graph.ind_p <- lapply(adj.ind_p, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag = 
FALSE, weighted = TRUE) 
graph.affil_p <- lapply(adj.affil_p, graph.adjacency, mode = "undirected", diag = 
FALSE, weighted = TRUE) 
 
# select the graphs for the three periods and the total  
two_1 <- graph.two_cum[[10]] 
two_2 <- graph.two_p[[1]] 
two_3 <- graph.two_p[[2]] 
graph.two_cum_total <- graph.two_cum[[20]] 
p1 <- graph.affil_cum[[10]] 
p2 <- graph.affil_p[[1]] 
p3 <- graph.affil_p[[2]] 
graph.affil_total <- graph.affil_cum[[20]] 
 
# calculate nodes and edges per year  
nodes_two <- lapply(graph.two, vcount) 





nodes_affil <- unlist(lapply(graph.affil, vcount)) 
edges_affil <- unlist(lapply(graph.affil, ecount)) 
 
# calculate nodes and edges per period 




















# Calculate betweeness centrality of individuals in cumulative graphs, weighted 
and with cutoff = 3 
bet_two_cum <- lapply(graph.two_cum, betweenness.estimate, weights = 
1/E(graph.two), directed = F, 
                      cutoff = 3) 
 
# calculate the cohesion of the graphs in the three periods through the  







rt <- 566/666*100 
components(p1) 
V(p1) 
r1 <- 41/61*100 
components(p2) 
V(p2) 
r2 <- 186/247*100 
components(p3) 
V(p3) 
r3 <- 281/359*100 
# for graph two  
components(graph.two_cum_total) 
V(graph.two_cum_total) 
to_t <- 5978/6295*100 
components(two_1) 
V(two_1) 
to1 <- 408/616*100 
components(two_2) 
V(two_2) 
to2 <- 1988/2201*100 
components(two_3) 
V(two_3) 
to3 <- 3803/4082*100 
 
# Apply the Girvan-Newman Algorithm to the three periods of the one mode 
graphs  
# and visualize the networks 
# delete the vertices and edges 
p1n <- delete.vertices(p1, which(degree(p1)< 2)) 
p2n <- delete.edges(p2, which(E(p2)$weight < 2)) 
p2n <- delete.vertices(p2n, which(degree(p2n)< 2)) 





p3n <- delete.vertices(p3n, which(degree(p3n)< 7)) 
p3nr <- delete.edges(p3, which(E(p3)$weight < 3)) 
p3nr <- delete.vertices(p3nr, which(degree(p3nr)< 7)) 
 
# create and visualize the graphs  
# with weights indicating proximity  
e_bet_affil_2008_yes_w <- cluster_edge_betweenness(p1n, weights = 
1/E(p1n)$weight) 
deg_affil_c_2008 <- degree(p1n) 
lab_affil_c_2008             <- V(p1n)$name 
lab_affil_c_2008[degree(p1n, mode = "in") < 15] <- NA 
pdf("period 1 with edge weights girvan.pdf") 
ggraph(p1n, layout = "with_fr") + geom_node_point(aes(size = deg_affil_c_2008, 
color = factor(membership(e_bet_affil_2008_yes_w)),  alpha = 0.25)) + 
  geom_edge_link(colour = "black", alpha = 0.05)+ 
  theme(axis.line=element_blank(),axis.text.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.text.y=element_blank(),axis.ticks=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.y=element_blank(), 
        panel.grid.minor=element_blank(),plot.background=element_blank()) +  
  guides(size = F, color = guide_legend("Communities"), alpha = F) + 
  scale_color_hue(labels = c("UNEP FI", "Carbon Trust + IIGCC", "New economics 
foundation",  "Eurosif and members",  
                             "MCII + GCF", "ÖBU (Switzerland)"))+  
  geom_node_text(aes(label = NA), size = 2, repel = T, check_overlap = T) + 
ggtitle("Text linked by copublication 1998-2008") 
dev.off() 
ebet_2008_w <- as.vector(membership(e_bet_affil_2008_yes_w)) 
names <- read.csv("deg affil 1998-2008e.csv") 
comun_2008_w <- data.frame(names$X, ebet_2008_w) 
 
# write spreadsheet sorting text names to community numbers for later manually 
assigning  





write.csv(comun_2008_w, file= "communities affil weighted 1998-
2008_281119.csv") 
e_bet_2014_yes_w <- cluster_edge_betweenness(p2n, weights = 1/E(p2n)$weight) 
deg_p2n <- degree(p2n) 
pdf("period 2 with weights girvan.pdf") 
ggraph(p2n, layout = "with_fr") + geom_node_point(aes(size = deg_p2n, color = 
factor(membership(e_bet_2014_yes_w)),  alpha = 0.1)) + 
  geom_edge_link(colour = "black", alpha = 0.05)+ 
  theme(axis.line=element_blank(),axis.text.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.text.y=element_blank(),axis.ticks=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.y=element_blank(), 
        panel.grid.minor=element_blank(),plot.background=element_blank()) +  
  guides(size = F, color = guide_legend("Communities"), alpha = F) + 
  scale_color_hue(labels = c(  "Eurosif and members",  
                               "UNEP FI, UNEP Inq, IIGCC,  
                               CPI, Uni Oxford ", 
                               "GCF", 
                               "Carbon Tracker, nef, Aviva,  
                               shareaction, generation foundation ", 
                               "CBI, E3G, HSBC", 
                               "MCII, germanwatch", 
                               "UNEP FI, Aviva, WBCSD", 
                               "CPI, E3G, NCE", 
                               "2 degrees investing, I4CE", 
                               "Böll foundation, odi, CPI, WRI", 
                               "WBGU", 
                               "IFC, SSE", 
                               "Bank Track", 
                               "Mirova", 
                               "Friends of the Earth" 





  geom_node_text(aes(label = labtest), size = 1.8, repel = T, check_overlap = T, 
alpha = F) + ggtitle("Texts linked by copublication 2009-2014") 
dev.off() 
ebet_2014_w <- as.vector(membership(e_bet_2014_yes_w)) 
names <- read.csv("deg affil 2008-2014e1.csv") 
comun_2014_w <- data.frame(names$X, ebet_2014_w) 
 
# write spreadsheet sorting text names to community numbers for later manually 
assigning  
# the organisation names in the graph 
write.csv(comun_2014_w, file= "communities affil weighted 2009-
2014_281119.csv") 
e_bet_2018_yes_w <- cluster_edge_betweenness(p3n, weights = 1/E(p3n)$weight) 
deg_p3n <- degree(p3n) 
pdf("period 3 with edge weights girvan.pdf") 
ggraph(p3n, layout = "with_fr") + geom_node_point(aes(size = deg_p3n, color = 
factor(membership(e_bet_2018_yes_w)),  alpha = 0.25)) + 
  geom_edge_link(colour = "black", alpha = 0.05)+ 
  theme(axis.line=element_blank(),axis.text.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.text.y=element_blank(),axis.ticks=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.y=element_blank(), 
        panel.grid.minor=element_blank(),plot.background=element_blank()) +  
  guides(size = F, color = guide_legend("Communities"), alpha = F) + 
  scale_color_hue(labels = c(   
    "UNEP FI, E3G, CISL", 
    "UNEP Inquiry, UNEP FI, NRDC, 
    Mercer, EIU, NCE", 
    "FSB TCFD, SSE,  
    Green Finance Taskforce (UK)",  
    "2 ° investing, UNEP Inquiry, HLEG,  
    CERES, SSE, CBI,  
    Trinomics", 





    Trinomics, WWF", 
    "CPI, Böll foundation, odi, I4CE, IRENA", 
    "I4CE, WRI, 2 ° investing,  
    CPI, germanwatch", 
    "Carbon Tracker", 
    "Co-Firm, CISL", 
    "WWF", 
    "Eurosif", 
    "UNEP Inquiry", 
    "G20 Green Finance Study Group", 
    "I4CE", 
    "NCE", 
    "UNEP Inquiry", 
    "CIGI" 
  ))+  
  geom_node_text(aes(label = NA), size = 2, repel = T, check_overlap = T) + 
ggtitle("Texts linked by copublication 2015-2018") 
dev.off() 
ebet_2018_w <- as.vector(membership(e_bet_2018_yes_w)) 
names <- read.csv("deg affil 2014-2018e1.csv") 
comun_2018_w <- data.frame(names$X, ebet_2018_w) 
 
# write spreadsheet sorting text names to community numbers for later manually 
assigning  
# the organisation names in the graph 
write.csv(comun_2018_w, file= "communities affil weighted 2014-
2018_281119.csv") 
 
# extracted core  
e_bet_2018_core_yes_w <- cluster_edge_betweenness(p3nr, weights = 
1/E(p3nr)$weight) 
deg_p3nr <- degree(p3nr) 





ggraph(p3nr, layout = "with_fr") + geom_node_point(aes(size = deg_p3nr, color = 
factor(membership(e_bet_2018_core_yes_w)),  alpha = 0.25)) + 
  geom_edge_link(colour = "black", alpha = 0.05)+ 
  theme(axis.line=element_blank(),axis.text.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.text.y=element_blank(),axis.ticks=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.y=element_blank(), 
        panel.grid.minor=element_blank(),plot.background=element_blank()) +  
  guides(size = F, color = guide_legend("Communities"), alpha = F) + 
  scale_color_hue(labels = c(   
    "UNEP Inquiry, HLEG,  
    UNEP FI, E3G, WWF, 
    Green Finance Taskforce (UK),  
    Mercer, SSE, E3G,  
    2° investing, SSE, 
    Trinomics", 
    "2° investing, UNEP FI", 
    "I4CE, UNEP Inquiry", 
    "CPI, NCE, WRI", 
    "UNEP Inquiry" 
  ))+  
  geom_node_text(aes(label = NA), size = 2, repel = T, check_overlap = T) + 
ggtitle("Core: Texts linked by copublication 2015-2018") 
dev.off() 
ebet_2018_core_w <- as.vector(membership(e_bet_2018_core_yes_w)) 
names <- read.csv("deg affil 2014-2018r.csv") 
comun_2018_core_w <- data.frame(names$X, ebet_2018_core_w) 
# write spreadsheet sorting text names to community numbers for later manually 
assigning  
# the organisation names in the graph 









2) Citation network 
Since the matching of 666 names to a corpus of over 30000 pages exceeded the 
computing power of my computer, I separated the names in 6 vectors of 100 names 
each and one vector with 66 names. Afterwards I manually created an edge list from 
the matches and carried out manual spot checks e.g. to check for encoding errors.  
 









# create corpus from .txt files 
t2 <- readtext("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation network/co/*.txt", encoding = "latin1") 
contnet_corpus2 <- corpus(t2) 
 
# tokenize  
tokcont2 <- tokens(contnet_corpus2) 
 
# names lists  
name1 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas.xlsx", sheet= 2) 
name2 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas1.xlsx", sheet=3) 
name3 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas1.xlsx", sheet=4) 
name4 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 






name5 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas1.xlsx", sheet=6) 
name6 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas.xlsx", sheet=7) 
name6_2 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas.xlsx", sheet=8) 
name7 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas.xlsx", sheet=9) 
name7_2 <- read_excel("C:/Users/Andreas/OneDrive - University of 
Warwick/phd/NETWORK texts + citation 
network/affilnames_revised_nocommas.xlsx", sheet=10) 
n100 <- name1$Names 
n200 <- name2$Names 
n300 <- name3$Names 
n400 <- name4$Names 
n500 <- name5$Names 
n600 <- name6$Names 
n600_2 <- name6_2$Names 
n643 <- name7$Names 
n643_2 <- name7_2$Names 
 
# create tokens lookups 
tok100 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n100), case_insensitive = T) 
tok200 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n200), case_insensitive = T) 
tok300 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n300), case_insensitive = T) 
tok400 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n400), case_insensitive = T) 
tok500 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n500), case_insensitive = T) 
tok600 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n600), case_insensitive = T) 
tok643 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n643), case_insensitive = T) 
tok600_2 <- tokens_select(tokcont2, phrase(n600_2), case_insensitive = T) 







## n400 and n600 too large 
# make them lists and dfs 
names_contnet <- t$doc_id 
toklist100 <- as.list(tok100) 
toklist200 <- as.list(tok200) 
toklist300 <- as.list(tok300) 
toklist400 <- as.list(tok400) 
toklist500 <- as.list(tok500) 
toklist600 <- as.list(tok600) 
toklist643 <- as.list(tok643) 
toklist600_2 <- as.list(tok600_2) 
toklist643_2 <- as.list(tok643_2) 
df100 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist100,c))) 
df100 <- data.frame(t(df100)) 
df100 <- cbind(names_contnet, df100) 
df200 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist200,c))) 
df200 <- data.frame(t(df200)) 
df200 <- cbind(names_contnet, df200) 
df300 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist300,c))) 
df300 <- data.frame(t(df300)) 
df300 <- cbind(names_contnet, df300) 
df400 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist400,c))) 
df400 <- data.frame(t(df400)) 
df400 <- cbind(names_contnet, df400) 
df500 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist500,c))) 
df500 <- data.frame(t(df500)) 
df500 <- cbind(names_contnet, df500) 
 
df600 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist600,c))) 
df600 <- data.frame(t(df600)) 





df643 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist643,c))) 
df643 <- data.frame(t(df643)) 
df643 <- cbind(names_contnet, df643) 
df600_2 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist600_2,c))) 
df600_2 <- data.frame(t(df600_2)) 
df600_2 <- cbind(names_contnet, df600_2) 
df643_2 <- data.frame(t(sapply(toklist643_2,c))) 
df643_2 <- data.frame(t(df643_2)) 
df643_2 <- cbind(names_contnet, df643_2) 
 
#  write them as csvs 
# make 2nd column into a character vector 
df100$t.df100. <- vapply(df100$t.df100., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df100, file= "df100noco.csv") 
df200$t.df200. <- vapply(df200$t.df200., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df200, file= "df200new.csv") 
df300$t.df300. <- vapply(df300$t.df300., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df300, file= "df300new.csv") 
df400$t.df400. <- vapply(df400$t.df400., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df400, file= "df400new.csv") 
df500$t.df500. <- vapply(df500$t.df500., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df500, file= "df500new.csv") 
df600$t.df600. <- vapply(df600$t.df600., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df600, file= "df600noco.csv") 
df643$t.df643. <- vapply(df643$t.df643., paste, collapse = ", ", character(1L)) 
write.csv(df643, file= "df643noco.csv") 
df600_2$t.df600_2. <- vapply(df600_2$t.df600_2., paste, collapse = ", ", 
character(1L)) 
write.csv(df600_2, file= "df600_2noco.csv") 
df643_2$t.df643_2. <- vapply(df643_2$t.df643_2., paste, collapse = ", ", 
character(1L)) 














# data  
 
cit_new <- read_excel("edgelist_citations_new_complete.xlsx") 
citnet_new <- graph.data.frame(cit_new, directed = T) 




indeg_cit_new <- degree(citnet_new, mode = "in") 
View(indeg_cit_new) 
lab_cit_new              <- V(citnet_new)$name 
lab_cit_new[degree(citnet_new, mode = "in") < 11] <- NA 
pdf("citnet new.pdf") 
ggraph(citnet_new, layout = "with_kk") + geom_node_point(aes(size = 
indeg_cit_new, color = "blue",  alpha = 0.25)) + 
  theme(axis.line=element_blank(),axis.text.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.text.y=element_blank(),axis.ticks=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.x=element_blank(), 
        axis.title.y=element_blank(), 
        panel.grid.minor=element_blank(),plot.background=element_blank()) +  
  guides(size = guide_legend("Degree"), color = F, alpha = F) +  
  geom_node_text(aes(label = lab_cit_new), size = 3, repel = T, check_overlap = T) 







3) Matching to Paradigmatic Scholars and Journals  
The same tokenized corpus as in the citation network (tokcont2) was used to look for 









# create dictionary for scholars 
parad_names2 <- list(MPT = c("Markowitz", "Arrow", "Tobin", "Sharpe", "Fischer-
Black", "Merton", "Fama", "Sharpe"), 
                     ECO = c("Daly", "Costanza", "Ayres", "Kapp", "Meadows", "Odum", 
"Schumacher", "Georgscu-Roegen", 
                             "Boulding"),  
                     ENV = c("Chris Hope", "Nordhaus", "Bosetti", "Tol", "Stern", 
"Tavoni",  "Grubb"), 
                     Schumpeter, Keynes = c("Schumpeter", "Keynes"), 
                     ENV_without_Stern = c("Chris Hope", "Nordhaus", "Bosetti", "Tol",  
"Tavoni",  "Grubb")) 
dic_para2 <- dictionary(parad_names2, tolower = F, separator = " ") 
 
# apply dictionary to the corpus and convert it to a dataframe 
tok_para2 <- tokens_lookup(tokcont2, dictionary = dic_para2, levels = 1) 
dfm_scholars <- dfm(tok_para2) 
df_scholars <- as.data.frame(dfm_scholars) 
 









non_zero_scholars <- colSums(df_scholars != 0) 
write.csv(non_zero_scholars, file = "non_zero.csv") 
 
# Store overall values in a vector and export as .csv 
scholars_cols <- df_scholars[2:6] 
scholars_sums <- colSums(scholars_cols) 
write.csv(scholars_sums, file = "scholar_sums.csv") 
 
# Manually adjust header in csv to convert from vector to  
# dataframe,  read csv files and plot overall and non-zero values  
scholars_total <- read.csv("scholar_sums1.csv") 
ggplot(scholars_total, aes(x = reorder(para, -count), y = count)) + geom_bar(stat = 
"identity", fill = "darkgrey") + xlab("Paradigm / Scholar") + 
  ylab("Occurances in Corpus (635 texts)") + theme(axis.text.x = element_text(size = 
10.5), axis.text.y = element_text(size = 12)) 
non_zero_total <- read.csv("non_zero1.csv") 
ggplot(non_zero_total, aes(x = reorder(schol, -no), y = no)) + geom_bar(stat = 
"identity", fill = "darkgrey") + xlab("Paradigm / Scholar") + 
  ylab("Occurances in Corpus (635 texts)") + theme(axis.text.x = element_text(size = 
9), axis.text.y = element_text(size = 12)) 
 
### Repeat for dictionaries with journal names from the HED, the top5 mainstram 
journals  
# and the journals mentioned in chapter 5 
dic_manual_1 <- dictionary(list(gen = c("American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology", 
                                        "Brazilian Journal of Political Economy", 
                                        "Bulletin of Political Economy", 
                                        "Cambridge Journal of Economics", 
                                        "Competition & Change", 
                                        "Contributions to Political Economy", 
                                        "Economic Systems Research", 
                                        "Economía e Sociedade", 






                                        "Forum for Social Economics", 
                                        "International Journal of Pluralism and Economics 
Education", 
                                        "International Journal of Political Economy", 
                                        "International Journal of Social Economics", 
                                        "International Review of Applied Economics", 
                                        "Journal of Australian Political Economy", 
                                        "Journal of Economic Issues", 
                                        "Journal of Heterodox Economics", 
                                        "Journal of Institutional Economics", 
                                        "Journal of Post Keynesian Economics", 
                                        "Journal of World Economy", 
                                        "Metroeconomica", 
                                        "New School Economic Review", 
                                        "Nova Economia", 
                                        "PSL Quarterly Review", 
                                        "Panoeconomicus", 
                                        "Review of Keynesian Economics", 
                                        "Review of Political Economy", 
                                        "Review of Radical Political Economics", 
                                        "Review of Social Economy", 
                                        "Régulation Review. Capitalism, Institutions, Powers", 
                                        "Socio-Economic Review", 
                                        "World Economic Review"),  
                                fem = c("Feminist Economics"), 
                                hist_met = c("Economic Thought: History, Philosophy and 
Methodology", 
                                             "Economics and Philosophy", 
                                             "Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics", 
                                             "European Journal of the History of Economic Thought", 
                                             "History of Economic Ideas", 
                                             "History of Economics Review", 





                                             "Journal of Economic Methodology", 
                                             "Journal of Philosophical Economics", 
                                             "Journal of the History of Economic Thought", 
                                             "Oeconomia"), 
                                aust = c("Advances in Austrian Economics", 
                                         "Econ Journal Watch", 
                                         "Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics", 
                                         "Review of Austrian Economics"), 
                                ecolog = c("Capitalism, Nature, Socialism", 
                                           "Economics and Policy of Energy and the Environment", 
                                           "Environmental Values", 
                                           "International Journal of Green Economics", 
                                           "Journal of Agrarian Change", 
                                           "Mother Pelican: A Journal of Solidarity and 
Sustainability", 
                                           "Organization & Environment"), 
                                eco_ec = c("Ecological Economics"), 
                                evolu = c("Innovations (Revue d’économie et de management de 
l'innovation)", 
                                          "Development and Change", 
                                          "Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review", 
                                          "Industrial and Corporate Change", 
                                          "International Journal of Development Issues", 
                                          "Journal of Development Studies", 
                                          "Journal of Evolutionary Economics", 
                                          "Journal of Innovation Economics & Management", 
                                          "Oxford Development Studies", 
                                          "Structural Change and Economic Dynamics", 
                                          "Problemas del Desarrollo"), 
                                radical = c("Alternative Routes: A Journal of Critical Social 
Research", 
                                            "Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography", 





                                            "Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory", 
                                            "Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist 
Theory", 
                                            "International Critical Thought", 
                                            "International Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist 
Theory", 
                                            "Monthly Review", 
                                            "New Left Review", 
                                            "New Political Economy", 
                                            "New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and 
Interdisciplinary Inquiry", 
                                            "Research in Political Economy", 
                                            "Rethinking Marxism", 
                                            "Review of Capital as Power", 
                                            "Science & Society", 
                                            "Studies in Political Economy", 
                                            "World Review of Political Economy"), 
                                interdis = c("Accounting, Organizations and Society", 
                                             "Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic 
Income Research", 
                                             "Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society", 
                                             "Critical Perspectives on Accounting", 
                                             "Critical Perspectives on International Business", 
                                             "Critical Sociology", 
                                             "Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern 
Europe", 
                                             "Economic Geography", 
                                             "Interdisciplinary Journal of Economics and Business 
Law", 
                                             "Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements", 
                                             "International Journal of Public Policy", 
                                             "Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines", 
                                             "Journal of Economic Geography", 
                                             "Journal of Economic and Social Policy", 





                                             "Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics", 
                                             "Journal of World-Systems Research", 
                                              
                                             "Momentum Quarterly", 
                                              
                                             "Public Policy Research", 
                                             "Review of International Political Economy", 
                                             "Social and Economic Studies", 
                                             "Thesis Eleven", 
                                             "tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique"), 
                                envi_ec = c("Environmental and Resource Economics",  
                                            "Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management"), 
                                mft = c("Journal of Finance", 
                                        "Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis", 
                                        "Journal of Business", 
                                        "Financial Analysis Journal", 
                                        "Journal of Portfolio Management", 
                                        "Journal of Banking and Finance", 
                                        "Journal of Business Finance and Accounting", 
                                        "Journal of Financial Research", 
                                        "Review of Financial Studies", 
                                        "Journal of Financial Services Research", 
                                        "Journal of Financial Education", 
                                        "Review of Future Markets", 
                                        "Journal of Financial Economics"), 
                                top_5 = c("American Economic Review", 
                                          "Econometrica", 
                                          "Review of Economic Studies", 
                                          "Journal of Political Economy", 
                                          "Quarterly Journal of Economics"))) 
 





c_manual <- tokens_lookup(tokcont2, dictionary = dic_manual_1, levels = 1) 
dfm_manual <- dfm(c_manual) 
df_manual <- as.data.frame(dfm_manual) 
 
# exclude inet texts  




man_cols <- df_man[2:13] 
man_total <- colSums(man_cols) 
View(man_total) 
 
# calculate non-zero values 




# plot non-zero values 
non_zero_j_manual <- read.csv("non_zero_journals_manual_eds.csv") 
ggplot(non_zero_j_manual, aes(x = reorder(jour, -no), y = no)) + geom_bar(stat = 
"identity", fill = "darkgrey") + xlab("Paradigm / Journal") + 
  ylab("Occurances in Corpus (635 texts)") + theme(axis.text.x = element_text(size = 
10), axis.text.y = element_text(size = 12)) 
 
# plot absolute mentions from manual journals  
para_abs <- read.csv("manual_total_eds.csv") 
para_abs <- para_abs[,-c(1)] 
para_man <- cbind( c("Heterodox","Ecological","Evolutionary","Interdisc", 
"Environmental", "Modern Finance","Top5"), para_abs) 
colnames(para_man) <- c("Paradigm", "No") 






d <- as.numeric(para_man1$No) 
f <- para_man1$Paradigm 
para_cit <- data.frame(f,d) 
 
ggplot(para_cit, aes(x = reorder(f, -d), y = d)) + geom_bar(stat = "identity", fill = 
"darkgrey") + xlab("Paradigm") + 
  ylab("Occurances in Corpus (635 texts)") + theme(axis.text.x = element_text(size = 
10.5), axis.text.y = element_text(size = 12)) 
 
 
 
 
